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Abstract 
Scotland is entering a transition period for its environment and 
economy as it decides which path to follow in meeting its energy and electric 
power needs over the coming decades. This thesis describes and evaluates 
several of the major dimensions which will contribute to those decisions and 
see welfare improvements for individuals and society in Scotland. 
Chapter One presents the current state of energy consumption in 
Scotland and provides technical details to understand the role of power 
generation. The dramatic need to plan replacement of an aging power 
infrastructure is also documented. The United Kingdom's international 
commitment to the European Union and the United Nations for reducing green 
house gas emissions and how that commitment is shared around the world is 
reviewed. Finally, Scotland is compared to several European countries on the 
basis of government policies and attainment of renewable energy deployment. 
Chapter Two describes the current policy initiative in Scotland to use 
market mechanism to incentivise the deployment of renewable power 
technologies. The operation and effectiveness of the Renewables Obligation 
(Scotland) program is described and analysed in depth. 
Chapter Three is a literature review of public perceptions, opinions and 
attitudes toward renewable energy. This chapter also presents evidence 
about the value of environmental changes that may occur with the deployment 
of renewable technologies. The environmental concerns examined are 
landscape, wildlife, and air pollution. 
Chapter Four presents a choice experiment to estimate the value of 
environmental changes and employment which may occur from renewable 
energy projects being built around Scotland. The household willingness-to- 
pay was estimated. Significant differences between urban and rural values 
were identified in regards to environmental impacts. Rural populations were 
found to value environmental impacts lower in exchange for the employment 
and economic development that would result locally from energy projects 
being built. 
Chapter Five discusses some of the controversial issues and technical 
problems with choice experiments. 
Chapter Six is a game theory model of interactions between small 
renewable energy producers and a large dominant traditional power producer. 
This chapter develops a model which better represents the actual behaviour 
and functional operating environment of the green certificate market. The 
model consists of two power producers producing an identical product 
(electricity); the dominant producer uses only brown fuels and is required to 
purchase green certificates from the fringe green firm. The model attempts to 
find the policy and market equilibrium points for two firms trading two goods in 
two markets while minimising the cost to society of a green certificate 
program. 
The final chapter presents the major findings of this thesis and 
concludes by advocating policies which would address the goal of ma)dmising 
social welfare from the deployment of renewable energy technology in 
Scotland. 
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"Sunshine is a form of energy, wind and sea currents are 
manifestations of this energy. Do we make use of them? Oh No! 
We bum forests and coal, like tenants burning down our front 
door for heating. We live like wild settlers and not as though these 
resources belong to us" 
Thomas Edison, 1916 
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3 
Introduction 
In 2003, the Government of the United Kingdom published a White 
Paper outlining the direction energy policy should pursue for the next 10 
years. The document, Our Energy Future - Creating a Low Carbon 
Economy (DTI, 2003), called for a 60% reduction In carbon dioxide 
emissions by 2050. This announcement marked the greatest 
commitment any UK government had ever given to pursuing a 
sustainable energy policy and shifting away from long established fossil 
fuel energy sources. Environmentally clean, renewable energy sources 
were identified as a vital contributor to attaining the OLow Carbon' vision. 
To emphasize the importance of renewables the allocation of an 
additional E60 million in capital grants was announced, to demonstrate 
increased support and to stimulate near-term renewable energy 
technologies (DTI, 2003). 
Scotland followed the White Papers lead with its own 
announcement, the 'aspiration" to increase electricity generated from 
renewable energy sources. A goal was set to increase green power from 
10% level of all electricity generated in 2003 and move toward a 40% 
level in 2020, With an intermediate goal of 18% by 2012 (Scottish 
Executive, 2002b). For a nation Wthout significant potential for 
developing new hydroelectric sources (BHA, 2004), Scotland's aspiration 
is one of the most ambitious in the wodd. 
The ubiquitous nature of electricity, and all the technology which 
depends on its availability, may be the defining notion of a modem 
developed economy and society. It is considered the greatest engineering 
4 
achievement of the, 20th century (NAE, 2004). The system based on 
large-scale power generation, ' large-scale transmission grids, and vast 
local distribution networks has been the dominant model used for 
delivering electricity to consumers since commercial power companies 
were started by Thomas Edison 120 years ago (IEEE, 2003). 
The proposed expansion and reliance on even greater levels of 
renewable'energy sources will challenge the fundamental structure of the 
power industry. It will require new paradigms and technologies in the 
delivery of electric energy and energy is used by society (Strbac, 2002). It 
may well require a fundamental change in how society perceives the use 
of electric power, how it is used at home and at work, and its effect on 
lifestyle values. For example, the geographically dispersed nature of wind 
will require hundreds of wind turbines located in dozens of wind farms to 
produce the same amount of energy as a single coal-fired power plant; is 
society ready to accept that landscape change for clean energy? 
The electricity transmission grid may become less important for 
long distance transmission of electric power and re- oriented to regional 
sharing, to allow for the intermittent quality of some forms of renewable 
energy; how will that change the business practices for energy firms? 
Local communities may have the opportunity to provide their own electric 
power by owning and operating renewable energy projects; how will that 
effect rural development and community political empowerment? 
Industries which consume large quantities of power may have to 
adapt traditional operation practices to new standards, like scheduling 
5 
production to match electric power availability Instead of power being 
available upon demand, i. e., shifting from day to night-time operations. -, - 
Global Climate Change 
The principle motive for renewable energy development in the 
United Kingdom is a growing concern about the effect of green house 
gases (GHG) which are being emitted into the atmosphere (DTI. 2003). 
This concern is global (UN, 2003) and concentrates on climate changes 
which will harm human populations and the ecosystems which people 
depend upon. Electric power production is the single largest source of 
GHG emissions in Scotland (Scottish Executive, 2002a) and the second 
largest source in the world (Pew, 2004). The author accepts the premise 
of anthropogenic climate change and does discuss or debate the issue 
within this dissertation, but treats anthropogenic cJimate change an 
exogenous fact accepted by the majority of nations and people of the 
world' . This motivation leads to the ambition of reducing the use of 
primary energy sources like coal and natural gas for the production of 
electdcity. 
New institutions have been created to act on the issue of global 
climate change. The desire to reduce GHG emissions exists at numerous 
levels of society, from local villages to the international community. The 
Climate Change Convention and the Kyoto Protocol are international 
1 As of 27 February 2006,162 states and regional economic integration organizations 
have deposited instruments of ratifications, accessions, approvals or acceptances. The 
total percentage of Annex I Parties emissions is 61.6% (UNa, 2006) 
6 
agreements dealing with this issue (UN, 2003). The European Union (EU) 
has passed Directive 2001/77/EC, also known as the Renewable Electric 
Sources (RES) Directive (EC, 2001), which sets out renewable energy 
objectives for each 
Chart 1.1 Global Sources of Anthropogenic GHG Emissions 
Agriculture 
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Member state, as a portion its total electric energy consumption. And 
Scotland which has set aside C9 million to assist communities in building 
renewable energy systems which can be maintained and operated by the 
local community (SCHRI, 2004). 
7 
Terminology and Technical Information 
Energy, in the context of this thesis, refers to electric energy or 
forces of nature that are being used by humans to produce a mechanical 
force which moves a generator turbine and produce electricity for 
commercial distribution. 
Renewable energy is a phrase that can be easily misconstrued. 
The author uses the phrase, wrenewable energy'. to describe the 
combination of technology and environmental resources that produce 
usable electric energy. The environmental resource must be capable of I 
replenishment in human life and commercial time scales. Without this 
limitation even fossil fuels like oil and coal are 'replenishable" over 
millions of years (ASE, 2005). 
Most forces of nature which can be harnessed for renewable 
energy depend upon relatively new technologies which are not 
economically competitive or commercially viable at this time (UCS, 2004). 
This statement is not true for one type of renewable energy, hydroelectric 
power. Hydro is the single largest source of renewable energy in 
Scotland, the UK and the world (lEA, 2003; KSES, 2004). Hydroelectric 
generation is a mature technology that has produdon costs which 
compete with fossil fuels and nuclear power in most of the world. 
Electricity is an uncommon commodity, which is instantaneously 
consumed as it is produced. The fine balance between production and 
consumption must be maintained or the transmission and distribution 
system will experience blackouts (Cozassa, 2003). There is no slack in 
the system for the physical delivery of electricity. 
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Chart 1.2 Global Sources of Electricity Production, 2003 
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Chart 1.3 Global Sources of Renewable ElectricltY Production, 2003 
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Megawatt (MW) and kilowatt-hour (kWh) are standard units of 
measurement when discussing electricity. A MW is a flow rate of energy, 
used to describe the rate at which power is generated or consumed, i. e. a 
50 MW power plant; it is not a quantity of power. Quantity of electricity is 
measured by multiplying the flow rate (MW) by time, so one MW flowing 
for one hour equals 1 megawatt-hour (MWh). A KWh is 0.1% (111000) of 
an MWh. One MW is sufficient to power approximately 1,000 households, 
assuming they are electrically heated and occupied by a family of 4 on an 
average Scottish Writer evening (Strathclyde, 2004). This typical 
household would use 5,480 kWh of electricity per year. The average for 
all British households is 4500 kWh per year. 
Two critical characteristics used to compare one type of generating 
plant or facilities to another are the facilities' capacity and load factor. 
Capacity is the maximum MW power which can be produce; its total 
potential for generating. The load factor is the percentage of total 
potential power actually produced by the power plant. 
For example, a coal-fired power plant may have a capacity of woo 
MW with a load factor of 65%. If the power plant operated 24 hours per 
day, 365 days a year, it could produce 8.76 million MWh each year. But 
with a load factor of 65%, only 5.69 million MWh are actually produced 2. 
An average mfind farm has an operational profile of 24 hours per 
day, 365 days a year availability, but it is not operational 20% of the time 
(due excessively low or high winds and maintenance), and rarely 
operates at full capacity the other 80% of the time (BWEA, 2003). This 
2 1000 MW * 24 hours * 365 days = 8,760,000 MWh. 
8,760,000 MWh * 65% = 5,694.000 MWh. 
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means wind farms have an average load factor of 25% to 40%, the upper 
portion of the range is expected for offshore systems. 
Load factors vary by technology, depending on repair, 
maintenance and operational requirements, consumer demand 
requirements, and the supply of primary energy source (fuel). 
The average load factor by various power technologies: 
Table 1.1 Expected Load Factors by Power Technology 
Technoloqv Load Factor M Technology Load-Factor M 
Nuclear Power 65 to 85 Coal 65 to 85 
CC Gas Turbine 70 to 85 Hydro 30 to 50 
Wind Energy 25 to 40 Landfill gas 70 to 90 
Sewagegas 90 Wave Power 25 
Municipal Waste Combustion 60 to 90 
Energy Crops (combustion) 85 
(AusWEA, 2004) 
Power p jects are described by their technologies (wind, coal, r0i 
nuclear, etc. ) and MW capacity, the load factor is the crucial factor in 
comparing the quantity of electricity each type of project can deliver. For 
example, to produce the equivalent power of the afore mentioned coal- 
fired power plant, it would take 20 wind farms, each with 100 MW (50 
turbines, each 2 MW capacity, with a 100 metre hub height) at a 33% 
load factor to deliver the same quantity of power. 
A final concept which is needed to understand electric power is the 
issue of dispatchability. Dispatchability is the characteristic of a power 
producer to control when power is available. Power plants fuelled by coal, 
20 farms * 100 MW = 2000 MW. 200OMW * 24 hours * 365 days = 17,520,000 MWh. 
17,520,000 MWh * 33% = 5,781.600 MWh. 
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methane and nuclear are totally dispatchable, as are biomass combustion 
plants (biomass combustion is classified as renewable). Hydroelectric is 
dispatchable, if water has been stored in controlled reservoirs. Marine 
based renewable technologies are not dispatchable, but are highly 
predictable. Wind and run of river hydro, are not dispatchable. 
Society, households and business firms, in economically 
developed counties generally plan on electric power being available 
whenever it is demanded by them. Therefore, the less controllable or 
dispatchable an energy technology is the less value it has compared to 
power from traditional sources (UCS, 2004). 
Electric Power in Scotland (Current Profile) 
Slightly less than 50 million MWh of electricity was generated is 
Scotland in 2002. Approximately two-thirds of this amount, 33.6 million 
MWh, was consumed within the Scottish economy. The remaining one- 
third is accounted for by transmission and distribution losses, own use by 
power producers, pumped hydro-storage facilities, and net transfers to 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland (KSES, 2004). Demand growth in 
Scotland has averaged 0.79% per year during the past 10 years, while 
growth in supply has averaged 2.24% per year for the same time period 
(SEEF, 2003). To maintain the balance between generation and 
consumption, an increasing amount of power is being transmitted 
(exported from Scotland) to England and Wales for consumption. 
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Table 1.2 Scottish Electricity Generation and Consumption: 
2001-2002 
Electricity Consumed 
Other uses or loss 
Total electricity generated 
(KSES, 2004) 
GigaWaft hours (GigaWaft = 1000 MWh) 
2000 2002 2002 
34,690 33,840 33,680 
15.681 15,128 15.875 
60,731 48,968 49,555 
Scotland's percentage of consumption will rise dramatically in 
2004 and beyond as the national level of production decreases. This 
decrease is the result of power station closures in Scotland. British 
Nuclear Fuels Limited ordered the Chapelcross Nuclear Power Plant to 
cease operation in June 2004 (BNFL, 2004). All power produced at 
Chapelcross was exported to England and Wales. The remaining two 
nuclear power plants in Scotland, Torness and Hunterston B, are 
scheduled for closure in 2021 and 2011, respectively (DTI, 2004). Both 
stations are owned by British Energy. Together 
Chart 1.4 Scottish Electricity Generation by Source: 2000-2002 
Bectricity Generation by Source: 2000-2002 
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(KSES, 2004) 
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Table 1.3, 'SC-otdsh Electricity Generation by Source: 2000-2002 
Percentage 
-- 2000 2001 2,0027 
Nuclear 33.6 36.9 32.0 
Coal 33.3 32.2 30.8 
Gas and Oil 22.0 21.2 25.6 
Hydroelectric (natural flow) 9.3 7.6 9.0 
Hydroelectric (pumped 
storage) 1.2 1.1 1.3 
Other renewables 0.6 1.0 1.3 
(KSES, 2004) 
The three nuclear power stations operating in Scotland produce 
one-third of the power generated in Scotland. These nuclear facilities also 
supplied the energy used for pumped hydroelectric storage at the 
Cruachan and Foyers power stations (Scottish Power, 2004). 
Fossil fuels contributed over one-half of the primary energy 
sources for generating electricity during the years 2000-2002. Coal, with 
a 32% share, contributes more GHG emissions per unit of electricity 
delivered than any of the other energy sources (EIA, 2004). Natural gas 
produces 60% less GHG per MWh of production than coal (EC, 2004). 
There are two major coal-fired power plants in Scotland; Longannet with 
capacity of 2304 MW and Cockenzie with 1200 MW capacity. The 
Cockenzie station anticipates closing in 2010, while Longannet station will 
remain operational for an additional 15-20 years (Scottish Power, 2003). 
Scottish Power owns both facilities. 
Production using heavy oil is not planned in any scenarios for 
Scotland, although one power plant is maintained for long-term security of 
supply emergency use. Diesel fuel for isolated island power generation is 
expected to continue, but is not a significant category. 
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The last large scale power project to mention in Scotland is located 
in Peterhead and is owned by Scottish and Southern Energy. The 
Peterhead Power Plant is a natural gas-fired power plant with a 2500 MW 
capacity. It is expected to operate past the year 2030. A 400 MW natural 
gas-fired station has been approved for construction in Fife, but no 
construction start or'commissioning date has been announced (DUKESs 
2003). 
Scotland will experience a major restructuring of its electric power 
system over the next 20 years. Hunterston B and Cockenzie, with 28% of 
Scotland's capacity, will close by 2011. Longannet and Torness, with 
42% capacity, will close in 20 years. 70% of current generating capad y 
will need to be replaced if Scotland is to remain a net exporter of power. 
In excess of 50% of new capacity will need to be constructed 
within Scotland if it is to continue being self-sufficient in supplying its own 
power demands. Only one major facility will not need replacement, the 
Peterhead Power Station. 
However, the United Kingdom is depleting its North Sea natural 
gas reserves and Will start requiring net imports from Europe and other 
foreign countries by'2005 4. Oil and gas forecasts for the UK predict gas 
imports will account for 50% of demand by 2010 (SCI, 2004). The 
Peterhead power plant will have to compete in European gas markets for 
commercially reliable supplies to meet Scotland's energy needs. Imported 
natural gas prices will be greater than current levels due to transportation, 
both ocean tanker and pipeline, and be more volatile that past domestic 
4 The transition from being a net exporter to a not importer did occur as predicted in the 
3 rd quarter of 2005 (IEA, 2006) 
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supplies have been. Winter prices are forecasted to trade around 24 
pence per therm (approximately 100 cubic feet of gas) by 2004_65 as 
i compared to 21 pence per therm, a 15% price increase (SCI, 2004). 
Renewable energy sources made up the smallest portion of 
energy production in Scotland, having grown to just over 10% of total 
electric energy supplied in 2002. Long established large and medium 
scale hydroelectric schemes provide 9/10th of this category. Large and 
medium scale hydroelectric schemes are a mature technology and have 
been commercially competitive With nuclear and fossil-fuelled generation 
for many decades (BHA, 2004). However, expansion possibilities are very 
limited in Scotland as most all sites for large hydro schemes have already 
been developed during the past century. Only one project in excess of 12 
MW capacity is currently being analysed for construction, the 100 MW 
Glencoe Hydro project beside Lock Ness (SE, Section 36,2004). 
The Changing Profile 
It is the in the 00ther Renewables' category that is of particular 
interest to the author. As seen in the above Table 1.3, there has been a 
doubling of electricity derived from new types of renewable energy within 
just 2 years, 2000-2002. This rate of growth is expected to continue at 
even higher rates given the new structure of government regulation and 
the resulting economic profits being earned by renewable energy power 
firms. Chapter Two discusses the effects of the new policies in detail. 
Price per therm in winter 2006 was 28 pence (DUKES, 2006). 
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Prior to December 2002 no commercial scale (greater than I MW 
capacity and connected to the electric grid) renewable generation 
systems of any technology type had been commissioned in Scotland 
using solely private funds. All projects had received capital grants from 
local councils and the national government or higher than market prices 
for electricity through government subsidies. 
Renewable Energy Policy and Programs in other European 
Countries 
This section begins by discussing three keystone international 
agreements that act as exogenous motivators for renewable energy 
development in the United Kingdom and Scotland. The first is the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its companion 
implementation agreement, The Kyoto Protocol. The third agreement is 
the European Union Directive on the Promotion of Electricity Produced 
from Renewable Energy Sources in the Internal Electricity Market. After 
which common national policies and programs used to support the 
deployment of renewable energy systems are described. 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
and the Kyoto Protocol ' 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climat6 Change 
(UNFCCC) in 1992 established a process for agreeing to specific actions 
at a later time (UN, 2003). Essential issues that were agreed upon in the 
climate change convention are: 
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i. There is a global enVironmental problem with 
increasing concentrations of dimate change gasses 
and increasing rates of emissions. 
ii. An ultimate goal of stabilizing climate change gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the global climate. 
iii. Achieve stabilization of dimate change gasses within 
a timeframe that allows for adaptation by ecosystems 
and human society. 
There are several explicit value judgments about how the work of 
the climate change convention should go forward: 
L Poorer nations have a right to economic 
development. 
ii. The greatest vulnerability from cJimate change is 
placed upon the poorer nations. 
iii. The responsibility and costs for avoiding climate 
change are to be carried by the rich developed 
nations. 
The rational for the value judgements stated in the convention are 
that developed nations have put most of the climate change gasses in the 
atmosphere to date and are the primary ongoing contributors. Sifting 
agricultural zones, sea level rise, and rainfall patterns changes all effect 
developing nations more than developed nations. 
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The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997 by the UNFCCC in 
response to the growing scientific information and public pressure about 
responding to global climate change. It is considered the most far 
reaching agreement on environmental and sustainable development ever 
adopted. The Protocol has three significant items: 
i. Legally binding targets and time tables for member 
nations to comply with the Protocol. 
ii. Six climate change gasses were identified as the 
emissions to be reduced. Three major gasses: 
carbon dioAde (C02), methane (CH4), and nitrous 
oxide (N20). Three industrial gasses: 
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), Chlorofluorocarbons 
(CHCs), and sulphur hexafluoricle (SF6). 
iii. The emissions reductions of each nation are to be 
verifiable and credible. 
The over arching objective is for a 5.2 % reduction in aggregate 
emissions below the 1990 levels by 2008-2012. The reduction in 
atmospheric pollution rates will not be sufficient to reduce the existing 
stocks of climate change gasses but will slow down the rate of increase in 
pollution. 
The Kyoto Protocol is expected to enter into full legal force 
worldwide in November 2004 after Russia formally ratifies the agreement. 
(Reuters, 2004) To become international law the protocol had to be 
ratified by Annex 1 (UN, 2003) listed nations, which consists of developed 
nations participating in the UNFCCC. These ratifying nations have to 
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account for at least 55% of the GHG emissions from tho developed 
nations. Russian, with 17% of GHG emissions. became crifical for the , 
protocol to be enacted when the United States withdrew in 2001. Russia 
represents 17% of the emissions and the United States contribution is 
36%. 
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Table 1.4 Annex I Party carbon dioxide emissions in 1990** 
Party 
1990 C02 emissions 
(Mmt) % 
Australia 288-97 2.1 
Austria* 59.20 0.4 
Belgium* 113.41 0.8 
Bulgaria 82.99 0.6 
Canada 457.44 3.3 
Czech Republic 169.51 1.2 
Denmark* 52.10 0.4 
Estonia 37.80 0.3 
Finland 53.90 0.14 
France* 366.54 2.7 
Germany* 1012.44 7.4 
Greece* 82.10 0.6 
Hungary 71.67 0.5 
Iceland 2.17 0.0 
Ireland* 30.72 0.2 
Italy* 428.94 3.1 
Japan 1173.36 8.5 
Latvia 22.98 0.2 
Liechtenstein 0.21 0.0 
Luxembourg 11.34 0.1 
Monaco 0.07 0.0 
Netherlands* 167.60 1.2 
New Zealand 25.53 0.2 
Norway 35.53 0.3 
Poland 414.93 3.0 
Portugal 42.15 0.3 
Romania 171.10 1.2 
Russian Federation 2388.72 17.4 
Slovakia 58.28 0.4 
Spain* 260.65 1.9 
Sweden* 61.26 0.4 
Switzerland 43.60 0.3 
United Kingdom* 584.08 4.3 
United States 4957.02 36.1 
Mmt million metric 
tonnes 
European Union members states 
combined 24.2 
Individual country's share of the total global C02 emissions for the purpose 
of determining entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. 
The table does not include Annex 1 Parties that had not yet submitted a 
national communications under the Convention 'when the Protocol'was 
adopted. The emission of these Parties (Croatia, Lithuania, Slovenia and 
Ukraine) will not be counted towards the entryý into forc6 threshold., Figures 
1 exclude the land-use change and forestry sector. 
(CCS, 2002) 
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European Union Directive on the Promotion of Electdcity Produced 
from Renewable Energy Sources in the Intemal Electdcity Market 
In 2001 the European Union issued after long discussions between 
the different institutions the Directive on the promotion of electricity 
produced from renewable sources (RES-E directive). This Directive sets 
out to create a framework that will promote, in the medium term (10 
years), a significant increase in renewable electricity within the EU. It 
represents an important way point in shaping the regulatory framework 
for RES-E generation in the EU. The RES-E Directive might even be a 
prelude to a possible EU-wide harmonisation of regulations at Member 
State level. Hereafter the main features of the RES-E Directive are 
outlined (EUFORES, 2005). 
The Directive set a target of 22.1% of renewable electricity as 
compared to overall electricity consumption should be met by 2010. In the 
Annex the European target are transformed into targets for the Member 
States. 
The RES-E Directive provides for a broad definition of renewable 
energy. It includes hydro power (large and small), biomass (solids, 
biofuels, landfill gas, sewage treatment plant gas and biogas) wind, solar 
(PV, heat, thermal electric), geothermal, wave and, tidal energy. General 
waste incineration has been excluded but the biodegradable fraction of 
waste can be considered as renewable. A contentious category, the 
biodegradable part of waste incineration, is allowed 'as long as the waste 
hierarchy is respected' has been retained. Furthermore, large hydropower 
(more than1O MW) is also included. It has been tacitly agreed that large 
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hydro will count for meeting the targets but will not be eligible for support 
measures. - 
Table 1.5 Renewable Electricity Targets for EU Member Statesý 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Community 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Malta 
Poland 
Slovenia' 
Slovakia 
Community 
(RES-E, 2003) 
Member States 
RES-E % 1997 
1.1 
8.7 
4.5 
8.6 
19.5 
15.5 
3.6 
16.0 
2.1 
3.5 
70.0 
38.5 
24.7 
'49.1 
1.7 
13.9 
New Member States 
RES-E % 1999 
0,05 
3,8 
0,2 
0,7 
42,4 
3,3 
1.6 
29,9- 
17.9 
12,9 
RES-E % 2010 
6.0 
29.0 
12.5 
20.1 
29.4 
21.0 
13.2 
ý5.0 
5.7 
9.0 
78.1 
39.0 
31.5 
60.0 
10.0 
22.0 
RES-E % 2010 
6 
8 
5,1 
3,8 
49,3 
7 
5 
7,5 
'33,6 
'31 21 
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It is important to note that the directive does not present a 
harmonised European support scheme. The member states are obliged 
to fulfil their own clearly specified national targets, which vary greatly. An 
EU-wide negotiation agreed to these targets. And at the same time. the 
principles providing for these national targets for consumption of 
electricity from renewable sources of energy are defined at the 
Community level, i. e. the ground for a future efficient and effective EU- 
wide system is being prepared. 
The grid access issue is another important point of the directive. 
Concerning the issue of the high costs of grid connection, the directive 
requires member states to take the necessary measures to grant 
guaranteed access to the transmission and distribution of electricity from 
renewable energy sources. Where appropriate member states have to 
give priority access to renewable energy sources. AJI over Europe, 
network operators will be obliged to set up transparent cost calculations 
for distribution and the fees have to be non-discri minatory. A further 
improvement is that the grid capacity is no longer a reason not to give 
access. The grid operators have to reinforce their grid if necessary for the 
connection. 
Member States will ensure that operators: 
Publish objective, transparent and non-discri minatory rules on 
costs for connection and for strengthening of the grid provide producers 
with complete and detailed estimates of costs. The grid operator can only 
deny grid access with regards to the maintaining the reliability and safety 
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of the grid. Unfortunately many grid operators are relying on this while 
denying grid access. 
Moreover, the directive addresses the particular problem of lengthy 
and difficult administrative procedures that potential generators of 
renewable energies must respect in many member states. It requires 
them to review their existing legislative and regulatory frameworks in 
order to speed up authodsation procedures. - 
The objectives of the member states are: 
* to reduce the obstacles to increasing production 
* to rationalise and speed up administrative procedures 
9 to ensure objective, transparent and non-discri minatory rules 
* to take account of the characteristics of renewable technologies 
The directive also provides for a system concerning the guarantee of 
origin of renewable energies, which will increase transparency while 
facilitating consumer choice. 
And finally, this directive gives, the Commission an instrument with 
which it will be able to assess the level-playing field of the electricity 
market thoroughly for the first time. The state aid in the member states' 
conventional energy sources sectors will be subject to strict evaluation. 
And apart, the commission has to evaluate the success made in reflecting 
the external costs of conventional energy sources. 
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Common Policies to Support Renewable Energy 
Currently, there are a range of government programs and support 
systems for renewable energy expansion being used by European Union 
countries. These programs can be classified into four broad groups: feed- 
in tariffs, quota obligations (tradable green certificates), tendering 
systems and tax incentives. The following policy descriptions are taken 
from OThe support for electricity from renewable energy sources impact 
assessmenf, a report from the European Commission (EC, 2005). 
Feed-in tariffs (renewable energy feed-in tariff or REFIT) are the 
most common financial support program in the EU, with a majority of 
Member States using this policy. Feed-in-tariffs are a guaranteed market 
price for green energy producers; the price is set by the government for 
electricity derived from specific sources or technologies. 
Feed-in-tariffs have several advantages: investment security for 
developers and investors, fine tuning of support to specific technologies, 
as well as the promotion of mid- and long-term technologies, not just 
technologies which are on the cusp of commercial viability. However, 
feed-in-tariffs are difficult to harmonize with other countries if an EU-wide 
support program is to be created. A more market-oriented variant of the 
feed-in-tariff is the support premium, where a predetermined monetary 
subsidy is paid in addition to the revenues earned from fluctuating 
electricity prices. This later REFIT system is operating in Denmark and in 
Spain. Spain uses this market price plus top up premium to support 
specific technologies. 
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Green certificates (Tradable Green Certificates or TGCs) are 
market-based instruments. Green energy producers are given certificates 
to match their production of electricity and end users or other power 
market agents are required to purchase the certificates to meet 
government mandates. At least in theory, TGC programs have the 
advantage of yielding the best value for money invested, and the program 
favours a single European market while posing a lower risk of over- 
compensation. However, green certificates create a higher risk for 
investors and early stage technologies may not receive sufficient financial 
premiums to be supported under such schemes. The United Kingdom 
has used a TGC program since 2002. 
Pure tendering procedures have been used by Ireland and France. 
Tendering programs consist of the governments contracting private firms 
to build and operate renewable power facilities of a specific size and 
technology. France recently changed its support system to a combination 
of tendering and feed-in-tariff. Ireland is moving in the same policy 
direction. Theoretically, tendering systems make optimum use of market 
forces, but they behave in a stop-and-go manner and are not conducive 
to stable investment conditions. This type of support scheme involves the 
risk that low'bids may result in projects not being implemented. This was 
the program used in Scotland (Scottish Renewables Order6) and 
throughout the UK during the 1990's. 
Scottish Renewables Order is discussed elsewhere in this chapter. 
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Pure tax incentives are applied in Malta and Finland. In most 
cases (e. g. - Cyprus, UK and the Czech Republic), however, this 
instrument is used as an additional policy tool. 
It should again be emphasized that the above categorization into 
four groups is a fairly simple presentation of the situation. There are 
several national schemes that have mixed elements, especially in 
combination with tax incentives. 
Renewable Energy Support Programs In other European Countries 
Four European countries are profiled in this section; Germany, 
Spain, Sweden and Denmark. These countries have been operating 
under the same goals and external commitments of the Directive for 
Renewable Energy Sources - Electricity and The UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol. Brief commitments are made comparing experiences with 
Scotland and possible lessons which can be learned. The following 
profiles have been substantially taken from "Country Profiles: Overview of 
Renewable Energy Sources in the Enlarged European Unionn, a report 
written for the European Commission in "004 (EC, 2004). 
Germany 
Germany has experienced dramatic growth in renewable energy 
during the last decade as a result of an aggressive government subsidy 
program. Wind energy has grown faster than any other power generating 
source, in absolute quantity, not just in proportional growth. In 2003 wind 
farms in Germany contributed the same level of power production as the 
large and small hydropower sector, approximately 25,000,000 MWh. 
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About 50% of Europe's - wind - energy generating capacity is installed in 
Germany. 
Other technologies which contribute to the renewable electricity 
goal are hydro, biomass, landfill gas, and photovoltaic systems. 
Hydropower provides the second-largest portion of renewable electricity, 
but no significant new deployments have occurred since the mid-1990's. 
Biomass electricity (including biodegradable municipal waste, the source 
of landfill gas), is the third largest renewables source with about 
6,200,000 MWh of electricity production in 2002. Strong growth rates 
I 
have also been achieved with photovoltaic systems, with installed 
capacity of 258 MW and a generating potential of about 190,000 MWh in 
2002 and about 260,000 MWh in 2003. 
Actual power generation from 1990 until 2002 is shown in Table 
1.5. Two facts to notice in the chart are; total power Oroduction'is up from 
approximately 18,500 GWh to 47,000 GWh in 2002, a 155% increase in 
production, and observe that wind and hydropower were both lower in 
2001 than is 2000, as a result volatile weather patterns. The average 
quantity of wind and rain were lower in 2001 than in 2000 leading to 
decreased energy production. This was in spite of an expansion in the 
number of deployed wind turbines. 
A similar weather event occurred in 2003 with actual generation of 
wind energy being lower, decreased to 18.5 TWh, due to seasonal wind 
speeds and duration being 16% below average. 
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Graph 1.1 RES electricity production up until 2002 in Geffnany 
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In Table 1.6 renewable electricity generation is shown for the years 
1997 and 2002 as well as the average annual growth during this period. 
Table 1.6 RES-electricity production in 1997 and 2002 in GWh 
RES-E Technology 1997 IGWhl 2002 IGWhl Av. Annual growth 
IN 
Biogas 746 2,913 31% 
Solid Biomass 505 700 7% 
Biowaste 1,168 2,035 12% 
Geothermal electricity 0 0 
Hydro large-scale 11,696 16,340 TNO 
Hydro small-scale 6,772 7,660 2% 
Photovoltaics 27 176 45% 
Wind onshore 3,034 17,200 41% 
Total 23,948 47,024 14% 
Share of total consumption 4.50% 81% 
(tu, ZUU4) 
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SUMMARY OF RENEWABLE ENERGY MARKETS AND POLICY 
RES targets 
The RES-E target set for Germany to be achieved in 2010 is 
12.5% of gross electricity consumption (in 2020 10% of total energy 
consumption and 20% of electricity consumption). 
Status of the renewable energy market 
Germany has a mature renewable energy market which is showing 
large growth'rates even at high market share rates. Biomass is the only 
technology that is significantly lagging behind expectations. 
Main supporting policies 
The main promotion scheme for renewable energy in Germany is 
the Renewable Energy Act. This legislative act creates a program of 
renewable electricity feed-in tariffS7 . This act is due to 
be'updated to 
reflect the maturity of some technologies which will need less support and 
the desire to incentivise expansion of other technologies like biomass 
Current renewable electricity feed-in-tariff subsidies (2003): 
* Wind: 9E cents/kWh for at least five years after installation. 
Reduction of tariff to 6E cents/kWh depending on yield of 
system. Yearly reduction of tariff by 1.5%. 
* Biomass: up to 500 M 10 E cents/kWh, up to 5 MWp: 9E 
cents/kWh, up to 20 MWp: 8.6 -E cents/kWh, 
Hydro, landfill gas, sewage gas: up to 500 M 7.7 E 
cents/kWh, form 501 kW to 5 MW: 
ý6.6 
-E cents/kWh 
See prior section on Renewable Energy Suppo rt Policies. 
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* PV: 48 E cents/kWh, yearly reduction of tariff by 5%. 
Starting in January 2004 feed-in-tariff of 59 E cents/kWh. 
Market Incentive Program: Investment subsidy for most sources 
except wind. 
Income tax regulations on wind energy investments. 
Environment and Energy Efficiency Program: subsidized loans for 
major share of wind investments. 
Full exemption from mineral oil tax and environmental tax for all 
pure liquid and solid biofuels in heat and transport. 
Key factors 
Limited grid capacity in the northern parts of Germany is currently 
hampering the growth of onshore wind energy. This constraint is resulting 
in limited exploitation of wind generating potential. Offshore wind energy 
is deploying more slowly than predicted due to higher than expected 
costs and technical problems (long distance from land and deep water). 
Biomass combustion is deploying slower than expected due to fuel price 
uncertainty and high infrastructure costs. The use Of low-cost wood 
waste, i. e., forest slash has been fully exploited, so more expensive 
biomass sources must be developed. 
The proposed new renewable energy act will have a major impact 
on wind, biomass and large hydropower. The current high feed-in tariffs, 
investment subsidies and government loans have facilitated considerable 
growth in the renewables market. 
A new feed-in tariff system is proposed that will lower the tariffs for 
wind on-shore, increase tariffs for biomass electricity, geothermal 
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electricity and introduce a feed-in tariff for the refurbishment of large 
hydro. The reallocations of resources provided by the government due to 
new priorities for renewable technology are predicted to motivate minor 
restructuring of the renewables market. 
The stability of political support and policy regimes in Germany has 
successfully stimulated continuous and high levels of growth in renewable 
energy, especially in the case of wind energy, PV and solar thermal 
installations over the past decade. 
In comparison to Scotland: 
Germany has attained dominance in installed wind power capacity 
whilst having a lesser amount of the natural resource. Scotland has about 
one-half of the wind resource of all Europe, yet has less than one-sixth 
the capacity of Germany, at the present time. 
The consistent and clear support from the German government of 
almost a decade has created a positive investment climate in renewable 
technologies. The feed-in-tariff has shown itself to be very low risk for 
investors. 
Germany faces a similar situation as Scotland, limitations on grid 
transmission lines to transport. the green energy from rural production 
areas to areas with greater demand. 
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Spain 
Hydropower is by far the most significant source of renewable 
energy in Spain, contributing approximately 16,000,000 MWh in 2002, 
representing 41 % of all renewable power produced that year. Strong 
growth in on-shore wind farms has occurred during the past decade. 
Spain achieved 4,100 MW of wind farm capacity by the end of 2002 and 
more than 6,000 MW by the end of 2003, a 50% expansion in one year. 
The capacity level is similar to the total vAnd capacity wqhin the Unqed 
States in 2002. Spain benefited from 9,600,000 MWh of wind energy in 
2002. 
Solid biomass is also relatively well developed with 8%, 2,900,000 
MWh, of total renewable power being generated from this technology in 
2002. 
Graph 1.2 RES-electricity production up until 2002 
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Tablel. 7, below, shows an overview of the electricity generation 
from renewable energy sources in Spain in 1997 and 2002, as well as the 
average annual growth during the intervening period. The electricity 
generation from RES expressed as share of the overall electricity 
consumption was 20% in 1997, while it was only 16.2% in 2002. 
35 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Table 1.7 RES electricity production In 1997 and 2002 In GWh 
RES-E Technology 1997 IGWhl 2002 jGWhJ Av. Annual growth 
N 
Biogas 139 418 25% 
Solid Biomass 672 2,949 34% 
Biowaste 273 648 19% 
Geothermal electricity 0 0 - 
Hydro large-scale* 30,349 12,147 -17% 
Hydro small-scale* 4,007 3,895 -1% 
Photovoltaics 1 5 38% 
Wind onshore 717 9,564 68% 
Total 36,158 29,626 4% 
Share of total consumption P/6] 19.900/0 12.6% 
Non-large hydro RES-E 5,809 17.479 
Spain uses a definition for small and large-scale hydro power 
capacity that is different from the commonly adopted EU 
definition. In Spain all production capacity lower than 50 MW is 
considered to be small-scale production capacity. 
(EC, 2004) 
SUMMARY OF RENEWABLE ENERGY MARKETS AND pOLICY 
RES targets 
The RES-E goal set for Spain is 29.4% of gross electricity 
consumption to be met by renewables in 2010. 
Status of the renewable energy market 
Wind power has expanded in a dramatic manner with 50% growth 
in 2002, as previously mentioned. The biomass sector needs an 
integrated policy approach which recognises the additional benefits for 
environmental protection and rural development. 
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Main supporting policies 
Spain uses a feed-in-tariff support system, from which renewable 
power producers may choose between a fixed preferential tariff and a 
(variable) premium price on top of the market price. Investment support is 
also provided. Tariffs are specified for plants: ý 5OMW. 
Tariffs specified for 2003: l2remium (Ect/kWh) feed-in (-Ect/kWh) 
Solar PV (< 5k": 36.0 39.6 
Solar (other installations): 18.0 21.6 
Solar thermal-electric: 12.0 
Wind: 2.66 6.21 
Small Hydro (: 5 1OMW): 2.94 6.49 
Primary Biomass: 3.32 6.85 
Secondary Biomass: 2.51 6.05 
Geothermal, wave and tidal: 2.94 6.49 
(EC, 2004) 
Key factors 
Transparent support schemes and the high feed-in tariffs deliver 
high investment certainty. 
Feed-in tariffs are decreased and might become too low to induce 
new investments. 
Changes due to liberalisation of the sector cause uncertainty. 
I 
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* Biomass feed-in tariffs were up-to-now too low to develop new 
capacity. 
Spain introduced a widespread and aggressive program to stimulate 
renewable energy deployment in 1997. This has resulted in substantial 
expansion in new capacity, primarily wind power. Feed-in tariffs and 
premiums provided high transparency and certainty for commercial 
developers and investors in the market and are therefore the principle 
motivators for the growth which has resulted to date. After Germany, 
Spain is the most favourable country for wind investments. 
In comparison to Scotland: 
Spain has chosen the feed-in-tariff mechanism for its primary 
support of renewable energy expansion. Dramatic growth occurred as a 
result as seen in the expansion of wind power. As with Germany this 
demonstrates the strength of feed-in-tariffs for the ability to target specific - 
technologies and to assure sufficient incentives to create the -desired 
growth of a market. 
Sweden 
Renewable electricity production has increased 7% since 1990. 
The most significant technology growth has been in bio-energy 
which grew by 250% in since 1990 and no accounts for around 4,000,000 
MWh of power. Hydropower has been and continues to be the single 
largest source of renewable energy in Sweden. The hydropower industry 
is mature and has experienced limited growth in capacity recently. In 
2002 hydro generated 66,000,000 MWh. 2003 demonstrated the volatility 
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that comes with energy sources dependent on weather (rain and snow for 
hydro) when total power production declined by 26%. Wind power has 
just recently been deployed at commercial scale in Sweden (both on- 
shore and off-shore) and has a reached a level of around 600,000 MWh 
in 2002. Deployed wind power capacity reached 399 MW by the end of 
2003. 
Supply volatility can result from use of hydro power and is 
graphically illustrated in the following figure; this volatility has been due to 
variations in weather conditions from year to year. 
Graph 1.4 RES electricity production up until 2002 in Sweden 
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Graph 1.5 RES electricity production In Sweden up until 2002 
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Table 1.8 RES-electricity production in 1997 and 2002 in GWh 
RES-E Technology 
Biogas 
l"7 jGWhj 
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2002 IG%%'bl Av. Annual growth 
IN 
17 18 
Solid Biomass 2,685 3,775 7 
Biowaste 105 208 15 
Geothermal electricity 0 0 
Hydro large-scale 64,560 62,370 -I 
Hydro small-scale 2,582 3,630 7 
Photovoltaics 0 0 0 
Wind onshore 205 600 24 
Total 70,183 71,804 0.1 
Share of total consumption 49.10% 46% 
Non-large Hydro RES-E 5.623 8.230 
(EC, 2004) 
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Summarv of Renewable Ene[gy Markets and Poligy 
RES targets 
The RES-E goal set for Sweden is 60% of gross ele6tridity 
consumption in 2010. Sweden is different from most other countries as it 
has established the target as a quantity of electricity, jo, ooo, 000 MWh. 
Sweden is also trying to diversify -away from such dependence on 
hydropower by including an obligation to provide 17% of the renewable 
energy from non large-hydro by 2010. 
Status of the renewable energy market 
Renewables provide approximately 50% of Sweden's total 
electricity consumption. Hydropower is the primary source from 
renewables. The use of biomass has ýincreased significantly during the 
past decade, but still represents a relatively small portion. Deployed wind 
capacity is relatively small although wind energy resources in the south of 
the country are comparable to Denmark's. When the new certificate 
scheme was drawn up by the Government, market parties expressed fear 
and reluctance to invest. 
Main supporting policies 
Tradable green electricity certificates (TGC) for Wind, solar,, 
biomass, geothermal and small hydro were introdu I ced in I May'2003. The 
system has created an obligation for end-users of power to purchase a 
certain amount of renewable certificates as part of their total electricity 
consumption (increasing to 17% in 2010). This is a similar program to that 
in Scotland and the UK, see chapter on Renewable' Obligation 
Certificates (ROC). 
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Non-compliance leads to a penalty, set at 150% of a yea(s 
average electricity price. To secure a smooth transition, price guarantees 
are available for producers up to 2007. TGC system prices will be settled 
by supply and demand trading in a TGC market. Forecasted prices were 
expected in the range of 1.3 - 1.6, E cents/kWh for each certificate traded. 
Wind energy investment grants to cover, or reduce, costs by 15% 
remain available. As a transition measure, an environmental premium for 
wind is available. This premium had a value of 1.9 E cents/kWh in 2003 
and will decline to 0 in 2007. 
Key factors 
The TGC system is hoped to incentivise greater investment in the 
most cost-effective manner. Guarantees have been built into the system 
to insure a smooth transition to a TGC market. Also, environmental tax 
benefits can make some biomass CHP systems competitive. Under the 
TGC market system, prices may fluctuate from year to year depending on 
production and new deployment of renewable power plants. This holds 
for TGC as well as commodity prices for electricity. Both elements form a 
source of uncertainty for investment decisions. Sweden followed a 
program of promoting new renewable sources by a combination of energy 
taxation and environmental premium schemes until early 2003. Since 
May 2003, however, a major policy change has been implemented by 
introducing a tradable certificate scheme in order to achieve the cost- 
effective and market-oriented promotion of renewables. The certificate 
system has started-up and the effects are yet to be determined. It may 
result in a cost-effective development of renewables (thereby excluding 
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some sources from the market). The Swedish govemment has declared 
that the certificate system may be opened up for imports of green 
certificates. 
In comparison to Scotland: 
Two important, if not cdtical, lessons can be seen from Sweden's 
experiences with renewable energy. The first lesson is the volatility of 
some forms of renewable energy, with the very significant decrease in 
pro uction t at has occurred when annual rains did not appear. Security 
of supply means that alternative sources must be available if the 
renewable energy is not forthcoming. Stand-by power sources can lead to 
dramatic increases in overall energy prices. The second lesson is that 
Sweden is also using a TGC market approach to'motivate renewables 
expansion. It has not been in operation a slufficient length of time to be 
confident of its results. Scotland's program is just as uncertain of its 
results. 
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Denmark 
Onshore wind technology has the greatest portion of renewables 
generation in absolute terms, as well as having the highest growth rate 
during the last decade. About 5,000,000 MWh of electricity was produced 
by on-shore wind power plants in 2002. 
Economic conditions for wind energy were very stable in the 
1980's and 1990's. AM wind generated power was given priority access to 
the transmission grid for transfer to distributors and end use consumers. 
This priority access was complemented with a feed-in-tariff proýgrarn 
paying approximately 8E cents/kWh. However, the situation has changed 
during the last few years, primarily due to a number of changes which 
curtailed support for some schemes. In 2000 the annual deployment of 
wind power capacity peaked at just over 500 MW, followed in 2001 by 
only 115 MW being deployed. 
In 2002, new deployed capacity increased due to favourable re- 
powering conditions. Repowering is a power industry terms which 
consists of upgrading existing wind turbines with new technologies; it is 
most common is to replace the turbine blades and the generator motor. 
The quantity of newly added on-shore wind capacity in 2003 
declined to only about 50 MW. 
Major off-shore wind energy projects were deployed in 2002 and 
2003. The Homs Rev wind farm (160 MW) in 2002 and the Nysted wind 
farm (165.6 MW) in 2003, as well as, three smaller wind farms. This 
resulted in total offshore capacity of about 425 MW. 
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Biomass, especially biowaste, but also solid biomass and biogas, 
has the second largest share or renewable electricity. The detailed 
figures can be seen in Table 1.8, below. Little growth has occurred in the 
biomass sector since 2001 as earlier policies to promote biomass have 
been curtailed, like those for wind energy. 
Graph 1.6 RES electricity production up until 2002 in Denmark 
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Due to a strong focus on environmental issues during the 1980s 
and 1990s, when the Danish government promoted renewable energy, it 
is already widely used. More than 20 % of the electricity supplied in 
Denmark is currently based on renewable energy and approximately 9% 
of the country's primary energy consumption is supplied by renewable 
sources. Both of these values are relatively high and significant 
compared to Scotland. 
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1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Table 1.9 RES-electrIcIty prcWuctlon In 1997 and 2002 In GWh and 
average annual growth since 1997 
RES-E Technology 1997 (GNVhJ 2002 JGNý11 Av. Annual grov%th 
Biogas 93 233 20 
Solid Biomass 314 875 23 
Biowaste 461 1.017 17 
Geothermal 
electricity 
0 0 
flydro large-scale 0 0 
Hydro small-scale 19 32 11 
Photovoltaics 0 1 
Wind 1,934 4,877 20 
Total 2,822 7,035 20 
Share of total 
consumption. [O/ol 
8.70 20 
(EC, 2004) 
SUMMARY OF RENEWABLE ENERGY MARKETS AND POLICY 
RES targets 
The RES-E target set to be achieved by Denmark in 2010 is 29% 
of gross electricity consumption. 
Status renewable energy market 
The renewable energy market has dramatically declined over the 
last two years. 
Main supporting policies 
The main promotion schemes for RES in Denmark are the 
following. 
Act on payment for green electricity - settlement price instead of 
formerly high feed-in tariff. 
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* Wind onshore: The new tariff scheme is insufficient to attract new 
investments. Newly deployed turbines receive the spot pdce8, plus 
an environmental premiumo (maximum of 1.3 E cents/kWh) plus a 
compensation for offsetting costs" (0,3 -E cents/kWh), in total 
limited to 4.8 -E cents/kWh. Turbine owners are responsible for 
selling and balancing the power. The tariff can be well below the 
4.8 E cents/kWh in times of a low spot price. 
* Wind offshore: New installations receive spot price plus an 
environmental premium (maximum of 1.3 E cents/kWh) plus a 
compensation for offsetting costs (0-3, E cents/kWh). in total limited 
to 4.8 E cents/kWh. Turbine owners are responsible for selling and 
balancing the power. The tariff can be well below the 4.8 IE 
cents/kWh in times of a low spot price., 
* Tendering procedure planed but conditions are currently under 
discussion. 
Solid Biomass: A settlement price of 4 -E cents/kWh is'guaranteed 
for a period of ten years. Additionally and as a guarantee these 
plants receive IE cent/kWh in compensation for a Renewable 
Energy certificate. 
* Biogas: A settlement price of 4E cents/kWh is paid 
8 Spot price -a market price paid for immediate deliver (typically less than two hours 
advance agreement). 
9 Environmental premium - the social value of green energy set by the Danish 
government. 
10 Offsetting costs - special costs associated with renewable energy production not 
associated with coal or gas generation. 
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e Waste: A settlement price of IE centIkWh is paid I 
Key factors 
Termination of the original high feed-in tariffs has lead to a 
stagnant market for additional renewable energy sources to be deployed. 
There has been a delay in implementing a green certificate scheme 
similar to the United 1(ingdorn or other European nations. A new 
government was elected at the end of 2001 and Initiated fundamental 
changes to the existing energy policies and targets. Most of the 
promotion schemes for renewables have been abolished. The 
introduction of a green certificate market has been announced but has 
not been implemented so far. Except for two offshore wind parks. which 
were already in an advanced planning phase. the strong RES 
development observed in the 90's has stopped. 
In compadson to Scotland: 
Denmark is well established with renewable energy sources being 
utilized in many sectors. The benefits of a long term and consistent 
government policy can be seen. However, the change of government in 
the early 2000's has lead to a total revamping Of support programs and 
significant stagnation has occurred since that time. This is another 
country that has transformed its support program to a TGC market and 
results are as yet undetermined. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to provide essential information about 
renewable energy as a technology, an alternative to continuing GHG 
pollution, and as a major government agenda to meet environmental 
goals and commitments. 
Renewable energy resources are becoming a significant 
government policy issue worldwide as countries address global 
environmental issues. This chapter has shown the international 
consensus and the European consensus on reducing pollution from the 
production of electricity, specifically by reducing C02 emissions from 
power plants using fossil-fuels. 
Other European countries were compared to Scotland in their 
pursuit of reducing GHG. All of the countries are similar to Scotland in 
that they have only a decade to 15 years of experience in motivating 
renewable energy production and technology deployment. All have met 
with some success and some reversals from meeting their goals. 
Everyone is looking for policies which will be efficient at expanding this 
power sector yet not create an excessive social cost. 
One of the most prominent policies mechanisms being used today 
in Europe, and throughout many developed nations, is the tradable green 
certificate. This is the principle mechanism being used in the United 
K(ingdom and Scotland since 2002. 
In the following chapter an extensive description and discussion is 
presented of Scotland's TGC program, which is called the Renewables 
Obligation (Scotland). 
49 
BLANK IN ORIGINAL 
Chapter 2 
Renewables Obligation (Scotland: 
The New Policy Instrument and Past Policies of the 1990's 
Chapter Sections 
Introdudon 
Operation of the ROS and ROC market 
Operation of the Renewables Obligation (Scotland) 
Number of Licensed Electricity Suppliers 
Certified Renewable Energy Producers 
Eligible Types of Technology 
Buyout Fee and Recycling of Funds 
Recycling of Funds 
A Simplified Case Study 
Effect of the Recycled Buy-out fee 
Market for ROCs 
TAXES 
Near Term Course for the ROS 
Potential for Strategic Behavior 
Renewables Policy during the 1990's 
Renewables Policy since 2002 
Conclusion 
52 
Introduction 
In April 2002 a new policy regime was instituted in the United Kingdom to 
incentivise and promoting renewable energy. In Scotland the program was called 
the Renewables Obligation (Scotland) (ROS), while in England and Wales the 
program was called the Renewables Obligation (RO). The legislation and 
programs in each country are identical with the exception that two markets for 
Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROC)' exist, one for Scotland and one for 
England and Wales. 
Renewable energy is a devolved issue to the Scottish Executive, so a 
separate concurrent law had to be instituted in Scotland. The emphasis in this 
thesis is on Scottish energy and environmental issues, therefore the ROS and 
ROC are used in discussions; all of which applies to England and Wales and the 
RO. There is unified UK-wide management and operation of the two renewables 
programs by the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM), but unified UK- 
wide trading of electricity over the transmission grid will not occur until sometime 
in 2005. 
The ROS is a government initiated program to create a commercial 
market which transacts the positive environmental and air qualities which result 
from electricity generated from clean renewable fuel sources. 
Carbon dioxide, and other GHG, is a co-product Of coal and gas fired 
electricity production. A significant negative externality is created when the 
pollution is released into the atmosphere causing local air pollution problems and 
Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROC) will be explained in detail later in this chapter. 
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adding to global climate change. However, the atmosphere Is a public good, 
which has no specified owner who can claim property damages from the polluter, 
fossil fuelled power plants. 
Therefore, electricity generated from fuel resources which do not pollute 
the environment or air have a positive utility for the public, who are ones being 
harmed. The government recognises this positive utility from renewable power 
and wishes to promote greater production of this good. 
Operation of the ROS and ROC market2 
The ROS requires all commercial business firms who sell electricity in 
Scotland to purchase ROCs equivalent to a pre-established percentage of their 
electricity sales, with sales measured by quantity not monetary value. These 
firms must comply with the ROS or faces severe penalties which range from 
financial penalties to the possibility of loosing their license to operate. 
Once suppliers have attained the ROCs, they demonstrate compliance 
with the obligation by submitting the certificates to the utility regulator, Ofgem. If 
they do not have ROCs sufficient to match their obligation they may pay a buy- 
out fee to the government in replacement of each ROC not submitted. Electricity 
suppliers do not have to purchase the actual electricity generated from 
renewable power firms, they only require the ROCs. Electricity suppliers can 
acquire ROCs directly from renewable power producers or in the newly created 
marketplace for ROCs. 
2 This section is a general description of program as envisioned in the ROS legislation (ROS, 
2002). 
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The supply of ROCs comes from renewable power producers who have 
received the certificates from the govemment. ROCs are issued to accredited 
power producers who use specified renewable technologies and fuel sources. 
One ROC is issued to renewable power producers for each MWh of electricity 
they produced and sold in the electricity market. This is the only point where 
certificates and actual physical electricity are related and interact. The price of 
ROCs is not directly tied in any manner to the price of electricity. Green energy 
producers may sell the ROCs in the marketplace to any party who desires them. 
These transactions can occur through bilateral negotiation, public auction 3, or 
other intermediaries. Any electricity suppliers, producers or brokers may 
participate In the trading of ROCs. 
The buy-out fee paid to the government is collected and recycled to all the 
electricity suppliers who participated in, the ROC market and submitted ROCs to 
meet all or just -a portion of their obligation. Essentially, these firm receive a 
partial refund of the money spent purchasing ROCs. The amount of refund is 
based on the level of participation by each individual firm as a portion of the total 
market of submitted ROCs. 
Those firms who did not participate in the ROC market and chose to pay 
the buy-out fee receive no refund. 
To reiterate: 
Renewable energy companies now produce two goods Jor the marketplace; 
electricity and ROCs. They have two revenue sources; one from the production 
3 The Non-fossil Purchasing Agency (Scotland) (NFPAS) operates a, public auction of ROCS 
each quarter. The auction is discussed later in this chapter. 
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and sale of electric power, and one for the co-production and sale of ROCs. 
There is little or no input cost associated with ROCs production. 
The electricity is sold on the open commodity market for delivery into the 
grid. The ROCs are sold to firms which have a demand for them. The demand 
has been created by the obligation to submit ROCs or an equivalent buy-out fee 
to the government. 
The Government is using two policy variables in their management of this 
program; the obligation percentage which polluting firms must meet and the 
optional buy-out fee. The government's goal is to assure a sufficiently high ROC 
price that motivates rapid expansion of the renewables industry and deployment 
of renewable energy power stations across Scotland. 
Operation of the Renewables Obligation (Scotland) 
In this section the structure and operation the ROS as it actually took 
shape during its founding years of operation will be described. 
Number of Licensed Electricity Suppliers 
In Scotland there are 28 licensed suppliers, 7 of which supply to domestic 
customers. Scottish Power (SP) and Scottish & Southern Energy (SSE) (or their 
subsidiary companies) are the market dominant companies, accounting for 75% 
of power sales in Scotland (Energywatch, 2004 and Ofgem ROI). All of these 
firms were required to participate in the ROS. 
At the end of an obligation period, which runs annually from 16t of April 
to 31st of March of each calendar year, suppliers must submit ROCs to Ofgern 
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equal to a published schedule. See Table 2.1 below. The percentage quota 
schedule is established in the ROS legislation. 
FE-x a -mp Ii 
If an energy supply company sold 10,000 MWh of electricity in Scotland during the 
first obligation period, I April 2002 to 31 March 2003, the firm would be obliged to 
submit to Ofgem either 300 ROCs or E9,000, or a combination the two. The amount 
of ROCs due represents 3% of the total quantity of power sold 4. This monetary 
amount represents the maximum buy-out fee payable, at E30 per ROC, if no ROCS 
are submitted. The buy-out fee is established in the ROS legislation. 
10,000 MWh * 3% = 300. 
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Table 2.1 Annual Obligation Quotas For 
The Renewables Obligation (Scotland) 
ROS ObilgaUon Targets 
Obligation Pedod 
Start End 
Percentage of 
Total Electricity 
Supplied 
01-Ap r-02 31-Mar-03 3.0% 
01-Ap r-03 31-Mar-04 4.3% 
01-Ap r-04 31-Mar-05 4.9% 
01-Ap r-05 31 -Mar-06 5.5% 
01-Ap r-06 31-Mar-07 6.7% 
01-Ap r-07 31-Mar-08 7.9% 
01 -Ap r-08 31-Mar-09 9.1% 
01-Ap r-09 31-Mar-10 9.7% 
01 -Ap r-1 0 31-Mar-11 10.4% 
*01-A pr-11 31-Mar-12 11.4% 
*01-A pr. 12 31-Mar-13 12.4% 
*01-A pr-13 31-Mar-14 13.4% 
*01-A pr-14 31 -Mar-1 5 14.4% 
*01-A pr-15 31-Mar-16 15.4% 
Each subsequent pebod of 
12 months ending on 
31-Mar-2027 
15.4% 
* The original obligation quota was scheduled to increase in 2011 to a final 
level of 10.4%. The obligation is currently in consultation about a proposal to 
modify and extended the obligation to 2016 Wth an increase of 1% for each 
additional year. 
(ROS, 2002 and ROS, 2004) 
These 28 Scottish firms had combined electricity sales totalling 
28,919,867 MWh. This translated into an obligation to submit 867,596 ROCs 
or equivalent buy-out funds. The United Kingdom total combined electricity 
sales were 279,799,067 MWh. This translated into an obligation to submit 
8,393,972 ROCs or equivalent buy-out funds. 
a The Scottish Renewables Order was the predecessor program to the ROS. The SRO 
program and other background Issues are discussed later in this chapter. 
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Certified Renewable Energy Producers 
At the start of the first obligation period 65 renewable generating 
stations had been accredited by Ofgem by the end of the period 31 
additional stations had been accredited. The generation capacity increased 
from 153 MW to 258 MW, a 70% increase. 
For all of the UK, 431 stations were accredited, with 505 accredited by 
March 2003, the end of the period. The generation capacity had increased 
from 1,452 MW up to 2,223 MW a 53% increase in one year. 
Table 2.2 Number of accredited generating stations by country 
England Scotland Wales Total 
Biomass 11 1 0 12 
ACT 2 0 0 2 
Co-firing 18 1 0 19 
Hydro <20 MW 
IDNC 23 34 18 75 
Landfill gas 210- 9 7 -226 
Micro hydro 3 25 1 29 
Off-shore vvind 2 0 0 1-2' 
On-shore vvind 42 26 23 91 
Sewagegas 49 0- 0 '4'9 
Total 360 96 49 505 
(Ofgem R01,2004) 
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Table2.3 Number of ROCs Issued In Vt obligation period, by country 
England Scotland Wales Total 
Biomass 574.828 33,266 0 608.094 
ACT 173 0 0 173 
Co-firing 385,106 44,753 0 429.859 
Hydro 20 MW DNC or less 20,725 365,383 112,464 498.572 
Landfillgas 2,575,315 98,533 44.896 2,716,744 
Micro Hydro 772 39,769 379 40.920 
Off-shore vvind 2,347 0 0 2,347 
On-shore vvind 305,890 430,441 351.326 1,087,657 
Sewagegas 178,303 0 0 178,303 
Total 4,043,459 1,010,145 509,065 5,562,669 
(Ofgem ROI, 2004) 
Certified power producers in Scotland generated 1,010,145 MWh of 
electricity during the first obligation period, thereby earning the same 
quantity of ROCs. In England and Wales certified producers generated 
4,552,524 MWh of green energy and received the same number of ROCs. 
Supply and demand of ROCs in Scotland: 
Supply = 190109145 Demand = 867,596 
Supply and demand for ROCs in the UK. 
Supply -= 4,552,524 Demand = Bj3931972 
Recall that ROCs can be used in meet obligations in either Scotland 
or England and Wales. Therefore, there is an excess supply of certificates 
produced in Scotland, while there is a very significant shortage of ROCs to 
meet demand in the UK as a whole. 
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The only option available to the electric supply firms who do not have , 
sufficient ROCs is to pay the buy-out fee. A shortage of 3,841,448 ROCs is 
equivalent to El 15,243,440. 
Eligible Types of Technology 
Not all forms of renewable energy are eligible for the ROS program. 
Eligibility is dependent on the type of technology and the scale of production. 
Which clean energy technologies were to be included or and excluded was a 
source of public debate and widely consulted. Generally, two criteria were 
used to decide the matter. The first criteria concerned the technology 
involved; did it need additional financial support for it to be commercial viable 
in the near term. The second criteria examined the social desirability of the 
technology. Examples of social criteria are; large hydro which was deemed 
ineligible by the first criteria and waste-to-energy which was deemed 
ineligible by the second (EUFORE, 2001). 
Yet there are inconsistencies with these criteria. Co-firing of biomass 
with coal is allowed in for a limited time frame and limited quantity of ROCs. . 
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Table 2.4 ROS Eligible Technologies 
Wind Offshore or Onshore 
Marine Wave, Tidal, Current 
Solar Photovoltaic 
Hydro 
Small-scale hydro generating station (declared net capacity 
between 1.25 MW and 20 MW) 
* Micro-scale hydro generating station (declared net capacity less 
than 1.25 MW) 
Biomass * Biofuel produced from pyrolysis of biomass. 
* Biogas produced from anaerobic digestion, gasification or 
pyrolysis of biomass. 
* Generation station is fuelled by biomass combustion. 
Co-fired Biomass * Generation station Is fuelled part by biomass and part by fossil 
fuel. Only that portion of energy derived from biomass is eligible, 
after I April 06 biomass portion declines to 75% eligible, after 1 
April 2001 co-firing is not eligible. 
Waste Biofuel from pyrolysis of waste. 
Biogas produced from anaerobic digestion, gasification or 
pyrolysis of waste. 
* Sewage gas and Landfill gas. 
(ROS, 2002) 
Debate continues over which technologies to include and support 
(Ofgern A, 2001). The length of time co-firing biomass with coal In the 
Longannet Power Station was extended after political debate in 2004. The 
reason for the extension is to assist growers of energy crops with an assured 
market (RPA, 2003). This action will likely extend the commercial life of 
Longannet and other coal-fired plants. However, the use of escaping 
methane from old coal mines was rejected. Supporting methane capture 
technology would have assisted the diversion of a powerful GHG, CH4 to a 
beneficial use, electricity production (WEC, 2005). 
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Buyout Fee and Recycling of Funds (figures from Ofgern ROI, 2004) 
The option exists for suppliers to pay a buy-out fee to discharge their 
obligation. The option maybe exercised for any, or all, of the obligation. For 
the first obligation period, the buy-out price was set at E30 per ROC. The 
buy-out fee is adjusted once a year at the beginning of new obligation cycle, 
Ofgem matches the fee increase to the change in the Retail Price Index for 
the past year. The second and third years of the ROS had buy-out fees set 
at E30.51 and E31.39, respectfully (Ofgern R02,2005). 
The inclusion of the buy-out fee alternative in the ROS program was 
motivated by several reasons. First, the transaction costs of participating in 
the ROC market could be prohibitive for some companies, while a simple 
cash fee paid directly to Ofgem would fulfil the obligation more efficiently, i. e. 
small energy producing firms which would owe only a small number of ROCs 
to Ofgem. Ten of 28 energy producers in Scotland were obligated to submit 
less than 1,000 ROCs to Ofgern the first year of the ROS's operation. 
Another reason for the buy-out option was the total obligation due for 
the entire United Kingdom was expected to be greater than the forecasted 
amount of ROCs that would be produced and available each period. A 
mechanism was needed to compensate for the short fall of ROCs. 
The Oexcess demand" is actually a deliberate policy objective of the 
government. It is instituted to assure demand will exceed supply, so all 
ROCs produced will have demand for them in the marketplace. This will also 
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assist in sustaining high market Prices for ROCs, as suppliers bid against 
each other for the limited number of ROCs. 
A final reason for the buy-out fee was to increase the opportunity for 
optimal decision making by individual firms. Each firm could decide for 
themselves which method, or combination of methods, was the most efficient 
way to meet their regulatory obligation. 
Recycling of Funds 
Buy-out fees paid to Ofgem are collected than distributed back to the 
energy suppliers who participated in the ROC program. The funds are 
recycled on a proportional basis, based on the total number of ROCs 
submitted against the amount submitted by each supplier. 
Example: 
If an energy supply company submitted 300 ROCs to meet their renewables I 
obligation, they would be eligible to receive back a portion of the total buy-out fees 
collected by Ofgem. If the 300 ROCs represented 10% of the total ROCs submitted 
to Ofgern for that obligation period, the firm would be entitled to 10% of the fund 
created by the collect fees. Assuming the buy-out fund is worth E50,000, the firm 
would receive recycled funds of E5,000 from Ofgem. 
If the firm had chosen to pay the buy-out fee and not submit ROCs, the firm I 
would not receive any of the funds. If the firm had chosen to combine the two I 
methods, it would receive funds back from Ofgern In proportion to the ROCs Itl 
contributed. The buy-out fee paid In by the firm is irrelevant to the refund amount. 
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A SImplified Case Study 
This section now presents a case study from ROS's first year of 
operation and Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE). 
In the first obligation period a total of 867,596 ROCs were required 
from the 28 electricity suppliers in Scotland; 3% of the 28,919,867 MWh of 
electricity sold in Scotland that period. 
SSE submitted 115,755 ROCs, but had an obligation of 223,344 
certificates. All ROCs submitted by SSE, were collected from renewable 
power station which they owned. SSE did not purchase any ROC in the open 
market. 
The portion of SSE's obligation not met through submitting ROCs was 
fulfilled through. payment of a buy-out fee, approximately E3.2 million. 
SSE's ROCs accounted for 26% of the total ROCs submitted in Scotland, so 
SEE was entitled to a refund equal to 26% of the total buy-out fees collected 
for that period. 
Ofgem recycled funds totalling E2.8 million to SSE., 
After accounting for the refund, SSE met their 'obligation by submitting 
115,755 ROCs and E400,000. 
The same buy-out recycling mechanism resulted in a refund of E3.8 
million to Scottish Power (SP) for the same period. The below table itemises 
the funds returned to participants of the ROC program in the first year in 
Scotland. 
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Table 2.5 Redistribution of ROS buy-out 
Buy-out redistributed 
Supplier licence for ROCsISROCs 
produced (C) 
Atlantic Electric and Gas Ltd 0 
British Energy Generation Ltd 362,351 
British Gas Trading Limited 2,063,851 
Cinergy Global Trading Ltd 3,674 
Economy Power Ltd 74,288 
Electricity Direct (UK) Ltd 418,079 
Forturn Direct 0 
Forturn Energy Plus Limited 0 
London Electricity plc 186,451 
Maverick Energy Ltd 0 
Norweb Energi Ltd 0 
Npower Direct Ltd 30.125 
Npower Ltd 672,789 
Npower Northern Ltd 92.872 
Npower Yorkshire Ltd 95.439 
Opus Energy Ltd 235 
Powergen (UK) pic 241,402 
Powergen Retail Ltd 470.133 
ScottishPower Energy Retail Ltd 3,778.730 
Seeboard Energy Ltd 36,461 
Severn Trent Energy Ltd 47 
SSE Energy Supply Ltd 2,726,466 
TotalFinaElf Gas & Power Ltd 0 
TXU Direct Sales Ltd 0 
TXU Europe (Ah Online) Ltd 8,550 
TXU Europe (AHGD) Ltd 5,181 
TXU UK Ltd 0 
UK Electric Power Ltd 0 
Total 11,267,124 
(Ofgem ROI, 2004) 
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Effect of the Recycled Buy-out fee 
A major result of the buy-out fee being distributed back to participants is 
the market value for ROCs is not directly constrained by the value of the buy-out 
fee. The market price for ROCs is determined by the buy-out fee plus the 
expected refund. 
If Scottish & Southern Energy had not participated in the ROC program 
and they would have had to pay an additional E3,500,000 as the buy-out fee to 
meet their obligation, Their total cost to meet the obligation would have added up 
E6,700,000. (SSE did have 116,000 ROCs, this is a hypothetical, "if they did not 
have ROCs"; SSE would have had to pay E3,500,000 in additional fees) 
This means the 115,755 ROCs which were submitted by SSE off-set 
E6,300,000 in buy-out fees or approximately E55 per RM-The E6,300,000 
amount is the net amount not paid in to the fund (E6,700,000 - E400,000, after 
the recycled funds are accounted for). So the full value of a ROC to SSE is E55, 
not the E30 per ROC buy-out fee. 
For SSE, SIP and other energy companies that produce the necessary 
ROCS through internal operations, i. e. ownership of renewable power stations, 
ROCs could represent up to 75% of the revenue earned by generating and 
selling certified renewable energy. The wholesale electricity market in Scotland 
traded between E16 and E22 per MWh during 2002/03 period, depending on 
seasonal and daily demand for power. ROCs were earning SSE E55 per MWh. 
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Example2.1 Actual Ex-post Value of ROCs to Scottish& South em En orgy 
(2002/2003 obligation period) 
ROC Obligation 223,344 
Particloation in Program 
Fulfilled by self-generated ROCs and cash 
115,755 ROCs 
E3,227,670 Cash Buy-out 
E2,726,466 Refund 
E 501,204 Net Cash out 
Non-varticivation In Program 
Fulfilled by 
E6,700,320 Cash Buy-out 
Offset E6,700,320-E501,204=E6.199.116 value of ROCs not subfttted. 
C6,199,116/ 115,755 ROCs = E53.661ROC. true ex-vost value of submitted 
-ROCs 
(Note: All amounts are related to transactions under ROS and do not Include 
activities in England and Wales, where SP and SSE were also major partidpants. 
Difference between actual amounts and rounded amounts in above discussion are 
due to the buy-out fund being under paid, as several companies had gone into 
receivership) 
A power supply firm which purchased all of the necessary ROCs from 
the marketplace at E47(see Graph 2.1), in the first obligation period would 
have had an ex-post value after the buy-out fee refund of E23. E7 less 
than the buy-out fee during that period. Participation in the ROCs market 
and using RM to meet the obligation has a cost of E23 per certificate. 
Meeting the obligation by simply paying the buy-out fee has a cost of 
E30 per certificate. 
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Grag)h 2.1 Market Prices per ROC, with Expected Recycled Buy-out Funds 
hbrket Price per ROC, w th Expected Recycled Buy-out Funds 
cr 50 
00 
0 2D 40 60 80 100 
Fl&rcerftp of Renew abies Obligation Met by ROOS Submissions 
(Buy-out fee = MOM) 
Note: Assuming no transaction costs, the expected market value of ROCs with 
the buy-out funds being recycled is: Market PriceIROC = Buy-out FeeIROC + 
Recycled FundslROC, where the Buy-out fee = E301'ROC and Recycled Funds 
= [(Total ROCs Obligated - ROCs submitted) *00]. Using the above graph, the 
estimated maximum market value of ROCs in the first period should have been 
E54.55, with 55% of the obligation being met with ROCs. 
Market for ROCs 
The trading of ROCs between renewables producers and electricity 
suppliers happens in two distinct manners. The first is a standard commercial 
trading market; parties seek each other out and negotiate bilateral contracts for 
the ROCs (contracts do not have to include the physical electricity being 
generated). Any legal contract may be negotiated. These deals are typically 
confidential and details such as price, quantity, contract duration and delivery 
terms are not available to other participants in the market. 
The second manner in which ROCs are transacted is an open public auction. 
Most of the renewable energy projects constructed under the Scottish 
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Renewables Ordei6 (SRO)'contracts in'the 1990's were eligible to become ROC 
certified producers. However, the ROCs do not belong to the generating 
companies, but to SP and SSE, who hold long-term contracts for delivery of all 
electricity generated by the SRO projects. The Non-Fossil Purchasing Agency 
(Scotland) (NFPAS) acts as agent for SSE and SP to conduct an open auction of 
ROCs four times a year. The total number of ROCs auctioned for the first 
obligation year was slightly less than the 60% of the total ROCs available 
(NFPAS, 2004). 
Table 2.6 ROC Auction Prices as Conducted and Reported by NFPAS 
Date (month & vea 
October 2002 
January 2003 
April 2003 
July 2003 
October 2003 
January 2004 
Apdl 2004 
July 2004 
November 2004 
January 2005 
(NFPAS, 2004 and 2005) 
Amount M Quantity (approx. 1 
C47.13 85,000 
E47.46 64,000 
E46.47 190,000 
E48.21 158,000 
E45.93 123,000 
E47.46 96,000 
E49.11 166,000 
E52.07 176,000 
E48.50 129,000 
E47.46 151,000 
The public auctions fulfil an important role beyond market making and the 
exchange of ROCs. It provides a public and transparent price signal which all 
interested parties can use for contract negotiations. Market agents can use this 
information to develop better negotiating strategies and operate with improved 
information and expectations. Greater confidence in optimal decision making can 
.I 
be gained for each firm's specific trading circumstances. 
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The portion of ROCs being auctioned has declined as more non-SRO projects 
have been commissioned. Starting in 2005, under new legislation, any producer 
of ROCs can use the auction system operated by NFPAS to send their 
certificates to market. This inclusion of non-SRO projects was the result of 
lobbying efforts by both buyers and sellers of ROCs. They mutually expressed 
support for the efficiency and effectiveness of the auction market (NFPAS, 2004). 
Taxes 
The funds collected by NFPAS from the auction of SRO issued ROCs are 
not forwarded to SP or SSE. Rather, they are retained by Ofgem to fund the price 
subsidy needed for SRO contracts. The collection of SRO ROC moneys has lead 
to the suspension of the Fossil Fuel Levy, in Scotland. Approximately E23.7 
million in taxes were avoided by Scottish electricity consumers starting the first 
year the ROS was implemented. Until November 2004, the total FFL avoided 
taxes have added up to approximately E57 million (NFPAS, 2004). 
Most electricity generated by SRO and ROS eligible power producers is 
exempt from the Climate Change Levy (CCL). The CCL was created in 2001 and 
is applied to all industrial and commercial consumption of electricity that comes 
from fossil-fuel or nuclear power sources. Household consumption is not taxed. 
The levy is charged at a flat rate on each kWh of energy consumed, at the 
following rates: 
Electricity 
Natural Gas 
0 CoaVLignfte 
0 LPG 
(CCL, 2004) 
0.43p/kWh 
0.15plkWh 
1.17plkg (appro)dmately 0.15p/kWh) 
0.96p/kg (approAmately 0.07p/kWh) 
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Other non-SRO and non-ROS produced renewable power can also be 
exempted from this tax. The CCL does not directly deal with or affect the ROC 
market, but it does have an impact on the demand for the physical commodity 
produced. Renewables generated electricity purchased for use by a commercial 
or industrial consumer is exempted from paying the CCL. This exemption can 
represent. a savings of 5% - 15% of the total cost of electricity. For large 
electricity intensive industrial processes this CCL exemption can represent a 
significant change in their costs of production. The CCL is essentially a penalty 
on fossil-fuelled and nuclear energy and a subsidy of renewable power. 
Near Term Course for the ROS 
The Renewables Obligation Scotland has completed two and-a-half years 
of operation. During autumn 2004, the Scottish Executive scheduled a 
consultation to advice on additional or corrective legislation to the ROS (SE-ROS 
2005). The proposed changes as proposed from the consultation are: 
1) Increase the obligation time frame and amount. Currently the obligation is 
scheduled to increase until 2011 and have an obligation of 11.4%. The proposal 
is to extend the schedule to 2016 and increase the obligation by 1% each year, 
so the final year has a maximum obligation of 15.4%. This final level will be in 
effect until 2027. 
Reasoning: renewable energy projects are dependent on long-term capital 
financing. Financing terms for commercial energy projects normally require 
projects to have high confidence in their revenue stream for at least 15 years, the 
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standard length of capital loans in the industry (Casazza, 2003). To provide this 
confidence, the obligation must always have a time frame longer than the loan 
terms and the expected market price for ROCs needs continued support by the 
obligation being higher than the available number of ROCs. 
2) Extension of ROS to allow participation of Northern Ireland. It is expected that 
Northern Ireland will institute similar legislation to the ROS in 2005. The program 
will be called Northern Ireland Renewables Obligation (NIRO). The proposal is to 
have the same unified market for ROCs as exists with England, Wales and 
Scotland. 
Reasoning: the larger the market the greater opportunity to increase efficiency 
and effectiveness of the program by allowing more competition between sellers 
and buyers of ROCs. It will allow for greater optimization of geographic 
renewable energy resources that can benefit the entire United Kingdom. 
3) Introduction of late-payment surcharges buy-out fees and the mutualisation of 
the ROS buy-out funds. 
Reasoning: the buy-out fees equalling E23.7 million were either paid late or were 
completely defaulted upon between the RO and the ROS. Less than E500,000 of 
the shortfall was in the ROS fund. Over E16 million of the shortfall in the RO fund 
was due to a single supplier going into, default, TXU UK Ltd. Actual recycled 
funds were E2.80/ROC less than the expected expost market value with refund, 
because of the E23.2 million shortfall in the England and Wales buy-out fund. 
This had a chilling effect on the market for RM as well as damaging investor 
confidence in the renewables energy industry. 
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4) Introduction of a unified buy-out fund and recycling for the ROS, RO 
and NIRO. 
Reasoning: the same as stated in- item 3 above, there is opportunity for arbitrage 
between the RO and ROS funds, and NIRO funds when it is created. By handling 
the funds in a UK wide manner the arbitrage potential Is eliminated. 
5) Allow small generator (less than 50 M capacity) to accumulate and submit 
ROCs on a flexible schedule. 
Reason: to allow small operators to minimize their transaction costs and motivate 
greater uptake of renewables by households and community based systems. 
6) Allow biomass generators to supplement their energy crop fuel with municipal 
waste or fossil fuel (methane or coal) Up to 10% of the total energy Input to the 
station. 
Reasoning: technical efficiency of biomass combustion, some generating 
systems may occasionally need high grade carbon fuels to be included. This is 
especially the case of coal-fired plants which have been converted to use 
biomass fuels. 
Potential for Strategic Behaviour 
The ROCs market has been consciously designed by government 
, regulators to allow as much private initiative and open market incentives as 
- possible. But this design has left room for strategic behavior by both sellers and 
buyers that may distort the market equilibrium and even destabilize confidence in 
the market and thus slow the expansion of renewable energy. 
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The obligation quota can act as a ceiling on the amount of renewables that 
will be built. As a greater percentage of the renewables obligation quota is met 
the value of ROCs decrease until the value collapses to zero (See Graph 2.1). It 
is highly unlikely that a firm would enter the market and produce ROCs that 
would exceed the quota. In fact, there is motivation and potential for firms to 
behave strategically. - alone or in collusion with others, by under producing energy 
and causing the price of ROCs to remain higher than they would have otherwise. 
Market concentration and production management should be, monitored 
accordingly. 
Licensed electricity supply companies who -have their own renewable 
generation facilities have a distinct revenue advantage. They are able to capture 
the total ex-post value of the ROCs. The auction price of ROCs has consistently 
been E5 to E9 below the theoretically maximum ex-post price. Various types of 
transaction costs and market risks can account for this value gap. The smaller a 
firm is the higher their time discount rate is likely to be, therefore buyers of ROCs 
can negotiate lower prices because buyers only need ROCs annually, after the 
end of the obligation period. Transaction costs contribute to the value gap. As 
discussed earlier there is risk in the buy-out fund being fully funded and recycled. 
Finally, there is the stochastic nature of ROC production, if the natural resources, 
e. g., sun, rain and wind, are better than forecast, ROC prices will be depressed. 
Technologic obsolescence is a greater risk in the renewables power 
generation sector than the rest of the energy/power industry. The learning curves 
for'most renewables tech'nol'ogi6s are steep and'costs"are falling quickly -. The 
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physical number of manufactured units is growing so rapidly, that cost curves for 
wind energy have been reduced by 50% in ten years (Wene, 2003). The potential 
for new entrants into the marketplace and decreasing ROC prices because of 
lower average costs may bring over production and collapse of prices, or at least 
lower prices, as discussed previously. Also, negotiating strength shifts to buyers 
and away from sellers, as sellers need long term contracts to guard against this 
risk. Rent seeking by purchasers is likely. 
Renewables technology is capital intensive and requires large amounts of 
long-term capital financing. Established firms like SP and SSE, and other major 
power producers, have a significant competitive advantage over smaller or newer 
firms in the market because of their pre-existing dominance, size, and ability to 
distribute investment risk over all corporate assets, not just against a single 
project. The large firms are possibly better equipped to build large wind farms 
and gain economic rents from economies of scale. 
I Renewables Policy during the 1990's 
Prior to 2002, the principle program for renewables development in 
Scotland originated in 1994 and was a series of three orders called the Scottish 
Renewables Obligation (SRO). These orders placed an obligation on the two 
electric utility monopolies (Scottish & Southern Energy and Scottish Power) 
which operated in Scotland. They were required to purchase all renewable 
energy generated by contracted projects. The Scottish government set specific 
goals with each new order for the types of renewables technology to be 
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contracted, e. g. - small and large wind farms, biomass gasification, municipal 
waste combustion, landfill gas, and small hydro. The MW capacity to be built for 
each technology band was also pre-determined before each new order. Each 
technology was also to receive different support levels in the form of capital 
construction grants and price subsidies for the electricity sold. (Scottish 
Parliament, 2000) 
The Fossil Fuel Levy (FFL), a new tax on electricity produced using fossil 
fuels, was created in conjunction with the SRO. The funds collected from the 
FFL were used to compensate the utilities for higher prices that were necessary 
to pay for electricity delivered from renewable power generation companies. This 
tax was as high as 11 % in the mid-1 990's (Scottish Parliament, 2000). 
Possibly the most important aspect of the SRO/FFL legislation was not its 
effect on feriewables but that nuclear energy was exempt from the levy. The 
fiscal impact on the nuclear energy industry was magnitudes'greater than that on 
renewables. In the ten years that the FFL operated in Scotland, 25% to 35% of 
electricity produced was by nuclear plants. The levy exemption amounted to a 
several hundred million pounds profit support for the industry that had higher 
production costs that its closest competitors, coal-fired and natural gas-fired 
power producers. This created a significant distortion of the market and acted as 
a major subsidy to nuclear energy which the government was trying to privatise 
(Mitchell and Conner, 2004). 
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The sum total of renewable energy projects actually constructed under the 
SRO policy'regime is listed below. The final SRO order was In 1999, but less 
than half of the contracted 'projects from 1994 tol 999 have been built as of. 
December 2004. Price supports will continue as late as 2015. 
Table 2.7 Scottish Renewables Obligation Projects 
(commissioned as of 12/2004) 
Technoloqv Prolects MW 
Onshore Wind Farms 17 79 
Shoreline Wave 1 0.05 
Hydro 1 3.3 
Biomass Combustion 1 12.5 
Landfill Gas 9 20.7 
- 
TOTAL 29 116.0 
(SE-RED, 2004) 
Most of the electric energy produced in the 'Other renewables' category 
during 2002 was derived from SRO supported projects. , 
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Renewables Policy since 2002 
With the election of Labour in 1997, with its manifesto including the 
expansion of renewable energy sources, extensive public consultation took place 
about energy policy (Kimber, 2005). One result of these consultations was a new 
renewable energy support program which was launched in April 2002., It is called 
the Renewables Obligation (Scotland) (ROS). It is important to distinguish 
between the name of this current program ROS and the prior program SRO. 
The affect of this new support program on the rate of construction and 
commissioning of new renewable energy projects has been dramatic. Since 
inception there has been a 160% expansion in generating capacity in just 33 
months. Only two small demonstration projects are being directly funded by 
government support. One of these projects is a proto-type marine generation 
system and the other a small municipal waste-gas system. The ROS program 
has been extensively discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Table 2.8 Renewables Obligation (Scotland) Projects 
(commissioned as of 12/2004) 
Technolo-civ Prolects mw 
Onshore Wind Farms 5 165 
Wave-offshore 
Hydro 
Biomass Combustion 
1 0.75 
00 
1 0.2 
Landfill Gas 8 14.3 
TOTAL 16 180.25 
* in addition to these projects, Longannet and Cockenzie coal-fired power plants 
have become certified to generate power using a portion of combustible biomass 
that qualifies as renewable energy. (SE-RED, 2004) 
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While government support has continued, it has been significantly 
redirected to support technology in the research and development stage. This 
basic research level technology is distant from commercial viability and therefore 
needs support as only limited private funds are being invested. Funds have been 
diverted to assist Scottish communities develop indigenous energy supply 
projects (SCHRI, 2004). 
Chart 2.1 Existing Renewables Projects in Scotland 
(commissioned as of 12/2004) 
Exisfing Renewables Proj*cts 
by MW Capacity (as of 120004) 
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(SE-RED, 2004) 
More dramatic growth is expected to occur in the near term. The quantity 
of renewable energy projects currently consented for construction will bring a 
250% expansion over the 180 MW of existing capacity, as they are 
commissioned. Projects that have applied for government consent to build and 
are currently being evaluated by the Scottish Executive, local planning boards or 
councils, may account for a 1000% increase in renewables capacity. Project 
developers have notified local councils and the Scottish Executive of an 
, -AQW ., 
-VI 
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Onshore Wnd Marine Kid ro lbom as a Landfill Cles, 
Farm& Combustion 
additional 4230 MW of capacity that is being contemplated; technical and 
environmental feasibility studies are being conducted at this time. These pre- 
application (study and scoping stage) projects would represent a 23-fold increase 
in capacity over existing renewable energy projects. These pre-application 
projects are almost exclusively onshore wind farms. 
Chart 2.2 Capacity (MW) by Technology (12/2004) 
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The value of energy projects that are permitted and awaiting construction 
have a capital cost of approximately E800 million. The construction budget for 
projects currently in the permitting process is worth approximately E1.6 billion. 
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The following section will describe and evaluate how the new govemment 
policy has changed market dynamics of the power sector, and motivated large 
amounts of private investment capital to enter the market and expand production 
of renewable energy. 
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Conclusion 
The ROS is fulfilling its primary objective of stimulating the availability of 
investment funds for deploying new renewable energy projects. The availability of 
funds has drawn many new firms into the renewables development market, as 
well as causing established firms to expand their existing operations. The 
number of projects in a planning or implementation stage in Scotland is growing 
into the hundreds and may well deliver several thousand MWs of new capacity. 
The combined revenues from the sale of electricity and ROCs gives renewable 
generating firms 300% to 400% higher prices per MWh produced than the price 
received by traditional fossil-fuelled power producers. The theory that economic 
profits will draw firms into a market is proving true in this scenario. 
However, some potential problems and issues have become apparent, as 
the renewables obligation program approaches the completion of it third year of 
operating. The vast majority of these new ý projects will be onshore wind farms, 
with a small portion of small-scale hydro projects, and minimal amounts of all 
other technologies. Only those technologies which. were on the cusp of being 
economically competitive have been promoted and deployed, by corrimercial 
enterprises. 
The ROS appears to have been a failure in motivating private industry to 
invest in greater research and development on technologies that are still distant 
from profitability, even at the new price levels, which include the ROC premium. 
Calls from the technology development sector, some might say the demands, for 
even greater levels of direct government support for basic research are growing. 
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The industry was expected to take on additional financial risks and invest more in 
renewable technology research with the potential financial rewards becoming so 
great. 
Wind farms by their nature need access to the wind so are built on high 
unobstructed hills, so are very visible to the surrounding countryside. This 
potential change to the rural landscape and environment is a growing concem to 
some of the Scottish public. Chapter 4 attempts to estimate the value of these 
impacts which renewable energy projects may have on the environment. 
The key policy variables within the ROS are the obligation quota, duration 
of the obligation, and the buy-out fee. As important as these policy variables are, 
maintaining independent energy markets and financial markets is critical to 
success of the ROS, so as allow maximum self-determination of business firms 
in their individual optimal behaviour and decision-making. How these different 
variables interact and the stability of the market is of some concem. Chapter 6 
presents a model of the strategic interactions between two firms operating under 
government- renewables obligation program and their response to changes in the 
obligation quota and buy-out fee. 
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Introduction to Renewable Energy Literature ,ý 
The economic literature on renewable energy is vast. Many fields 
of economics must be included to fully discuss issues about the use, 
development, and consequences of deploying renewable energy 
technologies. Power economics, energy economics, information and 
knowledge transfer economics, environmental and resource economics, 
and political economy must be included for any comprehensive 
discussion. 
Also, a working knowledge of power systems engineering is 
necessary, as the physical limitations of power production, transmission 
and distribution have explicit physical limits. Many simplifying 
assumptions which are commonly used in economic analysis would make 
the findings invalid if the physical reality of the engineered system were 
not correctly modelled. 
The author does not attempt to include all this information or 
review the literature in this thesis. 
The review presented in this chapter will generally limit itself to a 
discussion of literature that has used environmental economic analytic 
methods to examine questions about renewable energy issues. Also, 
included is literature which assisted in understanding the non-quantitative 
preferences of the public and choice experiment respondents. This 
consists principally of public opinion surveys. 
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Public Opinion Surveys 
There have been numerous surveys in Scotland and the United 
Kingdom which have examined the public's perception and preferences 
for renewable energy. Findings from several such surveys are presented 
and discussed below. 
Understanding people's preferences, before the choice experiment 
is conducted is important to the investigative process. The choice 
experiment is an attempt to go from quantification of people's opinion 
(and possibly strength of opinion) to valorising that opinion through stated 
preference analysis. 
The most definitive public opinion survey conducted to date in 
Scotland was commissioned by the Scottish Executive, Scottish Natural 
Heritage and the Forestry Commission. The survey, Public Attitudes to 
the Environment in Scotland 2002 (referred to as the PAES study). was 
conducted by the Social Research department within the Scottish 
Executive (Social Research, 2002). The sample includes interviews from 
over 4000 persons in Scotland. 
Portions of the survey findings are presented below with 
discussion of how the findings relate to the study in Chapter 4. Other 
surveys which have been conducted are also presented to give 
compadson. 
Table 3.1 below, show that wind and solar power had recognition 
levels equivalent to that of major power sources like coal and hydro. 
Nuclear power was the most recognized of all sources for electricity. This 
information helps to create an a Priori expectation of what context and 
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energy sources respondents will consider when faced with a choice 
experiment that involves renewables and traditional power sources. 
Table 3.1 Public Awareness of Electric Power Generation - Technologies 
PAES - Survey Question: Before today, which of the 
following ways of generating electlicity had you heard of.? 
Technolo-qv Percentam Aware 
Nuclear power stations 90 
Coal and oil fired power stations 85 
Hydroelectric power 87 
Wind power 84 
Wave power 57 
Solar power 82 
Wood (or other plants) used as a 
Fuel to generate'electricity 47 
Gas used as a fuel to generate 
Electricity 63 
Combined heat and power from 
Industrial processes 41 
None of these 0 
Don't know 1 
N= 1989 (Social Research, 2002) 
One of the most relevant findings was the low recognition of 
natural gas, which provides 25% of total electricity production. It is also 
the principle means by which electricity demand growth has been met for 
the last 15 years. Gas was the stated energy source for electricity in the 
Oneither" profile used in Chapter 4. 
In a national survey conducted in England, Wales and Scotland, 
"Attitudes and Knowledge of Renewable Energy amongst the General 
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Public: Report of Findings August 2003' (referred to as the A&K study) 
JNS, 2003). Knowledge of specific renewable energy technologies 
varied considerably between individuals. Whilst 44% of the survey 
sample claimed to know a lot or a little about solar power, this was only 
10% for biomass energy. Less than 10% of the general public claimed to 
Oknow a lot" about any of the renewable energy technologies. 
Although perceived levels of understanding were fairly low across 
all technologies, solar, hydro-electric and onshore wind power were best 
understood (with 44%, 41% and 39% claiming to know a little or a lot 
about each of them, respectively). Marine and biomass technologies were 
unknown to many: over three-quarters of respondents were not aware of 
or knew only very little about each of these. It is therefore perceptions of 
solar, hydro and onshore wind power that currently drive opinion of 
renewable energy in general. 
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Table 3.2 Public Awareness of Electric Power Generation - Attributes 
PAES - Survey Question: Which of the following 
statements would you say applies to generating electricity 
by each method? (Percentage of yes responses) 
Statement Nuclear Coal Natural Wind Other 
Power & Oil Gas Hydro Power Renewables 
Very expensive 35 21 15 16 10 ij 
Uses up natural 8 70 51 5 2 3 
resources that will run 
Out 
Produces greenhouse 29 37 38 5 1 1 
gases 
Does not pollute air or 4 3 5 37 59 46 
water 
Cannot generate a 2 5 4 16 42 34 
supply power at all times 
Creates a lot of noise 11 17 7 14 13 2 
that affects local people 
Produces dangerous 73 22 19 5 0 1 
wastes 
Is an eyesore 35 26 17 10 17 4 
Means energy can be 1 4 3 19 39 32 
produced on a small 
scale, close to where it 
is used 
None of these 1 1 3 5 3 3 
Don't know 11 12 17 20 12 22 
N= 1989 (Social Research, 2002) 
As with the prior question, these statistics help support an a prioli 
hypothesis about the positive or negative utility respondents associate 
with the use of different energy technologies in Chapter 4 
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Four particular attributes from the list in Table 3.2 are of special 
interest: 
Produces greenhouse gases 
Does not pollute air or water 
Is an eyesore 
Creates a lot of noise that affects local people 
These perceived attributes may be used to predict the welfare 
changes estimated for hypothetical renewable energy project profiles 
created in Table 4.7 Welfare Changes from New Renewable Energy 
Projects. The first two statements relate to the air pollution attribute, the 
third is related to landscape change, whilst the last statement shows that 
similar portions of respondents consider wind farms to have 
approximately the same noise levels to that of other major power stations 
like coal, nuclear and hydro. This information contradicts the focus group 
finding for the choice experiment, which showed that noise was not a 
concern in regards to renewables. 
Graph 3.1 Perceived Effects of Energy Sources on Environment 
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The A&K study (TNS, 2003) found comparable'portions of the 
general population agreed with similar statements to those use in Table 
3.2. The vast majority of respondents (93%) agreed that "using renewable 
energy sources is a way of looking after our children's future'. This 
statement lends support to the expectation of finding an endowment 
effect in the choice experiment. 
Agreement exceeded three-quarters of the A&K sample for these 
statements: wrenewable energy schemes are less polluting than burning 
fossil fuels"; Othere are more advantages than disadvantages to using 
renewable energy" and *renewable energy schemes are less damaging to 
the landscape than fossil fuel generating plants". 
Encouragingly, almost two-thirds of respondents disagreed that uall 
renewable energy schemes are unattractive" once again reflecting the 
generally positive attitude towards renewable energy. Unfortunately, there 
is no breakdown between nations to see the exact Scottish proportions to 
these statements. 
In excess of 90% of the public sample stated that renewable 
energy was a "very good" or a fairly good idea. Very few respondents 
(1%) described renewable energy as a bad idea. Almost two-thirds of the 
general public felt that it is 'much better" to use renewable energy 
sources than fossil fuels and a further 21 % felt that it iswa little better". 
The A&K survey asked a follow-up question of persons who rated 
renewable energy as a "very good" or "fairly good" idea. The respondents 
were asked why they believed renewables were good. Table 3. x shows 
the most common responses. 
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Table 3.3 Reasons for positive opinion of renewable energy 
Reason for Positive Rating Total % 
Environmentally friendly 28 
Less pollution/ greenhouse gases 11 
Cleaner 5 
OillcoaVfossil fuel damage environment 4 
Less/no waste 2 
Safer/safer to produce/safer for the public 2 
Any environmental benefits: 47 
Fossil fuels/other resources will run out/are is 
finite 
Save fossil fuels/don't use up resources 13 
Think about the futurelfor the futureAn the long 4 
term 
Any_'Ifor the future" benefits: 40 
Natural/natural resource 8 
It won't un out/can use again and again 8 
It's replaceable/renewable/sustainable 5 
Available/accessible/plenty of it 3 
Any sustainability benefits: 25 
Costs less/cheaper/cost effective 12 
Its free/its free after its been set up 2 
Economical 2 
Any economic benefits: 16 
An alternative/new idea/new sourcelprogress 5 
Better than current methods 2 
Don'tnow 2 
Base: General public sample respondents who stated renewable 
energy was a good idea, N= 1206. 
(TNS, 2003) 
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Graph 3.2 Preferred Technologies for Electricity Production 
PAES - Survey Question: How much energy do you think 
SHOULD be generated by each of these methods? 
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The above graph illustrates the different ratios of current 
technologies used to produce electricity and the public's preference for 
which technologies should be used and their relative contribution. 
There is a high endogenous preference for renewables expansion 
over all fossil fuel and nuclear sources. 
The choice experiment presented in Chapter 4 does not examine 
the issue of cumulative effects from multiple renewable energy projects 
through out Scotland; rather it examines the attributes of individual 
projects, in isolation from any other facilities. 
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Table3.4 Public Preference for Wind Fanns In Scotland- 
PAES - Survey Question: Which of these statements 
comes closest to your view on wind farms being used to 
generate electricity in Scotland? 
Statement Percentaqe In Aqreement 
We should create lots of small wind farms 19 
We should create a few large wind farms 21 
We should create lots of small AND a few large 
Wind farms 43 
We should not create any wind farms at all 2 
Don't know 12 
None 1 
Other I 
Total 99%* 
* Does not equal 100% due to rounding error. 
N= 1989 (Social Research, 2002) 
Table 3.4 indicates the public's preference for how widespread 
deployment should occur. However, the scenarios ranked above do not 
co-inside with the welfare values derived in the CE in Chapter 4. The 
implicit prices derived in the choice experiment estimated large and 
significant compensation would have to be paid for large onshore wind 
farms and a relatively small WTP for a moderate onshore wind farm. 
In 2003, MORI Scotland, a major public research firm in Scotland, 
conducted a survey of persons living close (within 20km) to wind farms in 
Scotland. 1,810 adults were questioned about their perceptions and 
expectations prior to the wind farm(s) being constructed in their area and 
how they currently feel about the projects (MORI, 2003). 
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Important findings from that research address many of the fears 
over negative environmental changes that people believe may occur. 
The first finding is that over half (54%) of the people would support 
a 50% increase in the wind farm size if it was proposed. This indicates 
that once a wind farm is in place the marginal impact on near by residents 
of enlarging the project is negligible. From this information the author 
conjectures that people will demonstrate a high and significant 
willing ness-to-pay to keep landscape pristine, but pay lesser amounts to 
change (mitigate) projects from high or medium impact to a lower level of 
impact. 
This support for expansion actually increases to 65% the closer in 
distance respondents live to a project. However, respondent's support 
does fall to around 40% if the proposed wind farm expansion is to double 
the size. 
82% of respondents living close to wind farms support an increase 
in the amount of electric power generated from wind farms in Scotland. 
This support for wind farms corresponds to the finding of the 
choice experiment which found different environmental preferences 
between rural and urban households. Wind farms will generally be 
located in rural areas and the rural population reveals a willingness-to- 
accept some development but not at a high impact level. 
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Diaqram 3.1 
Charts 45 and 46 from Attitudes and Knowledge of Renewable Energy 
Survey 
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The Attitudes and Knowledge of Renewable Energy survey went 
further than any other opinion researchers in trying to determine the 
difference between agreeing with renewables, because of the social 
pressure to agree (yea-saying) and the actual willingness to accept a 
renewables project near a respondent's residence. Respondents were 
asked; 'Which of the following deschbes what your reaction would be if a 
(renewable technology)... was developed in your area? " The results 
are presented in the following charts from the report (TNS, 2003). 
Alternative energy facilities were also presented to gather a comparable 
status quo baseline. The status quo consists of the power plants currently 
in use. 
Stated Preference Studies Relating to Renewable Energy 
Most research conducted , by environmental economists 
has 
concentrated in two areas; issues relating to wind farms and green pricing 
of electricity without regard to generation, tech n ology. As a result, there 
are few environmental valuation studies directly comparable to the study 
presented in Chapter 4. All comparable studies, except one, are solely 
oriented toward wind farm valuation. 
Environmental Impacts 
There is a limited amount of quantitative research into changes 
that occur in household utility from the construction of renewable energy 
projects with the resulting change in environmental amenities. 
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Stated preference studies that have examined the environmental 
impact of renewable energy development are by Alvarez-Farizo and 
Hanley (2002), EK (2002 and 2005) and Hanley and Nevin (1999). All 
these studies used stated preference valuation methods to estimate the 
environmental impact of wind farms. 
Alvarez-Farizo, et al, used potential wind farm development in a 
geographical area of interest in the north of Spain, to compare estimated 
implicit prices derived by two survey techniques, choice experiments and 
contingent rating. The choice experiment survey used three 
environmental attributes, two the same as in Chapter 4 and one new 
attribute, plus a standard monetary attribute. The former attributes being 
the impacts on "landscape" and "habitat and flora" (vs. impacts on 
landscape and wildlife in Chapter 4) and the later attribute being impact 
on "cliffs", an important geographic feature. Binary coding was used for 
the environmental attributes, with the coding indicating rather the quality 
was either protected from impact or would be lost by impact from a wind 
farm project. 
While the implicit prices are not directly comparable with Chapter 
2, some general observations can be made. Wildlife and landscape 
impacts were statistically significant in both studies, and wildlife impacts 
were given a higher value than landscape impacts. The contingent rating 
survey gave the same ordering and statistically significant results as the 
choice experiment, but had monetary values for landscape and wildlife 
approximately 45% lower. It was proposed that the survey respondents 
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did not pay as much attention to the price variable in the choice 
experiment as in the contingent rating survey. 
Ek (2002) used a choice expedment to estimate the value given by 
Swedish households to certain wind farm characteristics. 1000 
households were sent a mail survey with descriptive information about 
wind farms, 6 choice sets and a questionnaire about the respondent's 
environmental attributes and socioeconomic characteristics. The author 
used four non-monetary attributes of wind farms: noise level, location, 
turbine height, and size of wind farm. Household electricity prices were as 
the monetary attribute. The preliminary statistical analysis failed the IIA 
assumption so a random effects binary probit model was used to analyse 
the survey data. 
The implicit prices derived by this survey have similarities to the 
results derived in Chapter 4. Attributes that increase the degree of 
landscape intrusion create a negative WTP for Swedish households just 
as in Scottish households. When wind farms are large -or located in the 
mountains, electric power costs would have to decrease to compensate 
households for the negative. change in utility. Households revealed a 
willing ness-to-pay to have wind farms be small or located offshore. 
Values estimated for noise, and height of wind turbines were small and 
not statistically significant. 
Hanley and Nevin (1999), used two methods to evaluate the 
potential impacts on the local - environmental in a rural - Scottish area, 
Assynt, in North West Scotland. Three possible renewable energy options 
were proposed: a three-turbine, wind farm, a small-scale'ý hydroelectric 
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scheme and a small biomass generating station. The two survey methods 
used were a visitor impact analysis and a contingent valuation study of 
resident's preferences. 
The impact analysis estimated in monetary values of changes in 
tourism rates would be affected by renewables development. The least 
cost scenario wasý"no build" and the status quo would continue. The 
implied ranking, from least costly to most costly, of the three possible 
projects is wind farm, small-scale hydroelectric then biomass station. It 
was noted that the tourists preferred any project be community-led, as 
this would facilitate greater local income, better represent local resident's 
desires for their community, and decrease the possibility of failure. 
Tourism is a small sector of the economy in the study area, but was 
growing, so any renewables project had the potential to effect long-term 
prospects for the Assynt area. 
The CV study resulted in, implied community VVTP rankings of: 
small-scale hydroelectric scheme, wind farm, then biomass generating. 
The first two projects had similar WTP values of E14,282 and E13,585, 
respectfully. The biomass project's estimated WTP was less than half that 
of the other two projects. 
Other findings in this study showed preferences were sensitive to 
the specific location of proposed projects and that opposition was not 
necessarily related to the type of technology, also that jobs creation was 
an important attribute. for exchange of environmental amenities. 
All of these stated preference studies cited and discussed above 
concur with the general findings of Chapter 4. That there are negative 
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impacts from the construction of renewables projects. There is agreement 
that people have willing ness-to-pay for decreasing the impact on 
landscape and view sheds, as well as, to decrease the harm to wildlife 
that might result from projects. Biomass technology will face difficulties 
being accepted if jobs creation is not sufficient large. 
Revealed Preference Studies Relating to Renewable Energy 
Heclonic Valuation' 
The Hedonic Pricing Method estimates economic values for 
environmental amenities that directly affect market prices of some other 
good. This method is commonly applied to variations in housing prices 
that reflect the value of local environmental attributes. 
It can be used to estimate economic benefits or costs associated 
with: 
* environmental quality, including air pollution, water pollution, or 
noise I 
* environmental amenities, ýsuch as aesthetic views, proximity to 
renewable energy sites, or the opportunity to observe wildlife. 
The foundation stone of the hedonic pricing method is Lancaster's 
Characteristic Theory of Value 2; the price of a marketed good is related to 
its characteristics, or the services it provides. For example, the price of a 
house reflects the characteristics of that house - size, comfort, style, 
location, number of bed rooms and bathrooms, and aesthetic views, etc. 
The descdption of hedonic p'ncing, is ta'ken- iiom Ecosystem Va I luation by King et al., 
2005. 
2 See Chapter 4, section on Economic Theory and Econometric Models. 
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Therefore, it is possible to value the individual characteristics of a house, 
or other any good, by examining how the market price people are willing 
to pay changes when the charactedstics change. 
The hedonic pricing method is most often used to value 
environmental amenities that affect the price of residential properties. 
There are two basic steps to the conducting hedonic analysis: 
Step 1: 
Collect data on residential property sales in the region for a 
specific time period (usually one year). The required data include: 
* selling prices and locations of residential properties 
* property characteristics that affect selling prices, such as lot size, 
number and size of rooms, and number of bathrooms 
* neighbourhood characteristics that affect selling prices, such as 
property taxes, crime rates, and quality of schools 
* accessibility characteristics that affect prices, such as distances to 
work and shopping centres, and availability of public transportation 
* environmental characteristics that affect prices 
In the case of renewable energy facilities, the environmental 
characteristic of concern is the change to visible landscape near the 
residence or along commonly travelled roadways. 
Step 2: 
Once the data are collected and compiled, the next step is to statistically 
estimate a function that relates property values to the property 
characteristics, including the impact on the view shed. The resulting 
104 
function measures the portion of the property price that is attributable to 
each 
The hedonic pricing method is relatively straightforward and 
uncontroversial to apply, because it is based on actual market prices and 
fairly easily measured data. If data are readily available, it can be 
relatively inexpensive to apply. If data must be gathered and compiled, 
the cost of an application can increase substantially. 
Advantages 
* The method's main strength is that it can be used to estimate 
values based on actual choices. 
* Property markets are relatively efficient in responding to 
information, so can be good indications of value. 
* Property records are typically very reliable. 
e Data on property sales and characteristics are readily available 
through many sources, and can be related to other secondary data 
sources to obtain descriptive variables for the analysis. 
* The method is versatile, and can be adapted to consider several 
possible interactions between market goods and environmental 
quality. 
Issues and Limitations: 
* The scope of environmental benefits that can be measured is 
limited to things that are related to housing prices. 
* The method will only capture people's willingness to pay for 
perceived differences in environmental attributes, and their direct 
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consequences. Thus, if people aren't aware of the linkages 
between the environmental attribute and benefits to them or their 
property, the value will not be reflected in home prices. 
* The method assumes that people have the opportunity to select 
the combination of features they prefer, given their income. 
However, the housing market may be affected by outside 
influences, like taxes, interest rates, or other factors. 
* The method is relatively complex to implement and interpret, 
requiring a high degree of statistical expertise. 
,& The results depend heavily on model specification. 
* Large amounts of data must be gathered and manipulated. 
e The time and expense to carry out an application depends on the 
availability and accessibility of data. 
There has been insufficient time and quantity of communities 
effected - by the deployment of wind farms and other types of 
renewable energy projects in Scotland and the United, Kingdom for 
any meaningful data to be gathered; there have been insufficient 
transactions in the real estate market. 
A report issued in November 2004 by the Royal Institution of 
Chartered Surveyors (RICS) presented the findings of a membership 
survey on their perceived changes in values to residential property 
and agricultural lands from wind farms. This was not a rigorous 
quantitative analysis as the number of respondent surveyors who had 
actually dealt with impacted properties was around 80. (RICS, 2004) 
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Sixty percent of the surveyors stated that wind farms decrease 
the value of residential property, but the remaining 40% stated there is no 
negative impact on property values. Those who stated that there was a 
negative impact stated the following: 
Negative impact starts when a planning application is made 
Main factors for negative impact are: 
Fear of blight 
Landscape change after completion 
Proximity of property to wind farm 
* There is no uniformity to how properties are impacted 
Sixty-three percent of property surveyors who responded believed 
that the value of agricultural lands would experience neutral impacts from 
the construction of wind farms. Although it is unclear if the RICS repost is 
discussing wind turbines built on the property being valued or on property 
in the view shed. For turbines located on the property being valued, it is a 
reasonable expectation that the value should increase from rents being 
collected on the land lease. 
The report suggests further research, as experience increases, to 
find if what if any adverse impacts decrease with more experience and 
familiarity with wind farms. (RICS, 2004) This relates to the prior 
discussion about adaptive state dependence in Section 3.1.3 above. 
Jordal-Jorgensen (1996) published findings of a combined 
contingent valuation/hedonic pdce study that showed the n10. ise and visual 
economic cost of wind mills in rriýunicipalities ranged from les stI han 0.1 
ore per kWh for the contingent valuation up I ore per kWh for property 
values. One observation was that the environmental cost burden was 
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very unevenly distributed within communities. If the hedonic value is 
applied to those households that actually experienced the visual and 
noise nuisance it amounts to DKK 982 per year, while unaffected 
households had little or no environmental cost burden. It was also noted 
that economies of scale applied to the size of Wind farms, Wth the 
environmental cost per kWh diminishing as the number of turbines went 
from one to a cluster to a full wind farm. This supports a policy in 
Sweden of having a few very large wind farms, which is the opposite of 
Scotland and the findings in Chapter 4. 
The most significant hedonic price analysis to date was conducted 
in 2003 by the Renewable Energy Policy Project, located in the United 
States. It examined the change in property values in 30 communities 
across America that was affected by wind farm construction (REPP, 
2003). The sample set consisted of non-impacted comparable 
communities and communities with properties that were within a5 mail 
radius of the projects and within the view shed. Three scenarios were 
analyzed. 
Scenario One was concerned with how property values changed 
for both the affected view shed and the comparable community, and used 
data 3 years before and after the project came on line. Scenario two 
l. ooked only at how prices change before and after the project came on 
line in the view shed. Scenario three looked at both affected and 
comparable communities after the projects were on line. Each scenario 
examined 10 impacted communities. 
108 
For the majority of cases within each scenario the property values 
actually increased faster in the view sheds than the comparable 
community. Property value increases were found to accelerate in the 
view shed after the wind. farms were built. In several locations the 
acceleration was 2 to 3 times'that of the comparable communities. Of the 
30 view sheds analyzed, 26 were found to perform better than the non- 
impacted communities. 
Payment Methods for Green Energy 
There has been a consistent and very large gap between the 
prediction of power market surveys and the actual number of households 
that actually purchase green power from their utility company in a 
commercial setting. Farhar (1999) reviewed 
_20 
years of utility market 
research, looking at consumer willingness to pay for renewable electricity. 
In America, these surveys show that anywhere from over 50% to as high 
as 95% of households express a willingness to buy renewables, but the 
reality is 1% to 5% partici patio n'rates, with 2% considered successful 
participation (EERE, 2000) (CRS, 2002). One significant deterrent which 
has been identified to green power purchases by voluntary'participation in 
commercial markets is that of free riding. FergUson (1999), Tarnai and 
Morre (1998), and Wiser (2003) all found that rated based charging of all 
users of electricity to support greater use of renewables ranged from 30% 
to as high as 80%, depending on the additional month cost on their utility 
bill. ,I 
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Wiser (2003) presents research findings with direct application and 
validation of the ROS program currently operating in Scotland. Using a 
contingent valuation study the following was found: 
9 Collective payment methods have slightly higher WTP values 
than voluntary payments. This is attributed to the respondent 
recognition of free riding. 
e Private industry provision of additional renewables generation 
has a higher WTP than for government provision. This 
suggests a belief in more efficient and effect provision by 
commercial interests. 
* Individuals thought their WTP was higher than other 
respondents. 
o Those respondents with a WTP for renewables anticipate up to 
twice as many total households would also be willing to pay, as 
those who are not WTP. This can be interpreted as support for 
the bandwagon effect. 
All of these findings support the current structure of ROS. All 
consumers of electricity share in the additional cost from the renewables 
obligation and private industry is using the market for ROCs and 
investment capital to determine which renewables projects are to be built. 
Value of Wildlife 
Wildlife has been shown to produce two types of economic value: 
1) use value - derived from viewing, hunting and fishing, or any activity 
which has direct interaction with the fauna; and 2) existence value - 
occurring to both users and those not actually using wildlife but who have 
an interest in it (Stevens, et al., 1991). 
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Existence value was first introduced in the 1960' by, Weisbrod 
(1964) and Krutilla (1967). The first author suggested the non-user would 
pay an option to retain the possibility of future use, whilst the later argued 
that some rational people just derive utility from knowing the natural 
resource exists. Arguments which supported the utility of existence value 
are: 1) leaving an endowment or bequest to future generation; 2) knowing 
other people enjoy the resource; and 3) intrinsic value independent of 
direct benefit or harm to humans. Stevens (1991) found that existence 
values were likely to be very large and significant in comparison to use 
values. 
The non-use value may come from the "warm glow" effect on 
respondents, who derive a moral satisfaction from contributing to a public 
good, rather that the simply stating the inherent economic value of the 
good (Kahne and Knetsch, 1992). 
Ken Willis (1990) in a contingent valuation study found substantial 
positive values for conservation of wildlife and associated land holdings in 
England. The results indicated that the valuation of wildlife and nature 
conservation largely depend on the frame of the reference adopted. Willis 
found that the social costs are considerably less than the financial costs. 
However, it was also found that user benefits are considerably less than 
the financial costs, and that non-user benefits must be included to cover 
even the social costs of nature and wildlife conservation. 
A source of heterogeneity in any stated preference study 
examining wildlife, specifically any analysis which relies on multinomial 
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logit regression 3 (MNL), may come from moral beliefs about the intrinsic 
right to exist for all animal species. Depending on the strength of belief 
the impact on any survey results will range from heterogeneity which is 
correctable by covariates, i. e. a socio-demographic variable for this belief, 
to having to exclude the respondent as having a lexicographic 
preference. 
Multinomial logit is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4 
Valuing the Attributes of Renewable Energy Investments 
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Introduction 
Increasing the proportion of power derived from renewable energy 
sources is becoming an increasingly important part of many countrys 
strategies to achieve reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. However, 
renewable energy investments can often have external costs and 
benefits, which need to be taken into account if socially optimal 
investments are to be made. 
This chapter attempts to estimate the magnitude of these external 
costs and benefits for the case of renewable energy technologies in 
Scotland, a country which has set particularly ambitious targets for 
expanding renewable energy. The environmental externalities 
investigated herein are the impacts on and changes to landscape, wildlife 
and airquality from deployment of new energy generation sites. Unlike all 
published research into the issue of impacts from renewables, 
deployment, we do not restrict our investigation to the effects of particular 
technologies (such as hydro or wind: Alvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2002; 
Hanley and Nevin, 1999), but consider impacts applicable to a wide range 
of renewable technologies. We also consider the welfare implications of 
alternative investment strategies for employment and electricity prices. 
The methodology used to quantify these values is the Choice Experiment 
(CE) technique. 
Renewable technologies evaluated for their social welfare 
implications include hydroelectric, on-shore and offshore wind power and 
biomass. Welfare changes for different combinations of impacts 
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associated with the different technology investments are estimated. We 
also test for differences in preferences towards these impacts between 
urban and rural communities, and between high and low income 
households. 
Market Failure, Public Goods and ExternalitleS2 
Stated preference methodologies were developed to estimate the 
value of goods and serviceS3 that do not have a functioning market which 
reveals public or private preferences and monetary values. In particular, 
there has been a growing need to value non-marketed goods which arise 
from the production of an economic good. Non-market goods which 
impose negative impacts4 on households who were not party to the 
original transaction or market exchange are of special concern to 
environmental economists. An examination of these goods is the object of 
this chapter. Without knowing and incorporating the true cost or benefit of 
the non-market good, a socially optimal, level of production is unlikely to 
occur, and public welfare will be diminished. 
The beginning of this chapter presents an introductory discussion 
on the concepts of market failures, externalities and public goods. 
2 The material presented in this section can be found in most all introductory economic 
textbooks and certainly in all introductory environmental economic textbooks. The author 
gives specific citations where appropriate, otherwise the material is considered generally 
available knowledge and no citation given. 
3 Hence forth when ffigoode are referred to "services' is included in the context. 
4 Impacts can be both positive and negative in quality. In this chapter the concern was 
primarily for the negative impacts on environmental goods; landscape, wildlife and air 
quality. One positive impact from deployment of renewables projects was investigate, 
employment. 
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Economics markets commonly fail to include the complete costs 
imposed on the environment as they function to produce goods for 
consumers. 5 The failure of markets to accurately reflect and incorporate 
the true environmental costs of production means that market prices are 
sending incorrect information, or signals, to market agents as to the 
scarcity of the good being produced (Varian, 1999). According to neo- 
classical economics market prices are the key signal to producers as to 
what type of product and what quantity of output the firm should produce 
and which production inputs should be used by the firm. Households use 
market prices to decide what and how much to consume, as well as, how 
much labour to provide (sell) to business firms. When either party to a 
market transaction makes decisions based on a price which is an 
inaccurate reflection of the true private and social costs, than a socially 
inefficient outcome is likely to occur (Varian, 1999). 
Socially inefficient outcomes are defined as non-Pareto optimal 
outcomes. A Pareto optimal outcome is said to occur when it is no longer 
possible for trades or exchanges in the marketplace to o=r that would 
make some individuals better off without making some other individuals 
worse off (Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995). In the simplest 
interpretation of Pareto optimality, it can be stated that there is no waste 
in the economy or society. 
5 The author observes that market prices for most all goods or services are unlikely to 
reflect the full environmental cost of pollution from the fossil fuel or nuclear energy 
consumed in the production or distribution of goods or services. Therefore, firms over 
produce and consumers over consume as a result of these unaccounted for costs. 
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Two conditions must be met for market prices to accurately reflect 
the costs of producing a good or service. The market supply curve must 
represent the marginal social costs (MSC) of producing the good. And the 
market demand curve must represent the marginal social benefits (MSB) 
of consuming the good. If either households or firms receive benefits, or 
incur costs, that are external to the market then the market transaction 
price will fail to reflect the Pareto optimal level of trade. 
Dlaqram 4.1 A Well Functioning Market (no market failure) 
Price 
I MPB = MSB 
I Quantitv 
A market is said to be functioning well (presenting true and 
accurate information) if the equilibrium price (P, ) and quantity 
(Q, ) coincide with the equilibrium price and quantity as 
determined by the marginal social benefit (MSB) and marginal 
social cost (MSC) curves. The above market is Pareto optimal 
and efficient. 
If a market does not meet the Pareto optimal criteria than a market 
failure is said to have occurred. Public goods and economic externalities 
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are two common sources for utility and production decisions by 
households and firms to be different from the socially optimal level, thus 
ensuring market failure. 
A public good is a good which is non-fivalrous and non-excJudable. 
Non-rivalrous refers to a good whose benefits do not diminish as it is 
consumed by any single individual. Every consumer can benefit from the 
good Without diminishing other consumers benefits. Radio broadcasts 
are an example of a non-rivalrous good; no matter how much a single 
household consumes (listens) to the radio, no benefits to other radio 
broadcast consuming households are denied or diminished. The 
environmental goods investigated later in this chapter are considered 
non-rival goods. 
Congestible goods are non-rival only below a certain level of 
consumption. Above some critical level of consumption the demands of 
an additional consumer Vill impinge on the benefits of other consumers 
and diminish their benefits. Public parks and roadways are common 
examples of congestible goods. 
Non-excludable goods refer to goods with the quality that once it 
has been produced it is impossible, or at least very difficult, to prevent 
consumption of the good by any individual consumer. Lighthouses are a 
standard example of a non-excludable good; an environmental good 
which is non-excludable that arises from private production is improved 
air quality from commercial forestry. 
Non-excludability can lead to the problem of free riding. Free riding 
occurs when one individual pays the cost for a beneficial good (or 
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mitigation of a negative good) yet other consumers share in'the benefits 
and enjoyment of the good without paying a fair share. Fairness is a 
subjective standard by which Ao- judge: market failurel The common 
empirical standard by which economists judge free riding to be a problem 
is when public goods are under produced so less than optimal benefits 
accrue to society, or when public goods are over consumed causing less 
than optimal benefits for society (Varian, -, 1999). 
Free riding can also make Ahe identification of the market demand 
curve for public goods more difficult. Consumers who'are free riding have 
an incentive to mis-represent their, demand and willing ness-to-pay (WTP) 
for a public good., ý By - under - representing their, demand,, free riders may 
believe they will: lower, the contribution ý required. of thern, ý- i. e.; through 
taxes, for the provision of a good. 'e If they over. represent their demand for 
a good, they may believe greater quantities will be supplied without an 
increase in their own contribution. ý Mis-identification of the social demand 
curve viill lead to market failure. 
Low participation rates in voluntary green energy programs are 
partially blamed on the free rider problem by some firms in the electric 
power industry (Farhar, 1999; NREL, 2001). Thus, Ahe private provision of 
environmentally clean electric energy, which has, a significant public 
benefit, is under produced. See Chapter-Three, section. on, green energy 
literature for more details of green energy programs. 
Some public choice theorists advocate ý government intervention 
and state provision of. public'goods. as a way, to. solve the public goods 
problem (Stiglitz, 1988). However, in practice the information problem 
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(figuring out how much provision is optimal) and the incentive problem 
(making it in someone's interest to provide exactly that amount) are 
unsolved issues, so public goods will still tend to be produced at 
suboptimal levels even when the government provides them (Stiglitz, 
1988). 
To determine the efficient level of a public good the aggregate 
demand curve and the aggregate supply curve must be known. The 
aggregate supply curve for a public good is derived by the opportunity 
cost of resources foregone, as example, improved air quality requires 
firms to forego disposing of waste into the air by some means, waste 
treatment, pollution prevention, recycling, or reducing production. The 
aggregate supply curve of healthy air can be seen as the marginal cost of 
abatement of waste disposal into the air. 
Diagram 4.2 
Curve 
Household One 
Demand 
F ----k Q e- 
Household Two 
Demand 
Vertical Summation of Marginal Social Benefits 
MSB 
lw 
I Oe I 
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Diagram 4.2 illustrate the same equilibrium conditions as seen in 
Diagram 4.1 but demonstrates that the MSB (public demand) 
curve is the summation of multiple 'households. This vertical 
summation is possible because of the non-nval nature of the 
public good. 
The demand curve for a public good is derived by. adding up the 
price each individual is willing to pay for each unit of the good and across 
all individuals sharing in the consumption of that unit. The price of each 
unit is added vertically -for., each poris, ymer, of ;, that, unit.,,, This vertical 
summation is possible because the good is non-rival. See Diagram 4.2 
above. 
Firms have no marginal cost for disposing of their waste into the 
environment if open acces exists. So the firm's demand for tipping waste 
into the environment is equal to the marginal benefit'of the costless 
tipping. The firm's demand can also be described by the inverse, which 
are avoided costs the firm would have to pay for abating the pollution. 
The cost to the firm is called the marginal private cost (MPC); this is not 
the true and accurate social, cost'or IVISC., The -difference between MPC 
and IVISC is called the marginal, external cost, -(MEC). 
If the MEC is 
negative then a negative externality is said to exist. If the MEC is positive 
a positive externality, exists. -I Scottish - forestry,, again provides as an 
example of a positive MEC. 
In Diagram 4.3 below, -the case of aý positive, MEC, is illustrated. 
The social good created by expanded forestry is greater that the benefits 
incurred by the private firm -or, individual -who grows the trees. For this 
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reason there is under production of the socially optimal quantity of 
forests, Qe(MSB=MSC) "' Qn, which motivates the Scottish Executive to give 
subsidies to private firms and individuals to increase the planting of new 
forests (CJC, 2004). The same illustration can be used to explain the 
creation of the ROC program in Scotland: the desire for increased 
production of renewable energy. 
Diagram 4.3 Marginal Social Cost versus Marginal Private Costs 
[Price I 
I Quantitv 
Diagram 4.3 illustrates the MEC and under production pe < Qm) 
of a good that has positive externalities and public benefits. 
One possible method of intervention, if a public good is being 
under provided through the existence of negative externalities, is to 
change the goods non-excludable characteristic to one of excludability. 
This may be difficult if a large number of consumers or firms are 
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involved. The transaction costs (or enforcement costs) may, be so 
expensive that no intervention is economically feasible. Open access to 
the deteriorating good is allowed until the social benefits of improving the 
good is greater than the transaction costs of excluding ý firms, 'or 
consumers, from using the public good for private benefit. Using the prior 
air pollution example, using the air to dispose of waste will continue until 
the loss of social benefits (social cost) is great enough to justify the 
transaction or protection costs which will be incurred when the 
govemment acts. 
Scotland as a Case Study 
The economic reasons for Scotland developing renewables, are 
multifaceted. The first reason is that renewable energy projects by their 
very nature should be highly sustainable. - Economic development which 
can be sustained Wthout diminishing the country's natural, or human 
resources are a priority to the Scottish governments (Sustainable 
Scotland Network, 2005). There is minimal or no resource depletion due 
to the use of renewables technologies, as compared to gas, oil and coal 
based energy. 
Renewable energy projects, as with traditional fossil fuel projects, 
tend to be capital intensive, so ý the opportunity to develop and 
manufacture renewable energy equipment for domestic use and 
international export exists (RAB, 2004)., In 2001, Vestas, a major 
manufacturer of wind turbines,, announced a manufacturing facility would 
be opened in Scotland (Scottish Executive 2001),! although most capital 
equipment is currently imported. .-, -ýý, ý1 -1 1 
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There is potential to transfer some of the job skills learned in the 
North Sea oil industry to the marine renewables sector, which includes 
tidal, wave, and ocean current power generation technologies, as the 
offshore oil industry declines (a European Marine Energy Centre was 
opened on Orkney in 2004 to assist in the advancement of marine 
energy)(EMEC, 2004). Offshore wind farm development may use this 
skilled labour pool. 
England and Wales will have a more difficult time building 
sufficient renewables generating capacity to provide adequate non-fossil 
fuel energy which their populations will require to meet domestic targets 
(OXERA, 2002). Scotland, on the other hand, has some of the'largest 
renewables potential in all of Europe, and therefore may have sufficient 
excess supplies to trade south of the border. Finally, rural areas of 
Scotland, with some of the greatest needs for economic development, will 
be the location of most all land-based renewable energy projects 
(Hassan, Gerald and Partners, 2001). These rural communities may well 
reap many benefits from these long-term projects. 
Current scale economies dictate that projects like wind farms and 
biomass generation plants be 3-5% the size of a traditional 1200 MW 
coal-fired plant. Even the largest wind farms being planned today are only 
20% of this size. Also, because of the intermittency problems of 
renewable sources, greater quantities (measured by MW capacity) of 
generating assets are needed because of the lower average load of each 
renewables facilities. Depending on the technology, renewable energy 
projects normally require large amounts of surface area to capture the 
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energy in wind, water, solar radiation or biomass, in sufficient quantity to 
be commercially viable. These projects will likely be dispersed as a 
result. Thus dozens of communities in Scotland will likely be impacted by 
renewable energy projects that will be constructed to attain the Scottish 
Executive's clean energy goal. 
The Choice Experiment Method 
Renewable energy investments in Scotland are thus expected to 
grow rapidly in the near future. These investments will produce a series of 
impacts on the environment, the price of electricity, and on employment. 
Environmental impacts will occur to the landscape and wildlife, as well as 
changes in air pollution (for example, biomass combustion power plants 
emit air pollution). Exactly what environmental impacts occur, what 
happens to electricity prices through changes in cost, and any changes in 
employment, will depend on the exact investment mix (e. g. the balance 
between on- and off-shore wind farms; the extent of hydro 
developments). Taken together, environmental effects, price effects and 
employment effects can be thought of as the attributes of a renewable 
energy strategy. Knowing something about the relative economic values 
of these attributes is important if we wish a renewables strategy to (i) take 
some account of public preferences and (ii) take some account of 
economic efficiency (benefit-cost) concerns. Choice Experiments are an 
economic valuation method which enables this kind of information to be 
produced. 
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Choice Modelling, Choice Experiment and other Stated Preference 
Valuation Methods 
Choice modelling (CM) odginated as an empirical technique to 
conduct non-market valuation research for marketing, product 
development, and transportation studies. It is a form of stated preference 
analysis. There are four types of CM techniques: choice experiments; 
contingent ranking; contingent rating; and paired comparisons. The 
unifying concept for all of these CM methods is the theory that all goods 
may be described in terms of its attributes and the levels of those 
attributee. As example a landscape may be described in terms of the 
type and quantity of vegetation, biodiversity, terrain, colours, and human 
influences such as agriculture and structures. Changing any one of these 
attribute levels creates a new good. CM focuses on the value of these 
changes. CM can estimate both use and non-use values of goods 
(Louviere, 2000). It is important to note that only choice experiment and 
contingent ranking methods have substantial linkages to standard 
economic theory for the estimated values to be useful in cost-benefit and 
other economic analysis. 
CM can identify several non-market issues (Bateman et al., 2002) that 
are of importance: 
* Attributes which are significant determinants of value. 
* The implied 'ranking order of attributes. 
Lancaster's Characteristic Theory of Value is discussed later in this chapter. 
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The change in value from a change in one or more of the 
attributes. 
The total economic value of the good. 
There are many advantages of CE over other stated preference 
techniques. CE can simultaneously study several parts (attributes) of a 
proposed project scenario in the same survey. Contingent valuation (CV) 
is not capable of doing this. To estimate the value of different attribute 
levels a CV study would have to design different scenarios for level of the 
attribute and conduct a new survey for each scenario. 
CE is superior in measuring the marginal value. of, changes in 
attributes. The marginal values of attributes (sub-parts) of a project 
scenario can be more useful in a:. policy . context when compared to 
making decisions based on only knowing the total gain or loss from a 
project change. 
CE studies can eliminate, or reduce a major modelling problem 
associated with revealed preference analysis. Revealed preference 
studies use actual scenarios, many of which may have attributes that 
change in a collinear manner, i. e. for landscape vegetation and colour will 
be associated. Collinearity can inhibit econometric analysis. CE studies 
(OS7 are not limited to the use of actual scena I. Travel cost analysis is also 
limited by to actual attributes of the scenario under investigation. CE is 
not limited to the actual attributes of a project but can study levels beyond 
the upper or lower limits of what exists. 
7 Non-collinearity and orthogonallity are discussed later in this chapter. 
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CE addresses some of the critics of CV studies, such as yea- 
saying and strategic answefing (Blarney et al., 1999). Some survey 
respondents say yes to a question that has a politically correct social 
response, i. e. would you pay for reduced pollution? Strategic answering is 
when a respondent gives an answer (monetary value) which exaggerates 
their position on an issue, not an answer which reflects their true personal 
monetary value. In CE respondents are given a range of values to include 
in their responses over several choice sets. Respondents are only 
allowed to include monetary value in relation to other attributes. 
,, There are some disadvantages which arise from the use of CE 
analysis. Possibly the most significant is issues are the assumption that 
the sum of the attributes is equal to the whole of the good under study. 
This additive quality may not hold true in all circumstances (Hanley et al., 
1998). This is known as the packaging problem. Two studies (Steer et al., 
1999,2000) of public transportation in London, the Underground and 
buses, has demonstrated that the sum of individual attributes are valued 
more than the bundles of improvements in total. 
Coinciding with this assumption is a problem of model mis- 
specification. If any attributes which contribute substantial utility or 
disutility are not included the relative importance of included attributes 
may mis-inform policy makers. Any omitted attributes will be captured by 
the constant term in the model, but -the constant term may incorrectly 
imply an unidentified greater or weaker underlying value for the good. 
Value estimates for attributes are sensitive to the design of the CE 
study. This is true for all other types of stated preference research which 
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depends on surveying the public. Every aspect of the survey design has 
the potential to influence respondents,, such as the included or excluded 
attributes and levels, presentation media (pictures or words), and if the 
interview is conducted by mail, intemet or in-person. 
Two other issues are known weakness of CE. CE does not provide 
estimates for attributes that are valid when programs may be 
implemented in a sequential manner. CE modelling assumes ceteris 
paribus for the value of estimates; sequential changes of attribute levels 
may invalidate the marginal effects estimates of the model. The final 
disadvantage for CE analysis is that the complexity of the choice task 
may prove too difficult. Task complexity is discussed elsewhere in this 
chapter. 
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Economic Theories and Econometric Models 
The Characteristics Theory of Value and Random Utility 
Theory 
Choice Experiments (CE) are based on two fundamental building 
blocks: Lancaster's characteristics theory of value, and random utility 
theory. Lancaster (1966) asserted that the utility derived from a good 
comes from the characteristics of that good, not from consumption of the 
good itself. Goods normally possess more than one characteristic and 
these characteristics (or attributes) will be shared with many other goods 
(Lancaster, 1966). The value of a good is then given by the sum of the 
value of its charactenstics. 
Random Utility Theory (RUT) is the second building block. RUT 
says that not all of the determinants of utility derived by individuals from 
their choices are directly observable to the researcher, but that an indirect 
determination of preferences is possible (McFadden, 1973; Manski, 
1977). The utility function for a representative consumer can be 
decomposed into observable and stochastic sections: 
U. = V. (Eq. 4.1) 
Where Uan is the latent, unobservable utility held by consumer n for 
choice alternative a, Van is the systemic, or observable portion of utility 
that consumer n has for choice alternative a, and e.,, is the random or 
unobservable portion of the utility that consumer n has for choice 
alternative a. Research is focussed on a probability function, defined over 
the alternatives which an individual faces, assuming that the individual 
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will try to maximise their utility (Bennett & Blarney, 2001and Louviere et 
al., 2000). 
This probability is expressed as: 
P (alCn) =P [(Van + ean) > (Vjn + ejn), Va # j, (Eq. 4.2) 
for all j options in choice set Cn; a and n are as previously described; or: 
P (alCn) =P Van-Vin) > (ein - ean)], Va * j. (Eq. 4.3) 
To empifically estimate (3), and thus to estimate the observable 
parameters of the utility function, assumptions are made about the 
random component of the model. A typical assumption is that these 
stochastic components are independently and identically distributed (11D) 
with a Gumbel or Weibull distribution. 
Multiniomial Logit (MNL) -- 
This leads to the use of multinomial logit (MNL) models 
(sometimes called conditional logit models) to determine the probabilities 
of choosing j options (Hanley, Mourato and Wright, 2001): 
P(U uVe) , N>U jn) = 
exp(j Va j (Eq. 4.4) 
Z-exp(. uVj) ' 
Here,. u is a scale parameter, inversely related to the standard 
deviation of the error term and not separately identifiable in a single data 
set. The implications of this are that the estimated. Bs cannot be directly 
interpreted as to their contribution to utility,, since they are confounded 
with the scale parameter. When, using the MNL model choices must 
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satisfy the Independence from Irrelevant Afternatives (11A) property, which 
means that the addition or subtraction of any option from the choice set 
will not affect relative probability of individual n choosing any other option 
(Louviere, et al., 2000). Modelling constants known as alternative specific 
constants (ASCs) are typically included in the MNL model. The ASC 
accounts for variations in choices that are not explained by the attributes 
or socio-economic variables, and sometimes for a status quo bias (Ben- 
Akiva and Lerman, 1985). 
The Random Parameter Logit (RPL) Model 
Another econometric approach is the Random Parameters Logit 
(RPL), which is becoming increasingly popular in applied research. In this 
approach the utility function for respondent n choosing over alternatives j 
Ujn, is augmented with a vector of parameters Tj that 
incorporate the individual preference deviations with respect to the mean 
preference values that are expressed by vector p: 
Ujn'ý Cj + I: kPjk Xjkn +I: m Ym 
Smn Cj +Xk Ilkn Xjkn + Cjn (Eq. 4.5) 
where Cj is an alternative specific constant (Cj=o, for identification 
purposes), Xjkn is the kth attribute value of the altemative t, Ak is the 
coefficient associated with the kth attribute, Smn is the nAh socio- 
economic charactedstic of individual n, and y.,, is the coefficient 
associated with the mth individual socio-economic characteristic. Note 
that socio-economic characteristics are invariant across choice occasions 
for each individual in the sample, so are interacted with the alternative 
specific constant. Furthermore, i7kn is a vector of k deviation parameters 
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which represents the individual's tastes relative to the average (0) and Cin 
is an un-observed random term which is independent of the other terms 
in the equation, and which is identically and independently Gumbel 
distributed. The researcher can estimate 0, y and il; the il terms, as they 
represent personal tastes, are assumed constant for a given individual 
across all the choices they make, but not constant across people. 
Random parameter logit probabilities are weighted averages of the logit 
formula evaluated at different values of 0, with the weights given by the 
density f(p). The probability that respondent n chooses alternative i is 
given by: 
Prd ýI La (B) f (B) d(B) (Eq' 4.6) 
where Lni (0) is the logit probability evaluated at parameters P. Since the 
integral (Eq. 3.6) has no closed form, parameters are estimated through 
simulation and maximising the simulated log-likelihood function. In order 
to estimate the model it is necessary to make an assumption over how 
the D coefficients are distributed over the population. Here we assume 
that preferences for all the environmental attributes follow a normal 
distribution, except for the jobs and price attributes for which preferences 
were assumed to be homogeneous. 
Implicit Prices or Part-worth values 
The estimated coefficients of the attributes can be used to 
estimate the tradeoffs between the attributes that respondents would be 
willing to make. The price attribute can be used in conjunction with the 
other attributes to determine the will in g ness-to-pay of respondents for 
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gains or losses of attribute levels. This monetary value is call the "implicit 
price" or part-worth of the attribute: 
Part-worth =- (p non-market attribute IP monetary attribute) 
(Eq. 4.7) 
The scaling problem noted above is resolved when one attribute 
coefficient is dividing by another, as in the part-worth equation, since the 
scale parameter in the denominator and numerator cancels out. 
Alternative Estimation Methods 
Three alternative estimation methods or models may be useful in 
analyses of choice data where preference heterogeneity is present and 
the MNL method cannot be used. They are the nested logit (NQ model, 
latent class analysis and the random parameter logit (RPL) model. 
The nested logit model relaxes the homosceclasticity assumption 
in the MNL model by subdividing the sample group into subgroups which 
are based on the observed choices the individual group respondents 
made in the survey. This subdivision allows the variance to differ across 
the subgroups, but requires the IIA assumption to be maintained within 
each subgroup (Greene, 2002). 
The nested logit method was rejected for use in this analysis as it 
was deemed insufficient selection of the "neither' option occurred by 
respondents. Only 23 of over 800 choice sets had the 'neither' option 
selected; this is less than 3%. There would be little or no distinction 
between the nested logit models analysed at the first level of subgroup 
division. Nested logit first branch segregation would be options A and B 
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versus neither, second branch is than between A and B (Hanley et al., 
2002). See Diagram 4.4 below. 
A second analytical model used to address preference 
heterogeneity is latent class analysis. The underlying theory of the latent 
class model argues that individual behaviour depends on observable 
attributes of the individual respondent and on latent heterogeneity that 
varies with factors that are unobservable (Greene, 2002). The essential 
technique used in a latent class model is to divide the sample group into 
subsets based on respondent socio-economic characteristics. This 
division can be done endogenously or 
Diagram 4. Nested Logit Model - Decision Tree 
Choice Fifst Branch] 
Neither Renewable II 
Energy Project 
Plan A Plan B 
Diagram 4.4 is a Nested Logit Model decision tree for the choice 
experiment being discussed. The first branching occurs when 
respondents declare their preference for the status quo (continue 
on current energy path) or their preference for renewable energy. 
The second branching occurs when respondents declare which 
renewables profile they prefer, based on the bundle of descriptive 
attributes. 
exogenously. Latent class models allow for endogenous characteristics to 
segregate the individual respondents into categories (Swait, 1994). The 
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exogenous method is to hypothesize a source of heterogeneity and than 
segregate the sample set into subgroups and test for improved statistical 
significance of the estimates. As with the nested logit model, the division 
of the full sample into subgroups allows the variance to differ across the 
subgroups, but the IIA assumption still has to be maintained Within each 
subgroup. 
The final method, which has been previously discussed, is the RPL 
model, which neither assumes nor requires IIA to be valid for analysis. 
Designing the Choice Experiment 
Selection of Attributes 
In any choice experiment, attributes" must be chosen which meet a 
number of requirements (Bateman, et al., 2002). These are: 
relevant to the problem being analysed 
o credible/realistic 
* capable of being understood by the sample population, and 
* applicability to policy analysis 
Focus Groups 
Identifying a set of attributes, and levels within each attribute, is 
important to the creation of a rigorous choice experiment design. For this 
reason two focus groups were conducted with members of the general 
public (Dewar, 2003). The objective set to each group was the 
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identification Of important characteristics8, or attributes, of 'green 
electricity' production, without regard to the characteristics being 'good' or 
'bad' in quality. The facilitator had each group identify all types of 
renewable power technologies, and then discuss the good or bad 
characteristics of each type of technology and facility. Identified 
technologies were: windmills, hydro schemes (run of river and reservoir); 
tidal and wave powered; solar (photovoltaic and hot water panels); 
geothermal (heat pump); many types of biomass or waste combustion, 
i. e., municipal solid waste, wood and forest residue, animal and organic 
waste, natural gas from landfills, and fermentation of organics. After the 
technology was identified, the characteristics of each were discussed and 
listed on a chart. 
Next, the focus groups were separated into small sections of two or 
three persons, and assigned the task of ranking the technologies and 
ranking the distinct characteristics of each technology by importance to 
them as a group. Individuals members were asked to ý indicate their 
personal rankings of the characteristics and to indicate which were the 
most important or of greatest concern to them. 
Both focus groups revealed three characteristics which dominated all 
others. The first characteristic was renewable energy projects must have 
a low environmental impact, and should reduce or minimize how society 
changes or pollutes the environment. Another, characteristic was that 
8 The author and focus group facilitator used the word 'characteristics', instead of 
'attributes', in conducting the focus - groups. Discussing 'attributee in preliminary 
interviews with individuals from the general public appeared to, be., confusing, while 
fficharacteristics" appeared to be better understood. 
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projects be aesthetically pleasing. This characteristic was a little more 
contentious as some group members felt that both windmills and 
reservoirs are pleasing to observe, while other members felt that large 
man-made structures took aWay from nature's scenic beauty. The final 
dominant characteristic was that wildlife should not be harmed any more 
than it already has been, and projects which improved wildlife should be 
given greater support. 
Less significant characteristics mentioned by individuals, or the sub- 
groups which were used, were the creation of jobs, the effect on 
electricity prices, the abundance and sustainability of the resources, and 
more localized control and responsibility which might be possible with 
renewable energy projects 
Aftributes 
Five key attributes were chosen, based on the two focus groups, 
individual interviews, and on published government statements (e. g. 
Scottish Executive, 2002b) and academic literature dealing with 
environment and green energy. The attributes selected for the experiment 
were: 
* Impacts on the landscape, 
* Impacts on wildlife, 
9 Impacts on pollution levels, in particular, air pollution, 
* Creation of long-term employment opportunities, and 
9 Potential increases in electric prices to pay for renewable 
sources. 
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Table 4.1, below, presents the attributes and levels as used in the 
final design. Given the 5 attributes and 17 associated levels, 360 possible 
profiles exise, which was an unfeasible number to employ in the survey. 
Randomly selected respondents are expected to have limited Aime and 
mental concentration they will commit to a survey, so designing a survey 
which does not exceed those limits is critical to capturing accurate 
information (Dillman, 2000; Arsham, 2006). 
The levels for the environmental attribute were difficult to 
determined in a rigorous manner and still be able to present then in the 
survey without in creating excessive learning and education needs by the 
respondents. Benchmarking the levels to exogenous scientific standards 
was determined to be unpractical and increasing the likelihood of low 
response rates. For this reason it was decided to use the qualitative 
words, high, moderate, low, and slight to describe impacts from 
renewable energy projects. The interpretation of these words was left to 
the respondent. The translation of respondent's interpretation of these 
words to an indexed standard which policymakers can use is an area for 
further research. 
Three primary sources were consulted on criteda to measure the 
impact on landscape from human initiated change Guidelines for 
landscape and visual impact assessment from the Landscape Institute, 
Guidance on Local Landscape Designations from Natural Heritage 
9 The factorial is calculated by multiplying the number of levels of each attribute. In this 
choice experiment the attributes levels are: 4 for landscape, 3 for wildlife, 23 for air 
pollution, 3 for jobs created, and 5 for price changes. Therefore, 4*3*2*3*5= 360, 
the total number of profiles possible. 
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Scotland, and Making Sense of Place Landscape Character Assessment 
by the Scottish Natural Heritage and Countryside Agency (CSA, 2002; 
Landscape Institute, 1995; SNH, 2001). 
For impacts on wildlife the Scottish Wildlife Trust and the Scottish 
Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) were consulted (SWT, 2004; 
SEPA, 2004). SEPA was also consulted on the air pollution attribute. 
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Table 4.1 Attributes and Attribute Levels 
Affribute Descdption Levels 
Landscape Impact The visual impact of a project is dependent on None, Low 
a combination of both the size and location. Moderate, 
High 
Wildlife Impact Change in habitat can influence the Slight improvement, 
amount and diversity of species living. No-impact, 
around a project Slight Harm 
Air Pollution Many types of renewable energy projects None, 
create no additional air pollution, but some Slight ncrease 
projects do bum non-fossil fuels. These 
projects produce a very small amount of 
pollution when compared to electricity 
generated from coal or natural gas. 
Jobs All renewable energy projects will create new 1-3,8-12, 
local long4erm employment to operate and 20-25 
Maintain the projects. Temporary employment 
Increases during the construction phase are 
not being considered. 
Price Annual increase in household electric bill EO, E7, El 6, 
resulting from expansion of renewable energy E29, E45 
projects. An average household pays F-270 a 
year (E68 per quarter) for electricity 
Altemate specific constants 
ASC-A Takes value of 1 for Plan A, 0 otherwise. Acts to 
represent variations that cannot be explained by 
the attributes or socio-economic variables. 
ASC-B Takes value of 1 for Plan B, 0 otherwise. Acts to 
represent variations that cannot be explained by 
the attributes or socio-economic variables. 
143 
For the jobs attribute two resources were consulted: The Work that 
Goes'into Renewable Energy, November 2001, a report on the job 
creation associated with the development of renewable energy projects in 
the United States; and Environment Jobs Scotland: Skills for Renewable 
Energy in Scotland, which reviewed the skills and training issues facing 
the renewable energy sector. 
The price levels were determined in the following manner: 
EO - the lower limit, only a price increase is predicted from 
the expansion of renewable power sources. 
E7 - the average amount paid by consumers in Scotland 
who voluntarily participate in a green energy program 
(Energy watch, 2003). 
E29 - approximately a 10% increase in the average amount 
paid for electricity by household in Scotland in 2002 (Energy 
watch, 2002). 
E45 - an exaggerated upper limit for an energy price 
increase, used to capture an income effect. 
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Selection of Profiles 
There are a number of different strategies that may be used to 
reduce the quantity of choice sets submitted to survey respondents: 1. 
Reduce the number of levels used within the design; 2. Use a fractional 
factorial design; 3. Blocking the design; and 4. Using a fractional factorial 
design in combination with a blocking strategy (Hensher et al., 2005). 
Reducing the levels within the design will significantly reduce the 
size, yet such a reduction has a cost in terms of lost information and 
observations of incremental changes between levels. As, example, using 
this method the factorial would be lowered to 288 profiles, from 360, by 
reducing the price attribute from four to five levels, or the factorial could 
be lowered to 240 profiles if the wildlife attribute was reduced from three 
to two. Finally, if both attributes were reduced'by one level the factorial 
would be 192 profiles. 
Another factorial reduction method uses only the extreme attribute 
levels, the levels at each, end of the attributes range. This design, style is 
known as end-point design (Louviere et al.; 2000). All attributes would be 
binary in nature, with the *best" and "worst' levels being the - only 
possibilities. This procedure would reduce the number of profiles to 3210, 
but the information loss would be acute. 
Using only a portion of the total profiles is called fractional factorial 
design. By selecting a smaller and more manageable number of profiles 
the experiment can be conducted ý, without overloading the survey 
respondents. However, random selection of profiles"will likely produce 
10 The factorial is calculated as (2 *2*2*. 2* 2) = 36, for five attributes with two levels 
each. 
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sub-optimal and statistically inefficient experimental designs (Hensher et 
al., 2005). To avoid this statistical inefficiency an orthogonal design needs 
to be used in selecting profiles. 
Orthogonallity is a mathematical constraint which requires the 
attribute levels within each profile to be statistically independent of other 
profiles (Hensher et al., 2005). Orthogonallity is a condition where zero 
correlation exists between attribute levels of one profile to another profile. 
In other words, the change in one attribute in relation to another within 
one profile is independent from the change in one attribute to another in 
all other profiles in the selected fraction. 
Along with orthogonallity, main and interaction effects must be 
considered when using a fractional factorial. An effect is defined as the 
impact a particular profile has upon the respondents choices; it is 
measured as the difference in means (average log-likelihood of choice) 
between different profiles (Hensher et al., 2005). The main effect is the 
difference in the mean of each level of an attribute and the overall or 
grand mean of the profile, or the marginal effect of a change in an 
attribute level on the total likelihood of that profile being chosen by the 
respondents. An interaction effect is the effect -upon the response 
variable, respondent's choice, obtained from combining two or more 
attributes which would not have been observed had each of the attributes 
been estimated separately. In - simple terms, main effects are the 
estimation of the individual attributes, ceteris paribas, while interaction 
effects are the estimation of attributes allowing for changes in one or 
more other attributes. As example, a main effect would be the change 
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measured for one level of the landscape att(ibute, while an interaction 
effect would be the change measured for the same landscape level but 
coinciding with a change in one of the wildlife attribute levels. Interaction 
effects require a substantial increase in the number of observations to 
measure such marginal changes on marginal changes (Hensher et al., 
2005; Louviere et al.,, 2000; Bateman et al., 2002). 
The final method to reduce the number of profiles used in a choice 
experiment is called "blocking" (Hensher et al., 2005). Blocking entails 
including an additional attribute, the levels of which are used to divide the 
orthogonal design into separate sections. As example, if an attribute with 
3 levels is included in the orthogonal design, the design may be 
separated into 3 groups based on those sections. The three sections may 
than be administered separately in the experiment. A factorial With 180 
profiles could be broken into three groups of 60 or a fractional factorial 
with 27 profiles could be broken into groups of nine, the former continuing 
to be impractical, while the later can improve the experiment. 
The two most common methods used to reduce, the total number 
of profiles presented in a choice experiment are fractional factorial and 
the combination of the fractional factorial and blocking. 
In this experiment it was decided to use a fractional factorial 
design to reduce the full factorial of 360 to 25 profiles that could be used 
to estimate main effects. 
Econometric software, SPSS (VERSION 10.0), was used to select 
the optimal choice profiles, which were combined to make up the choice 
sets (choice groups) used in the experiment. This smaller set of profiles 
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was also orthogonally designed, which is a desirable, but not a 
requirement, of choice set construction. Table 3. x presents the 25 
profiles. 
All the profiles were examined for rationality. By rationality the 
author means would an average person believe this profile could actually 
come into existence. One profile of the 25 was deemed Irrational'. profile 
26. This profile was composed of all the lowest utility attributes for a 
household: high landscape impact; slight increase in harm to wildlife; 
slight increase in air pollution; the smallest amount of permanent 
employment gain; and the highest price increase in electricity. This profile 
is dominated by all other profiles generated for this experiment. The 
problem with this profile was confirmed in pilot tests of the survey 
instrument, when one respondent questioned, "Who would want the worst 
case, for the most money? " 
Hensher et al., (2005) states that dropping a profile from an 
orthogonal fractional factorial will not affect the statistical properties of the 
design, as all profiles are statistically independent of each other. Profile 
16 was dropped and the remaining 24 profiles used in the experiment. 
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Table 4.2 Attribute Profiles Designed for Use in Choice Experiment 
Profile Landscape Wildlife Air Pollution Employment Price 
1 Low No Impact Slig ht Increase 1 to 3 16 
2 Low No Impact None 20 to 25 45 
3 High Slight Harm None 8 to 12 16 
4 Moderate No Impact None 8 to 12 0 
5 High 
Slight 
Improvement None 1 to 3 7 
6 Low 
Slight 
Improvement Slig ht Increase 8 to 12 29 
7 High Slight Harm Slig ht Increase 1 to 3 45 
8 None 
Slight 
Improvement Slig ht Increase 20 to 25 16 
9 None Slight Harm Slig ht Increase 20 to 25 0 
10 Moderate 
Slight 
Improvement Slig ht Increase 8 to 12 29 
11 None . Slight Harm None I to 3 29 
12 Moderate Slight Harm Sli ght Increase 1 to 3 45 
13 High No Impact Sli ght Increase 8 to 12 0 
14 None No Impact Sli ght Increase 8 to 12 7 
15 None 
Slight 
Improvement None 8 to 12 16 
16 High No Impact Sli ght Increase 1 to 3 45 
17 High No Impact None 20 to 25 29 
18 None No Impact Sli ght Increase 1 to 3 7 
19 Low Slight Harm None 8 to 12 7 
20 Moderate 
Slight 
Improvement None 1 to 3 16 
21 Low 
Slight 
Improvement None 1 to 3 0 
22 None No Impact None 8 to 12 45 
23 Moderate No Impact None 1 to 3 16 
24 None No Impact None 1 to 3 29 
25 None 
Slight 
Improvement None 1 to 3 0 
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Creation of Choice Cards 
Twenty different choice sets were thus designed and used 
-in-. 
th'e 
questionnaire. Profiles were randomly paired together by a number draw, 
with partial replacement so some profiles were paired with more than one 
other profile. Using this method was assumed to create more total choice 
pairings than if just 12 pairs were created from the 24 remaining profiles. 
The assumption was inappropriate and may be a source of increased 
statistical variance and heteroscedasti city. 
The 20 choice sets which were created were blocked into groups 
of four in a survey. Each respondent received four choice sets. Each set 
containing two profiles and the status quo scenario (see Figure 4.1 
below). Combined groupings were alternated in the order they appeared 
in the survey and the order of the profiles were alternated between the '-, 
first and second column within each choice set (the choice set blocks 
may be view in Appendix B). This was done to avoid any presentation 
ordering bias by respondents. 
Ordering bias is when respondent's answers are influenced by the 
order in which information or questions presented to the person. Like all 
bias issues in surveying and econometrics, the data becomes suspect- 
and answers have increased uncertainty and decreased confidence 
(Dillman, 2000; Arsham, 2005; Louviere, et al. 2000) 
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Figure 4.1, Example Choice Set 
option example 
Plan A Plan B Neither 
ANDSCAPE No increase in 
' visual impact caused by HIGH NONE renewable ý 
location and/or size energy 
WILDLIFE 
-J health of habitat SLIGHT HARM SLIGHT HARM 
Alternative ArR POLLU7710AI 
NONE NONE climate change 
programs used 
EMPLOYMENT 
l l b i OBS 12 8 3 OB 1 
jobs 
new jo oca s n J - - J S North Sea gas 
_ 
community fired power PRICE OF C16 E7 
stations ELECTRICITY per year per year instead 
additional rates per 
year 
YOUR CHOICE- A I would not 
(please tick one only) F-1 want either A pr 8 
-1 
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General Criteria for the Design of Survey Instruments 
The following section consists of the general guidance given by 
Dillman (2000), Arsham (2005), and CRS (2005) on the construction and 
use of surveys. All of them follow the same basic format and advise, so 
the author has not differentiated the information. The information on 
survey techniques and issues by the afore mentioned sources have been 
combined with the works of Mitchell and Carson (1989), Bennett and 
Blarney (2001), and Hensher et al., (2005), all who have written on survey 
techniques in the context of stated preference and choice 
model ling/choice experiments. 
The overriding consideration in questionnaire design is to make 
sure your questions can accurately tell you what you want to learn. The 
way you order questions or how a question is phrased can change the 
answers received. Make sure the wording does not favour one answer 
choice over another. 
There are two broad issues when considering question and 
answer choice order in a survey instrument. One is how the question and 
answer choice order can motivate people to complete the survey. The 
other issue is how the order of questions or choices can bias the survey. 
Ideally, early survey questions should be easy and pleasant to 
answer. These kinds of questions encourage people to continue the 
survey. Grouping together questions on the same topic also makes the 
questionnaire easier to answer. 
Leave difficult or sensitive questions towards the end of the 
survey. Doing this will make it more likely people will answer these 
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questions. Socio-economic questions like location of household and 
income are examples of questions many people perceive as sensitive. If 
people refuse to answer these questions their responses have limited 
use, if the covariates are included in the analysis. This would not be the 
case if RPL is being used for the logit analysis. 
Answer choice order can make individual questions easier or more 
difficult to answer. Whenever there is a logical or natural order to answer 
choices, use it. Present agree-disagree choices in that order. Presenting 
the answer as disagree-agree may seem odd and confusing to both the 
respondent is a source of confusion when the questionnaire is in the 
coding process. The same issue applies to positive to negative and 
excellent to poor scaling., Numeric rating'scale should be ordered with 
higher numbers meaning more positive or stronger agreement with the 
answer. 
Question order can bias results in two ways. The first is 
mentioning an issue, concept or information in one question can stimulate 
respondents to think of it while they answer a later question, when they 
might not have thought of it, if it had not been previously mentioned. It 
may be possible to limit this, problem by randomizing the order of the 
questions. Separating related questions with unrelated ones may also 
limit the likelihood of this type of bias, though neither technique will 
eliminate it. Both of these methods may have an adverse affect and 
increase task complexity for the respondent. 
Question order can also bias results through habituation. This 
applies to a series of questions which all have the same answer choices. 
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As is the case in the choice experiment; respondents select OX, OBO or 
"Neither'. Some respondents will start giving the same answer. without 
really considering it, after being asked a series of similar questions., 
Several questionnaires were returned which had the appearance of this 
problem. Respondents tend to given greater thought when asked the 
earlier questions in the series and so give more accurate answers to 
them. This concept is called questionnaire fatigue or response fatigue. 
A third way to reduce habituation is to change the Opositivel 
answer. This applies mainly to level-of-agreement questions. It may be 
possible to word some statements such that a high level of agreement 
means satisfaction and other statements such that a high level of 
agreement means dissatisfaction. This technique forces the respondent 
to think more about each question. This is in direct contradiction to the 
previous guidance about presenting answers in a natural and non- 
contradictory manner. The information gained must be weighted by the 
potential coding and answer bias problems. 
Respondents have a tendency to select the choices nearest the 
start of a list when reading the list on paper, as in a mail survey. 
Respondents also tend to select the most recent answer when hearing a 
list of choices read to them. 
Sometimes answer choices have answers that are obvious to the 
respondent answering them, e. g. "What business or industry you work 
in? " The order in which answer choices are presented will not likely affect 
the answers given. 
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However, there are questions, particularly questions about 
personal preferences or questions with long, answer choices, i. e. ý choice 
experiments, which present an idea or opinion, in which the answer 
choice order has greater likelihood of biasing which choice is selected. - 
The questionnaire needs to be as- short as possible. The 
perception of a long time consuming survey will decrease the likelihood of 
a respondent even starting. And a long, questionnaire is more likely to 
lead to response fatigue, resulting in -incomplete surveys or incorrect 
answers. Generally, do not include a question if it is not necessary. While 
conducting field research is expensive, and a desire to collect all 
information, which may be relevant is desirable, 'it must be limited to a 
level which provides accurate information. 
Introduce the survey with a title which informs the'respondent of 
the survey's objective, e. g. IMPACTS FROM RENEWABLE ENERGY 
DEVELOPMEMT IN SCOTLAND: -A SURVEY OF PEOPLE'S VIEWS 
AUTUMN 2003. 
Include a short introduction -which states who is conducting the 
survey and the reasons why. Indicating that the research is being 
conducted for either academic or charitable organizations may increase 
cooperation from respondents. 
A cover letter should be included in all mail surveys. A good cover 
letter will increase the response rate. 
The use 'of Incentives may -, also increase the. response rate. 
Describe how to, return the questionnaire. , Include Ahe name and 
155 
telephone number of someone the respondent can call if they have any 
questions. Include instructions on how to complete the survey itself. 
Design of Survey Instrument 
The survey instrument (questionnaire) consisted of a cover letter 
and the questionnaire. The questionnaire has five sections: an 
introduction; description of the attributes; explanation of the choice 
experiment, presentation of the 4 choice sets (one choice block); and a 
final page where socio-demographic information was collected, as well as 
a place for the respon ent to given any additional comments or feedback 
on the questionnaire or topic of study. The complete survey may be seen 
in Appendix A. Each section is briefly described below. 
i) A cover letter informed the respondent that their household 
had been selected to participate in a national survey of 
people's views on renewable energy deployment in 
Scotland. The research was academic in nature and being 
carded out by the University of Glasgow. Further more the 
recipient was assured confidentiality of all communications, 
- and informed of a cash incentive for participating. 
ii) The questionnaire started by presenting a simplified context 
of renewable energy development in Scotland. The national 
commitment by the United Kingdom to reduce production of 
greenhouse gases was explained. Survey participants were 
told that the survey was not concerned Vith any specific 
type of renewables technology, but With the impacts that 
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could result from development of any renewable energy 
resource. 
iii) The five attributes discussed earlier were described, with 
examples being given to clarify each type of impact. 
iv) An example choice set was presented and the recipient was 
instructed in how the read and compare the three profiles 
and indicate their preference. 
V) Choice sets were then presented and the survey participant 
was requested to indicate - their preference. Each set 
contained three options. Plans A and B were possible 
renewable energy, projects, each with different attribute 
levels. A third option of choosing neither was given. This 
I neither option, commonly called the opt-out or status quo 
option, stated that there would be no increase in renewable 
energy, that alternative programs would be implemented to 
avoid climate change, and that North Sea natural gas usage 
would be expanded to provided for future electricity 
generation. 
v! ) The final page of the questionnaire was concerned with 
collecting standard socio-economic information about the 
participant. Information was requested about location of 
household, number, of children,, employment in the energy 
sector, -membership in a conservation group, age, 
household income, education attainment,, and amount of 
last electric bill., 
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Survey Pilot Test 
The questionnaire and accompanying cover letter were than 
submitted to a small pre-test with regard to their clarity and usefulness of 
the information contained. Feedback from this process lead to a revised 
and shortened version of the cover letter, clarification of some 
terminology and changes in how the socio-economic information was 
requested in the questionnaire. 
General Criteria for Sample Selection 
There are two main concerns in deciding whom to survey. The first 
is deciding what kind of people to survey. These people are called the 
target population or sample frame. Correctly determining the target 
population is critical. If the correct target population is not surveyed the 
analytic findings will be of limited value. If the sample is incorrectly drawn 
from the population it is said to be Obiased". Types of bias are described 
at the end of this section. 
Determining the sample size is the second main concern when 
conducting a survey. Statisticians have proven that a small, 
representative sample will reflect the group from which it is drawn 
(Greene, 2003). The larger the sample, the more precision and 
confidence can exist that the target population is being represented. 
However, the rate of improvement in precision decreases as the sample 
size increases. For example, increasing a sample from 250 to 1,000 only 
doubles the-precision of the estimates. Decisions about sample size are 
commonly based on factors such as: time available, budget and 
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necessary degree of precision. The main objective is to obtain both a 
desirable accuracy and a desirable confidence level with minimum cost. - - 
To calculate the desired size of sample population certain 
statistical terms need to be defined. 
9 Population Proportion: The percentage of people in the population 
who will respond a certain way for a given issue. This is an actual 
percentage which we would know if we were able to include 
everyone in a given population in a survey. We are attempting to 
estimate the population proportion by sampling a smaller group of 
people. 
9 Sample Size: The number of people in the survey. 
* Margin of Error, or Precision: The "plus or minus" amount, or 
percentage in the case of estimating proportions. 
* Confidence Level: The degree to which you are certain that the 
result, or estimate, you obtain from the study includes the true 
population percentage, when the precision is taken into account. 
Typical confidence levels are 80%, 90%, and 95%, although any 
confidence level can be used. 
(Business Research Lab, 2005) 
By assigning values to any three of these four variables, it is 
possible to determine the unknown variable which in this instance is 
sample size. 
The population proportion variable is assigned a value of 0.5. This 
value is the proportion which will give the greatest confidence in having 
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the correct sample size. As no information exists to estimate which of the 
profiles or attributes will be chosen in the survey choice sets it is 
assumed to be the greatest variance, the value 0.5. The margin of error 
variable is assigned a value of +/- 5%. This is the desirable standard of 
precision used in stated preference analysis. Confidence level is 
assigned a value of 95%, which is the common valued used by 
econometric analysis (Greene, 2003; Louviere, 2000). One final datum is 
required; the total population size. In this research the adult population of 
Scotland was used, 4,000,000 persons". 
Once these parameters are determined, two methods can be used 
to determine the necessary sample size. The first is to use statistical 
tables which list the required size. The second is to use statistical 
software. 
Quotas and Stratified Sampling 
A quota is a sample size for a sub-group. It is sometimes useful to 
establish quotas to ensure that your sample accurately reflects relevant 
sub-groups in your target population. For example, men and women have 
somewhat different opinions in many areas. If you want your survey to 
accurately reflect the general populationes opinions, you will want to 
ensure that the percentage of men and women in your sample reflect 
their percentages of the general population. 
Stratified sampling is a random sampling technique (Ryerson, 
2005). The whole population is first placed into mutually exclusive 
11 72% of the Scottish population was age of 20 or greater in 2001. Population in Moll 
was 5.06 million people. National Statistics 2005 
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subgroups or strata and then units are randomly -selected from each 
stratum. The segments are based on some predetermined criteria such 
as geographic location, size or demographic characteristic. It is important 
that the segments be as heterogeneous as possible. In simple random 
sampling, there is no assurance that a sufficient number of any single 
sub-group would actually be included in the sample. 
Proportionate stratified sampling is an additional attempt to assure 
proportional representation of sub-populations. of interest. For example, if 
one-quarter of the target population were women, the survey would 
attempt to maintain that same ratio in the sampling process. 
Disproportionate sampling is only undertaken if a particular strata 
is very important to the research project but occurs in too small a 
percentage to allow for meaningful analysis unless is representation is 
artificially boosted. In this technique you over sample and then weight 
your data to re-establish the proportions. Extending this from the previous 
example, assume there is only enough budget to survey 300 people, but 
inclusion of at least 100 women is required to have a sufficient number for 
further analysis. This means that you over sample for women, ratio of 
1.33: 1. Thus, the final data would need to be weighted for each of the 
women respondents to end up with the proper proportions- (Ryerson, 
2005). 
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Types of Sampling Bias 
There are several types of sampling bias: 
Population choice bias - when the researcher misidentifies the 
population whose values the study is Intended to obtain. 
Sampling frame bias - the frame may be a list or a methocl of 
generating a list of potential respondent If the populabon and the sapling 
frame diverge sampling frame bias can occur. For mail surveys, Mitchell 
and Carson (1989) recognise a problem with mailing surveys is to acquire 
an up-to-date address list of every potential sample group member of 
interest because of the frequency vAth which people change residences. 
They go on to state, 'There are likely to be fewer problems of this kind 
where the appropriate sampling frame consists of a current list of 
addresses held by a government agency -a list of the holders of fishing 
or hunting licenses, for example. 9 
Non-response bias - there are two types of non-response bias. 
Unit non-response (Kalton, 1983) is where a person or household fails to 
respond to a questionnaire. Item non-response a respondent answers 
some or most of the questions on a survey but fails to answer a particular 
questions of interest. Income is a common item non-response item. --- 
Sample non-responses bias - the response rates between sub- 
groups in the sample group are different such as education level and 
income level differences, these categories of people tend to also hold 
different values for public goods. 
Generally these types of non-response will be random and occur in 
an independent manner from one individual or household to another. 
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Sample Selection for Choice Experiment -I 
The parameters selected for this choice experiment areas follows: -- - 
Population Proportion: 0.50. 
This is the most conservative value that can be used in 
determining sample size. Maximises required sample population 
size. Given that no useable a prion knowledge exists which on 
the people's preferences being investigated this is the appropriate 
value. 
* Margin of Error, or Precision: +/- 5%. This is the standard 
precision used in econometric research and in stated preference 
research (Hensher et al., 2005). 
* Confidence Level: 95%. This is the standard used in econometric 
research and in stated preference research (Hensher et al., 2005). 
e Target Population: 4,000,000. This is the size of the Scottish 
population over the age of 20. It was determined that only the 
preferences of the adult population were desired. 
4 
To meet or accede these statistical parameters a sample size 
large enough to attain 384 respondents is required. Statistical software 
available on the intemet12 was'used to' calculate this quantity. It was 
confirmed by using SPSS statistical software also. 
If the survey was conducted through interviews, the required 
sample size would also be the number of interviews. However this 
12 Sample Size Calculator, 
http: /Iwww. qifted. uconn. edu/sieýle/research/Samples/samplecalculat , or. htm 
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research is being carded out Wth a mail survey. So the sample size 
needs to be large enough to attain 384 respondents. 
General Criteria for a Mail Surveys 
Advantages 
* Mail surveys are among the least expensive. 
* This is the only Wind of survey you can do if you have the names 
and addresses of the target population, but not their telephone 
numbers. 
* The questionnaire can include pictures - something that is not 
possible over the phone. 
* Mail surveys allow the respondent to answer at their leisure, rather 
than at the often inconvenient moment they are contacted for a 
phone or personal interview. For this reason, they are not 
considered as intrusive as other kinds of interviews. 
Disadvantages 
9 Timel Mail surveys take longer than other Winds. You will need to 
wait several weeks after mailing out questionnaires before you can 
be sure that you have gotten most of the responses. 
* In populations of lower educational and literacy levels, response 
rates to mail surveys are often too small to be useful. This, in 
effect, eliminates many immigrant populations that form substantial 
markets in many areas. Even in well-educated populations, 
response rates vary from as low as 3% up to 90%. As a rule of 
thumb, the best response levels are achieved from highly- 
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educated people and people with a particular interest in the subject 
(which, depending on your target population, could lead to a 
biased sample). 
One way of improving response rates to mail surveys is to mail a 
postcard telling your sample to watch for a questionnaire in the next week 
or two. Another is to follow up a questionnaire mailing after a Couple of 
weeks with a card asking people to return the questionnaire. The 
downside is that this doubles or triples your mailing cost. If "you have 
purchased a mailing list from a supplier, you may also have to pay a 
second (and third) use fee - you often cannot buy the list once and re-use 
it. - 
Another way to increase responses to mail surveys is to use an 
incentive. One possibility is to send a dollar bill (or more) along with the 
survey (or offer to donate the dollar to a charity specified by the 
respondent). If you do so, be sure to say that the dollar is a way of 
saying "thanks, " rather than payment for their time. Many people will 
consider their time worth more. than a dollar. Another possibility is to 
include the people who return completed surveys in a drawing for a prize. 
Nthird is to offer a copy of the (non-confidential) result highlights to those 
who complete the questionnaire. Any of these techniques Will increase 
the response rates. 
Remember that if you want a sample of 1,000 people, and you 
estimate a 10% response level,, you need to mail 10,000 questionnaires. 
You may want to check with your local post office about bulk mail rates - 
you can save on postage using this mailing method. -However, most 
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researchers do not use bulk mail, because many people associate "bulW' 
with "junW' and will throw it out without opening the envelope, lowering 
your response rate. Also bulk mail moves slowly, increasing the time 
needed to complete your project. 
Mail Survey for Choice Experiment 
A mail survey was used due to a constraint imposed by project 
funding. This is not an uncommon occurrence in stated preference 
research (Gordon et al., 2001). A researcher must try to include the 
maximum number of respondents that can be reached. If the number of 
respondents is below the minimum sample size required, it becomes 
even more important to test if the sample is representative of the target 
population. 
NOTE: Even if the required sample size is met, it must be tested 
for representing the target population. Attaining the necessary sample 
size is not sufficient in itself to assure any statistically requirements. 
The sampling frame for this project was the Scottish general 
public. Our sample population was randomly selected from the list of 
registered voters in eight council districts of Scotland. The districts are 
Aberdeenshire, Highlands and Islands, Western Isles, Edinburgh, 
Glasgow, Stirling, Borders, and Durnfries and Galloway. Approximately 
250 names were from Glasgow and Edinburgh, 80 from Aberdeenshire, 
and 30-45 names from each of the other districts. 
The areas were selected as a disproportionate stratified sample to 
increase the likelihood of capturing both - the overall preferences of 
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Scottish adults, as well as the preferences - of rural populations which 
would be most affected by the deployment of renewable energy projects. 
547 names were selected and mailed survey packages with a 
cover letter during the first week of September 2003. 
Use of Cash Incentive 
As an incentive to participate a E20 prize draw was offered, to 
those who completed and returned the survey. 'One in 100 of the 
respondents would be randomly selected to receive the cash. There is 
some debate on the effectiveness of offering cash incentives to increase 
participation rates from a mail survey (Church, 1993). The particular method 
used in this research is not believed to improve the, response rate in any 
statistically measurable manner. However, it has been demonstrated that no 
harm to the response rate. Given this situation it was decided to offer the 
incentive, as any marginal increase in responses would be helpful to the 
research. Slightly oýer 200 responses'were received. 'E20 was sent by check to 
two randomly selected respondents. Approximately one-half of the respondents 
registered in the survey to participate in the incentive draw. There was no 
method included in the survey instrument of identifying respondents if they did 
not given their name and address. See page two of the survey, Appendix A. 
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Response Rates and Respondent Characteristics 
Response rate 
Three weeks after the survey was mailed out, a follow-up postcard 
was mailed to encourage the completion and return of the survey. By 
October 2003,219 households had returned surveys, a 43% response 
rate after undeliverable letters are considered. 211 surveys were 
received in time to be part of the sample set. 8 surveys were returned too 
late to be included. 287 households did not respond. This response rate 
is acceptable, and comparable to other studies, (Ek, 2002; Hanley, et al., 
2001) that had response rates ranging from 44% to 56%, for a survey 
mailed to the general population. Mail surveys tend to have the lower 
response rates than telephone or face-to-face interviews (Bateman, et al., 
2002). 
Descriptive Statistics of Respondents Tables 4.3a to Table 4.3f 
Table 4.3a -Age Distribution (by survey categories) 
No 
<25 2540 41-54 55-65 >65 response Total 
Number Respondents 10 56 56 35 49 5 
1211 
.% 
Respondents 4.7% 26.5% 26.5% 16.6% 23.2% 2.4% 1100.0% 1 
Table 4.3b Location Ot Household (by survey cateciories 
Village or No 
City Town Countryside response Total 
Number of Respondents 88 33 86 4 211 
% Respondents 42.0% 16.0% 41.0% 
____2.0% 
100% 
168 
Table 4.3c Gross Household Income 
Distribution (by survey categories) 
Number of % 
Income Bracket Respondents Respondents 
EO -< El 0,000 29 13.7% 
El 0,000 - El 5,999 -. 
40 19.0% 
E16,000 - E20,999 19 9.0% 
E21,000 - E25,999 21 10.0% 
E26,000 - E30,999 13 6.2% 
E31,999 - E35,999 20 9.5% 
E36,000 - E40,999 12 5.7% 
E41,000 - F-45,999 5 2.4% 
E46,000 - E50,999 5 2.4% 
E51,000 - E55,999 6 2.8% 
E56,000 - E60,999 2 0.9% 
E61,000 - E65,999 4 1.9% 
E66,000 - E70,999 4 1.9% 
E71,000 - E75,999 0 0.0% 
E76,000 - E79,999 1 0.5% 
E80,000 > 5 2.4% 
No response 25 11.8% 
Total 211 100.0% 
Table 4.3d Membership In 
L, on. servauon I uroup (s) 
Number of % 
Respondents Respondents 
Member 16 8.0% 
Non-remembers 178 84.0% 
No response 17 8.0% 
Total 211 100.0% 
Table 4.3e Emploved In lEnerav Sector 
Number of % 
Respondents Respondents 
Employed in sector 18 9.0% 
Not employed in sector 187 89.0% 
No response 6 3.0% 
Total 211 100.0%" 
Table4.3f Child(ren) (living at home or awa 
Number of % 
Respondents Respondents 
Respondent with child(ren) , 145 69.0%-, - Respondent without 
child(ren) 62 29.0% 
No respons6 421 . 0% Total 211 100.0% 
. 01 
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Testing Sample Group for Bias and Representation of Target 
I 
Population 
Any mail out survey has the risk of self-selection bias. Self- 
selection bias, also called sample selection bias, occurs when the non- 
response from the sample population is not random, but rather individuals 
who do not respond are representative of a group who hoid different 
values for a good from those who do respond. The inverse can also be 
true, that individuals who hold different values for a good select 
themselves into the sample in a disproportionate manner. Both types of 
self selection bias can occur more easily with mail out surveys than 
telephone, person-to-person interviews and intemet surveys. 
Compadng the socio-economic information collected on the 211 
respondents who are included in the choice experiment analysis to the 
statistical profile of the Scottish population is one test for such a bias. 
Two statistical tests are used to determine if the sample is an 
acceptable representation of the whole population. The first is the 
proportional chi-square test (also known as the Pearson Chi-square). The 
second is the student's t-statistic. 
The Pearson Chi-square is the most common test for significance 
of a relationship between categorical variables (Stat Soft, 2003). The 
measure is based on statistical theory that the expected frequencies in a 
two-way table can computed, i. e. frequencies that would be expect if no 
relationship between the variables existed. For example, suppose 100 
rural respondents and 100 urban respondents are asked to choose 
between two renewable energy profiles. If there is no relationship 
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between preference and residence location, then it would expected to find 
an equal number of choices of each profile for each location. The Chi- 
square test statistic increases in significance as the respondent's 
answers deviate further from the expected pattern. 
The value of the Chi-square and its significance level depends on 
the overall number of observations and the number of cells in the table. 
Relatively small deviations of the relative frequencies across cells from 
the expected pattern will prove significant if the number of observations is 
large (Stat Soft, 2003). - 
The only assumption underlying the use of the Chi-square (other 
than random selection of the sample) is that the expected frequencies are 
not very small. The reason for this is that, actually, the Chi-square 
inherently tests the underlying probabilities in each cell; and when the 
expected cell frequencies fall, for example, below 5%, those probabilities 
cannot be estimated with sufficient precision (Everitt, 1977; Hays, 1988; 
and Kendall and Stuart 1979). 
Standard procedures for testing sample statistics are to identify a 
null hypothesis and an alternative hypothesis (Hill et al., 2001). In the 
case of the proportional Chi-square test the null hypothesis is that the 
sample population is equal to the national population. The null hypothesis 
must not be accepted for sample bias to be shown. 
In the sample, respondent's income and location of residence are 
different from the national proportions, at the 10% level. The null 
hypothesis is rejected. The sample-does not represent the whole 
population.. 
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Our sample is proportionally weighted to lower income levels than 
the national proportions, and the sample is more rural than the national 
proportions. These two descriptors are in fact correlated with each other 
(SPIU, 2005). Rejection of the null hypothesis means that the estimated 
coefficients and the calculated WTP values may not be statistically valid 
representations of the whole Scottish population. 
The second test is the studerif s t-statistic test. The mean and 
standard error is calculated for the sample population for each 
characteristic, location and income. A confidence Interval is configured 
around the mean. The null hypothesis state that the sample represents 
the whole population is accepted if the population mean lays within the 
interval. For characteristics, location and income, the null hypothesis was 
not accepted. The Mest is of limited validity in this context, as the 
sample and the population are not normally distributed. However, it is an 
acceptable secondary support of the prior Chi-square test. 
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Data Analysis 
To model the information collected from the questionnaire, each 
choice set has three lines of code that combines the attribute levels, 
ASCs and socio-economic vadables (Bennett and Blarney, 2001). The 
data matrix appeared in the form: 
Alternative Plan A: Va = ASCa + 16 attributesX +. 8 soci-econy 
Alternative Plan B: Vb=ASCb+-*8attribtitesX+flsoci-econy 
No Renewables Option: Vn ý J6 aftributesX + fl soci-econy 
(The neither/opt-out plan) 
where V is the conditional indirect utility, ASCa, b are the alternative 
specific constants for each choice plan, .8 affributes is a vector of coefficients 
associated with the attributes X and levels, and fl soci"con is a vector of 
coefficients associated with the socio-economics descriptors Y of the 
respondents. 
NLOGIT 3.01LIMDEP 8.0 econometric software was used to 
estimate the MNL model. Attributes were effect coded, rather than being 
coded using dummy variables, as this will provide estimates that are 
uncorrelated to the intercept of the model (Louviere, et al., 2000). Effect 
coding means that at least one level of each attribute is not included as 
an identified variable: thus a 3-level attribute generates two variables. 
The excluded level is coded as negative one. The attributes levels 
chosen for exclusion were the ones hypothesised to have the most 
negative effect on environmental amenities. Therefore, the estimated 
coefficients for each of the remaining levels indicate the value 
respondents placed on the change from the lowest valued (omitted) level 
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to the level of greater utility. The omitted levels were: High Landscape 
Impact, Slight Wildlife Harm, and Slight Increase in Ak Pollution. The 
effect of these omitted levels on utility is given by the negative of the sum 
of the coefficients on all the included levels. 
Model Estimation 
Multinomial Logit Model 
Results for all 211 respondents from the IVINL model are shown in 
Table 4.4. The "simple" model shows results when only the choice 
experiment attributes are included in the regression. The coefficients are 
interpreted as the parameters of the indirect utility function, although the 
fact that they are confounded Vith a scale parameter means that one 
cannot directly interpret their numerical value 
The MNL models are shown in Table 4.4. The "Simple MNU' 
model consists of a regression which includes only the key attributes from 
the choice experiment. The OMNL Model vAth covariates' consists of the 
L, ei 
I. y attributes and three covariates: household income, education of 
respondent, and age of respondent. 
The coefficients are interpreted as the parameters of the indirect 
utility function, although they are in fact confounded vvith a scale 
parameter which means that it is not possible to directly interpret the 
numerical values. The scale parameter can be eliminated by 
cancellation 13 when calculating implicit prices, marginal rates of 
substitution between attributes, or welfare measures. 
M If a common factor exists in both the denominator and numerator of a fraction, the 
factor can be eliminated in simplification of the expression (Swift and Piff, 2005). 
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The sign on each coefficient indicates the influence that each 
attribute has on choice probabilities. All attribute coefficients, in both 
models, have the expected values. The values of all but the price attribute 
are positive, as consumer preference theory predicts (Mas-Colell, 1995), 
since these attributes are expressed in the analysis to show! an increase 
in environmental quality, which is expected to result in increased utility by 
respondents. Price is found to be a negative value and therefore is also in 
accord with standard economic theory which states that an increase in 
price of a normal good should decreases consumer utility (Mas-Colell, 
1995). 
All of the environmental attributes are significant determinants of 
utility at some level: changes in air pollution, 'landscape effects and 
wildlife effects. However, employment creation is found to be non- 
significant as an attribute. 
A series of socio-economic variables (respondent descriptive) 
were proposed for inclusion in an "MNL with covariates" model based on 
standard consumer theory and stated preference studies. The student t- 
test and log likelihood tests were used to determine acceptance or 
rejection of each socio-economic variable. The rejected descriptive 
variables were: does the respondent have children; employment in the 
energy sector; membership in a conservation group; monetary amount of 
last electric bill; age (five categories); and education (three categories). 
The remaining covariates used in the "expanded" model show 
t 
either statistical significance; or are included on'substantial theoretical 
and social policy grounds., Education and age are, in the -former class, 
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while income is the latter case. (Dodgson et al., 1990; Batley et al., 2001; 
EK, 2005) 
Table 4.4 Multinomlal Logit Model 
Variable Coefficients Standard Coefficients Standard 
: MNL with Error AINL Error Descriptor Covariates 
Landscape change: 
moderate 0.2968 0.1551 0.2151 0.1396 
Landscape change: 
low 0.1352 0.2057 0.1561 0.1857 
Landscape change: 
none 0.4222 0.1064 0.3898 0.0986 
Wildlife: no impact 0.2170 0.1061 0.2720 0.0974 
Wildlife: slight 
improvement 0.6251 0.1283 0.4989 0.1157 
Air Pollution: none 0.7389 0.0658 0.7098 0.0589 
Jobs created 0.0169 0.0120 0.0111 0.0110 
Price -0.0518 0.0065 -0.0490 0.0059 
Alternative 
Specific Constant - 
A 3.2875 0.6004 2.9528 0.4605 
Alternative 
Specific Constant - 
B 3.0968 0.5990 2.7891 0.4620 
"Income -A -0.0047 0.0101 
'Income -B -0.0060 0.0101 
tducation 
-A 1.0505 0.3810 
bEducation -B 0.9037 0.3832 
'Age -A -0.7750 0.3619 
'Age -B -0.5701 0.3653 
Number of 
Observations 739 836 
Log-likelihood 435.20 -509.79 
Psuedo-W 0.4581 0.4416 
* Indicates significance at! % level; Indicates significant at 5% level 
a Respondent's household income level 
b Respondent's education level ( Higher Education = 1; General Education 0) 
c Respondent's age (Less than 41 years age = 1; More than or equal to 41 years age 
I =0) 
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Scotland has an on going social policy debate on the effect 
renewable energy will have household energy prices and low income 
households which may be driven into fuel, poverty 14 (EAS, 2004). Fuel- 
poor households in Scotland numbered 262,000 in 2002,12% of all 
households. The number of households in fuel poverty is down from 
738,000 (35% of households) in 1996 (EAS, 2004). 
A likelihood ratio test was used to compare the "simple" and "with 
covadates! ' models, to determine if the models were significantly 
difference from each other. The likelihood ratio test rejected the null 
hypothesis' 5; therefore the models are difference from each other. 
Several statistical tests were used to compare these two models. 
Implicit prices" derived from the two models, ýwere compared and were 
not found to be statistically different. The student's Mest was used, for 
comparison of the respective implicit prices. This result is also easily 
confirmed by a simple visual examination and -recognition, of the large 
overlap of confidence intervals (95% level) of both models implicit prices. 
14 The Scottish Executive has adopted the definition of fuel poverty used in the UK Fuel 
Poverty Strategy; however it is more specific in certain' areas, including the definition of a 
'satisfactory heating regime' which uses the levels recommended by the World Health 
Organisation. For elderly and infirm households, this is 23 C in the living room and 18 C 
in other rooms, to be achieved for 16 hours in every 24. For other households, this is 21 
C in the living room and 18 C in other rooms for a period of nine hours in every 24 (or 16 
in 24 over the weekend), with two being in the morning and seven hours in the evening. 
'Household income' would be defined as income before housing costs, to mirror the 
definition used in the UK Households Below Average Income Statistics (EAS, 2004). 
"The null hypothesis states the parameter values of the two models are equal at the 
95% significance level. 
16 Implicit prices ("part-worths") are interpreted as the incremental willingness-to-pay 
through an increase in electricity charges per annum per household for a change in any 
of the attributes. I -I I.. ý. 11 Ili ýJ-1 11, ý ý*' r 
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The standard errors and confidence intervals for these non-linear 
functions were calculated by LIMDEP 8.0 using the delta method. 
The adjusted McFadden Pseudo-R2 is also improved with the 
addition of the covadates. Louviere, et al., (2000) states that a McFadden 
statistic in the 0.20 to 0.30 range is comparable to an ordinary least 
square (OLS) adjusted-R2 of 0.70 to 0.90. Therefore, the MNL model vAth 
covariates is deemed the superior model. 
One final test was conducted on both of models, the Independence from 
Irrelevant Alternatives test. See earlier discussion of the ILA requirement 
in this chapter. Both models failed the IIA test. Regardless which plan 
was excluded for the test, Plan A or Plan B, the MNL models were found 
to violate this essential assumption. Neither MNL models can be 
accepted, 
Random Parameter Logit Model 
When heterogeneity is present, it is appropriate to specify a choice 
model which accounts for this heterogeneity". A "random parameter 
logit" model was therefore used (Train, 1998). The RPL model has been 
described in an eadier section, Economic Theory and Econometric 
Models. Given that income and location of residence were positively 
identified as a source of heterogeneity the sample was segregated into 
sub-groups for further investigation. 
17 The Multinomial Logit Model assumes that people tastes are homogeneous 
throughout the population. If it is not true, the resulting parameter estimates are biased 
and can no longer be used for preference and welfare estimates (Hensher, 2001) 
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Two sub-groups were created to test for statistical significance due 
to household income levels. One group had income below E16,000 per 
annum, while the other had income of E16,000 or greater per annum. 
RPL models were estimated for both sub-groups and a likelihood ratio 
test conducted. A likelihood ratio test is used to verify if the two groups 
were statistically different, or if they could be pooled together (pooled 
together is the null hypothesis). If the groups are structurally different, 
then the summed log-likelihood values will be greater than -the log- 
likelihood value of the combined groups (Greene, 2003). The null 
hypothesis is accepted; therefore separating the sample into two groups 
will not increase explanatory power nor reduce heterogeneity. 
The same test was completed for the location of residence 
characteristic. By segregating the sample into two groups based on 
location of residence either rural or urban. This characteristic was self- 
declared by respondents in the socio-demographic portion of the 
questionnaire. There were three possible options; residing in a city, a 
small town, or a village/the country. The null hypothesis that the groups 
should be pooled together was not accepted. Location is statistically 
significant in estimating the preferences of the sample population and is 
therefore a source of heterogeneity. Estimates of preferences are 
improved by separating the sample into two groups. 
The estimated coefficients derived from the random parameter logit 
model are shown below (Table 4.5). 
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Table 4.5, the second column descdbes the estimated coefficients 
of the entire sample population, whilst columns 3 and 4 show the 
estimated coefficients of the sub-sample populations: urban and rural 
residents. When interpreting the coefficients, it must be remembered that 
the coefficients describe the contribution of the attributes to choice 
probabilities: positive coefficients reveal an, increase in the choice 
probability, negative coefficients a decrease. Qualitative variables were 
coded using effect codes, so that the value of the omitted level is equal to 
the negative of the sum of the included levels. 
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Table 4.5 Random Parameter Logit Model 
Variables Total Urban dwellers Rural dwellers 
Alean 
Constant 3.406 3.131 4.878 
Landscape change: moderate 0.186 -0.133 0.587 
Landscape change: low 0.225 0.698 -0.436 
Landscape change: none 0.470 . 0.492 0.537 Wildlife: no impact 0.331 0.313 0.467 
Wildlife: slight improvement 0.735 0.795 0.961 
Air Pollution: none 0.929 0.893 $ 1.092 
Jobs created 0.013 -0.011 0.068 
Price -0.067 -0.086 -0.063 
Age 1.186 1.677 1.048 
EducatiotP 1.312 2.339 0.742 
Income' , -0.015 -0.032 0.004 
Standard Deviation 
Landscape change: moderate 0.460 0.748 0.649 
Landscape change: low . 0.972 1.183 1.387 Landscape change: none 0. '796 0.877 0.380 
Wildlife: no impact 0.569 0.373 0.853 
Wildlife: slight improvement 0.295 0.275 0.186 
Air Pollution: none 0.361 0.612 0.199 
Jobs created 0'. 031 0.037 0.010 
Number of observations 828 476 352 
Log likelihood at constant -700.23 -392.79 -306.24 
Log likelihood at convergence 1-470.30, -263.69 -190.12 
Likelihood Ratio 459.86 258.20 232.24 
Pseudo Rý 
. 473 . 
487 
. 
497 
Clarification 
Indicates significance at I% level, *- Indicates significance at 5% level, 
*** Indicates significance at 10 % level. 
Respondents' age (Less than 4 1: 1; More than or equal to 4 1: 0) b Respondents' education (ffigh Education: 1; General education: 0) 
*Respondents' income 
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Overall, each model is highly significant and shows a very good fit 
when comparing the log likelihood values at zero and at convergencele. 
The signs of all coefficients are consistent with a priod expectations. 
Starting with the Ototal sample" model the high significance and positive 
value of the constant indicates, everything else equal, respondents 
support renewable energy expansion. The constant Is interpreted as the 
effect of systematic factors not included as attributes. The landscape 
change coefficients specify that only a change from high impact to the 
absence of any impacts significantly affects choice. The effect of 
renewable energy projects which may have on wildlife is very important, 
and projects that may cause slight harm to vvildlife are less likely to be 
chosen. On the other side, projects that produce a slight improvement on 
wildlife are preferred to ones that have no impact on it This is 
demonstrated by the coefficient for mvAldlife: slight improvement* being 
larger than the coefficient for Owildlife: no impacf. People care a lot about 
the effect projects can have on air pollution. Interestingly, the jobs 
attribute is not a significant determinant of choice: that is, generally there 
are other more important issues than jobs which motivate people to 
support renewable energy projects. The negative sign on the pdce 
attribute reveals the negative effect that people perceive from electricity 
price increases. The higher the cost associated with any alternative, the 
lower the probability that alternative has of being. This is consistent with 
standard consumer theory. 
18 Simulations conducted by Domenich and McFadden (1975) compare values of 
pseudo-R 2 between 0.2-0.4 to values between 0.7-0.9 of the R2 of the ordinary least 
squares linear regressions. 
182 
The socio-economic variables which were included in the model 
show that both age and education influence choices. People who are 
younger than 41 years and/or have earned a higher education degree are 
more likely to support renewable energy projects. Income was not a 
significant determinant of choice. This lack of significance is possibly the 
result of the proposed increased in electricity prices in the experiment still 
being affordable to all respondents. 
Most coefficients' standard deviations are significant. This is a clear 
indication that respondent's preferences are indeed heterogeneous. 
Heterogeneity arises from different values being held by respondents 
about the potential impacts of renewable energy projects. Considering 
landscape impacts, for example, there are individuals who firmly believe 
that wind mills are 'beautiful and gracefully", whilst others believe that 
they destroy the quality of the landscape: our model results provide 
evidence of this variation in preferences. 
It is important to note the size, magnitude and statistically 
significance of the ASC for each of the three models. The ASC captures 
the unexplained enclogenous values held by the respondents; the ASCs 
within each model have coefficients which range from three to ten times 
larger than the attribute or covariate coefficients. Relatiýe to the other 
explanatory coefficients, these ASCs can be interpreted to show the 
existence of a strong and substantial preference for all renewable energy 
profiles over the status quo. 'This finding is supported by the public 
opinion surveys which were described in the'prior chapter. 
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Comparing Urban and Rural responses 
The urban and rural sub-sample models show preferences do differ 
between the two groups. Urban residents prefer projects that have low or 
no landscape impact (in spite of the eAstence of heterogeneity in this 
attribute), do not harm wildlife and do not generate air pollution. Creation 
of new permanent jobs is not a concern for urban respondents. Rural 
residents can be inferred to have greater support for renewable energy 
projects by having more significant coefficients which are positive in value 
and a smaller negative coefficient on the price attribute. Interestingly, 
rural respondents are very influenced by projects that create new 
permanent jobs, unlike the urban sample. This may reflect a perception 
that renewable energy projects will be constructed and maintained in rural 
areas. 
Implicit Prices 
The implicit prices of the attributes support the interpretation of the 
model coefficients. Table 4.6 lists the implicit prices estimated for the 
three models, with their 95% confidence intervals". For the landscape 
attribute a moderate or a low change in landscape quality does not have 
a positive willingness-to-pay in all models, since the confidence interval of 
the implicit prices overlaps zero. The full sample and the urban sample 
have a positive vAllingness-to-pay for projects that do not cause any 
landscape change; whilst the rural sample has implicit prices for changes 
in the landscape attribute that are not statistically different from zero. The 
19 The Krisky and Robb (1986) bootstrapping procedure was used for the confidence 
intervals estimation. 
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wildlife attribute has positive values associated with it, and in, particular a 
uslight" improvement in wildlife has a willingness-to-pay value of E10.95. 
Respondents are also willing to pay an average of E13.84 for projects that 
do not increase air pollution. Only the rural respondents have a significant 
and positive implicit price for the creation of new permanent jobs. In the 
rural sample an average respondents would be willing to give E1.08 for 
creation of each new permanent job. This underlines the importance rural 
residents place on any development plans that, may increase the number 
of jobs locating in their areas. 
Table 4.6 Implicit Prices 
Total sample Urban dwellers Rural dwellers 
Implicit Price Implicit Price Implicit Price 
Attributes 
Landscape change: 2.77 -1.54 9.38 
moderate (-2.52; 9,06) 7.69; 5.40) 1.49; 26.56) 
Landscape change: low 
3.36 8.08 -6.97 
(4.7 1; 10.16) 
ý(-0.91; 
14.79) 27.54; 6.88) 
Landscape change: none 
7.00* '5.69* 8.59 
(2.73; 11.79) (0.88; 11.63) 0.48; 14.47) 
Wildlife: no impact 
1 4.94* 3.63 7.47* 
(0.96; 10.16) (-0.82; 9.13) (0.09; 16.59) 
Wildlife: slight 10.95* 1 9.19 *1 1 15.35* 
improvement (6.74; 14.61) (3.24; 14.52) (8.97; 23.27) 
Air Pollution: 'none 13.84 *, '' , 10.33* , 17.45 * (10.78; 18.45) (7.24; 15.30) (11.97; 27.64) 
Jobs created 
0.19 
ýý .ý iý , -, 
0.13 1.08* - , 0.25; 0.6 1) 0.64; 0.38) 22; 2.09) (0. 
* Statistically diff-erent from 0 at 95'Dro confidence level 
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Social Welfare Changes from New Renewable Energy Projects 
From a policyrnaker's perspective, deriving welfare estimates is a 
useful aspect of choice experiments for use in benefit-cost analysis. 
Instead of just focusing on individual attribute values, choice experiments 
offer the ability to estimate the economic value of alternative projects 
which change the levels of some or all attributes simultaneously. To 
achieve this, a comparison of utility can be made between a reference 
project and a series of alternative projects. as long as each can be 
described using the attribute levels used in the experiment The utility of 
any alternative project is calculated by subtracting it from the utility of the 
status quo project; this result is then divided by the negative of the cost 
coefficient to convert from utility units to money-equivalent units of 
measurement (Bennett and Blamey, 2001). 
Welfare Change I/ bn1 (VO - V1) (Eq. 4.8) 
where b,. n is the estimated coefficient on the monetary attribute from the 
choice model, Vo is the value of the indirect utility associated with the 
reference project and V1 is the value of the indirect utility associated Wth 
any other alternative. In this conteA alterriative renewable energy 
projects can be compared to the Ono increase in renewable energy source 
alternative' (reference case). The resulting monetary value is the welfare 
change that results from the particular alternative project as compared to 
the reference project. Four different energy project scenarios were 
considered: 
A. Large Offshore Windmill Farm - 200 MW. 100 turbines each at 
80 meters nacelle hub height, 6-10 kilometres from shore. 
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B. Large Onshore Windmill Farm - 160 MW, 80 turbines each at, 80 
meters nacelle hub height. 
C. Moderate Windmill Farm - 50 MW, 30 turbines each at 60 meters 
nacelle hub height. 
D. Biomass Power Plant - 25MW, emissions stack height up to 40 
meters, portions of building up to 30 meters, fuelled by energy 
crops. 
All of these energy project scenados are taken from actual projects 
that have been constructed or are proposed and in the process of being 
permitted. The three wind farms are derived from information from the 
British Wind Energy Association (BWEA, 2003). The biomass power plant 
description was taken from the Peninsula Power Project, a biomass 
power plant proposed for the Devon region of England (Peninsula Power, 
2004). 
There is some concern about the status quo or opt-out profile which 
was developed and used in this experiment. A question eAsts about the 
sufficiency of the profile -to inform participants of the attributes from 
continued generation fuelled by natural gas from Peterhead Power 
Station. If there was insignificant information than the social welfare 
values derived in this section should be treated with-'sc'epticism (Bennett 
and Blarney, 2001). However, the implicit prices estimated from this 
research are not affected. 
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Table 4.7 Welfare Changes from New Renewable Energy Projects 
Scenario: Base Case 
Fossil Fuel 
power 
stadon 
expansion 
A 
Large 
Offshore 
Wind farin 
B 
Large 
Onshore 
Wind fann 
CD 
Small Bidm= 
Onshore PowerPlant 
Wind farm 
Attribute Levels: 
Landscape Low None High Moderate Moderate 
Wildlife None None None None Improve 
Air Pollution Increase None None None Increase 
Employment +2 +5 +4 +1 +70 
Welfare Change 31.88 18.14 
Vhsld/yr. ): (19.02, 11.57 26.91 (-12.97. 
otal sample 4819) (-2.67,29.63)(12.98,44.52) 52.80) 
elfare Change 0.08 1". 99 
Vhsld/yr. ): 17.87 (. 15.40, 11.17 (47.72, 
Urban sample (5.74,37.57) 21.65) (. 0.59,30.57) 20.73) 
Welfare Change 53.71 97.95 
(L/hsld/yr. ): (29.90, 33.04 50.16 (38.93. 
ýtural sample 91.82) (5.70,70.80 ) (24.30,96.54) 176.63) 
Table 4.7 shows the resulting welfare change for each of 
Ithe 
investment scenarios in relation to the reference project, computed using 
equation 8from above. Results are presented for whole sample and the 
two sub-samples representing for urban and rural respondents. 
The monetary values are the price representative households are 
willing-to-pay, on an annual basis, to have different types of renewable 
energy projects (indicated by different attribute levels), rather than the 
reference case of expanded fossil fuel power generation. The whole 
sample places the greatest value on offshore wind farms, with the major 
determinant the welfare change being the absence of air pollution and 
landscape impacts. The next most valued type of energy project is a 
small onshore vAnd farm. For a large onshore wind farm or a biomass 
power plant the willingness-to-pay is not statistically different from EO, 
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with a confidence level of 95%. The most interesting, aspects- of the 
findings presented in Table 5 are the comparisons of urban and rural 
preferences. Urban residents show a positive willing ness-to-pay for only 
the large offshore wind farm, whilst they show negative welfare for all 
other types of renewable energy projects. Rural respondents' welfare 
estimates are rather different and reveal a positive willing to pay for all the 
renewable projects proposed. The highest value is associated with the 
biomass power plant, with a major determinant being the level ý of 
employment associated with plant operation and agricultural production of 
the energy crops, - whilst also of significance is the benefit to wildlife 
associated With expansion of grom(ing biomass crops. The large offshore 
wind farm follows in importance, given the absence of negative impacts 
on landscape, wildlife, air pollution and the creation of 5 permanent jobs. 
The small onshore wind farm has a high willingness-to-pay value 
associated with it. The lower value for the small onshore wind farm is due 
to a moderate impact on landscape and the diminished creation of jobs. 
The large onshore wind farm is positively valued, even with the negative 
value of creating a high landscape - impact. This can be interpreted as 
rural residents being willing to accept some diminished landscape quality 
to get better air quality and some new job opportunities. 
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Test for Validity and Consistency 
It is important that respondents should demonstrate a consistent 
ranking order of the attributes, between sample groups and within the 
same sample group. For a study to have confidence in its results, 
specifically the identification of preferences and derived utility, the same 
ranking of attributes should be identified by alternative survey methods 
for the same sample group (Mitchell and Carson, 1989). If inconsistency 
in the rank ordering of attributes is found, potential problems may exist, 
on both theoretical and econometric grounds. 
Several studies have been conducted which attempt to measure 
the accuracy, or validity, of monetary values derived by CE (Ben-Akiva, 
1990; Swait et al., 1994; Loomis, 1996). These studies cover a range of 
testing methods; conducting 2 CV studies on the same issue on the same 
sample group; and re-surveying the same sample group at a later date to 
compare respondent values and preferences over time. A last method is 
to simply test if stated preferences match economic theory and match 
other studies which have examined a similar good. This last method is 
the basic premise upon which benefit transfer studies are founded. 
The comparative studies approach, conducting altemative stated 
preference research simultaneously or consecutively, was deemed too 
time consuming and expensive for the choice experiment being 
conducted here. The same was true for the re-survey method. 
Two methods of testing for consistency are identify and rank 
preferences in an secondary or alternative manner vvithin the same 
survey instrument, and to examine decision making rationality of 
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respondents by the profiles which are selected from the CE choice sets 
(Foster and Mourato, 2002). The first of these is an explicit test while the 
second is an implicit test. Respondent are aware of the test in the first 
instance and unaware in the second. 
An explicit validation question was included in the questionnaire to 
test for a respondent's consistency with their stated preferences. 
Respondents were given a separate listing of the five attributes and 
asked to indicate which single attribute was most important to them. 
Finure 4.2 Validation question presented In the CE survey 
Overall which of these impacts is most important to you? (Please tick only one) 
Landscape Wildlife_____ý_ Air Pollution_ 
Employment- Price of electricity- 
The rank order of the attributes, as determined by respondent 
avotes' was: 1) air pollution; 
2) wildlife; 
3) electricity price; 
4) landscape; and 
5) employment. 
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Table 4.8 Summary of Vote for Most Important Attribute 
Rank 
Attribute Number Rank order by Implicit Price 
of votes order Implicit 
Prices 
Air pollution 142 1 1 E13.84' ' ' - Wildlife 35 2 2 T95 V E4. W & E16 
Employment 31 3 4 EO. 19 
Landscape 30 4 3 E2.77. E3.38, E7. W* 
Price of 
electricity 
51 (2)" 
* The impicit prices tor tne pnce coetticient will always equal 1, 
as the implicit price determined by dividing the attribute coefficient 
by the price coefficient 
** Ranking of price by votes. 
" Statistically different from 0 at 95% confidence level. 
For air pollution and wildlife consistency Is demonstrated with the 
preference results shown in Table 4.8 above. The scale of the voting tally 
is similar in structure to the different in attribute values as shown by the 
implicit prices. 
The second two attributes, employment and landscape, are in 
reversed order between the two measures of preference. The margin 
between the two is only one vote. However, the size of the margin 
between the implicit prices indicates there is a significant deference in 
preferences and utility. This is an indication of inconsistent preferences. 
This supports the finding of heterogeneous preferences, which is 
discussed elsewhere in this chapter. 
Another validity test of results is the scope test (Mitchell and 
Carson, 1989). The scope test is basic preference theory that states that 
more of a good provides greater utility to a consumer so more is 
preferred, assuming not satiation (Varian, 1999; Banedee and Murphy, 
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2004). Consistency with preference theory is demonstrated by the implicit 
prices found between levels for each individual attribute. For all attributes 
with multiple levels the estimated willingness-to-pay increases with an 
increase the quality of the attribute. The implicit price WTP for reducing 
landscape impacts goes up as the quantity of impact goes up, e. g. people 
are willing to pay more as greater mitigation occurs. The same is true for 
wildlife and air pollution, improved quality of air and wildlife occurs people 
are willing to pay more. 
Another implicit test of validity and logical choice making was also 
conducted by examine the respondent choice behaviour in the survey. 
Hanley (2002) and Mourato and Foster (2002) examined the rationality of 
respondent choices when presented by a choice set which had a 
dominatelsubordinate pairing. If the respondent is rational they will choice 
the superior profile. 
One profile is said to dominate another profile when it the attribute 
levels are at least as good as the alternative profile's attribute levels 
(Foster and Mourato, 2002). Two choice " sets were found to have 
dominant/subordinate pairing. Profile 22 was paired with profile 12 and 
profile 20 with profile 6 in the CE survey. 
Profile 22 is superior to profile 12 when attribute levels are 
compared on the basis greater utility. Four attributes in profile 22, i. e., 
landscape, wildlife, air pollution, and employment, have attribute levels 
which are considered better (superior) that the levels present in profile 12. 
The price attribute is the same for both profiles. The superiority of profile 
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22 is confirmed by calculating the cumulative implicit price for each 
profile. 
Figure 4.3 Choice Set (Profile 22 and Profile 12) 
(Superior/Inferior paired profiles) 
Profile Profile Neither 22 12 
No increase in 
LANDSCAPE NONE MODERATE renewable 
energy 
WILDLIFE NONE SLIGHT HARM 
i ve Alternat 
AIR POLLUTION NONE SLIGHT climate change INCREASE prcqrams used 
EMPLOYMENT 8- 12 JOBS 1-3 JOBS 
North Sea gas 
fired power 
PRICE OF ELECTRCITY E45 E45 stations instead 
86 respondents returned surveys which included this choice set; 
77 preferred profile 22,6 preferred profile 12, and 3 preferred the 
uneither" option. Of the 83 respondents who selected a renewable energy 
plan, 93% stated a preference for profile 22. 
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Flqure 4.4 Choice Set (Profile 20 and Profile 6) 
(Superiorlinferior paired profiles) 
Profile Profile Neither 
20 16 
No increase in 
LANDSCAPE MODERATE HIGH renewable energy 
WILDLIFE SLIGHT IMPROVEMENT NONE Alternative climate 
rams used h ange prog c 
AIR POLLUTION NONE SLIGHT INCREASE 
North Sea gas fired 
EMPLOYMENT 1-3 JOBS 1-3 JOBS power stations instead 
PRICE OF ELECTRCITY E16 E45 
77 respondents returned surveys which included this choice set; 
73 preferred profile 20,2 preferred profile 16, and 2 preferred the 
Oneither option. Of the 75 respondents who selected a renewable energy 
plan, 97% stated a preference for profile 20. 
The failure rate for the Profile 22112 Choice Set is higher than the 
level found in Hanley et al., (2002), while the Profile 20/16 Choice Set 
failure rate is lower. The dominance/subordinate test shows that the 
population sample did overall provide logical and consistent preference 
revelation by the respondents. 
The few respondents who failed the validity test, and thus did not 
give rational or consistent selections may be interpreted in a number of 
ways (Foster and Mourato, 2002). First, human decision-making does not 
conform to the economic model of rational choice. This is the prevailing 
view in the psychological literature. Second, human rationality is bounded 
by the complexity of real situations, so respondents make simplifying 
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heuristics which may violate economic principles occasionally. Third, the 
design and measurement of the respondent in the choice experiment is a 
source of the irrationality, or in simpler terms, the experiment forced 
irrationality on the respondents by its design. The later two interpretations 
are discussed more thoroughly in the following chapter, in the sections on 
task complexity and state dependency. 
These validity tests demonstrate the presence of respondent 
inconsistency and possible irrational preferences. This inconsistency is 
the likely cause of heterogeneity and the violation of the IIA assumption. 
Conclusion 
Intermediate and remote rural areas of Scotland are facing problems of 
an ageing population and net out-migration of young people due to 
stagnant or declining local economies and a shortage of job opportunities. 
Rural economies can no longer rely on the agricultural sector as a source 
of employment and wealth. Diversification of the rural economy is thus 
essential to maintain the viability of rural population. This diversification in 
Scotland is increasingly coming from renewable energy schemes, 
encouraged by government intervention which has created financial 
incentives for renewable investment. However, the expansion of 
renewable energy sources is likely to have significant environmental and 
social impacts. In particular, renewable energy projects have impacts on 
landscape, wildlife, air pollution, electricity prices and job opportunities. 
The choice experiment method used in this paper enabled these effects 
to be jointly evaluated in welfare-consistent terms. Conclusions can then 
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be more easily drawn about the net social benefits of different renewable 
energy investment strategies. 
Our results suggest Scottish citizens generally support the 
expansion of renewable energy projects, in spite of the existence of 
heterogeneous preferences in regards to the potential costs and benefits 
of these projects. For the full sample, the implicit prices show the most 
valued attribute to be a reduction in air pollution. Secondly, respondents 
indicated significant importance to impacts on wildlife, especially for a 
change from slight harm to one of improvement. The costs of landscape 
change are generally significant if the project in question creates a high 
impact on landscape. There is no willingness-to-pay to reduce landscape 
impacts if projects are expected to have, a low or moderate impact. In 
terms of ranking renewable energy- projects, - the whole sample population 
would prefer large off-shore wind farm projects, followed by small on- 
shore wind farm projects. The alternative of a large on-shore wind farm 
project is given the lowest utility and preference. 
We also find important differences between urban and rural 
responses in this choice experiment. The implicit price analysis indicates 
that urban respondents have a positive willingness-to-pay for a landscape 
change from high impact to no impact, for a slight improvement in wildlife, 
and for a reduction in air pollution. Urban residents, though, placed an 
insignificant value on the creation of new permanent jobs from renewable 
energy projects. There is some evidence that negative landscape 
impacts from the development of projects are more acceptable to the 
rural population. Conversely, rural people value wildlife benefits and 
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reductions in air pollution more highly than their urban counterparts (the 
last issue of air pollution may be from a perception that biomass 
combustion was more likely in rural areas, i. e., close to the supply of 
energy crops). Of particular relevance, employment creation is a 
statistically and economically significant attribute for the rural sample, 
which would be willing to pay an addifional El . 08 per year per household 
for each additional full time job created by the renewable projects. 
The welfare changes associated with the four alternative 
renewable energy projects reaffirm the differences in preferences 
between urban and rural dwellers. The urban group show a significant 
positive willingness-to-pay only for the large offshore wind farm project 
whilst the rural sample stated a much higher willingness-to-pay for all the 
renewable project alterriatives. The biomass power plant which is 
characterised by an increase in air pollution, a moderate impact on 
landscape, an improvement in wildlife and the creation of 70 new 
permanent jobs, was given a very high willingness-to-pay (E 97.95). 
especially when compared to the second best option (large off shore wind 
farm) which was valued at E 53.71. This supports an interpretation that 
rural respondents value projects that improve job opportunities in their 
locale. 
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Introduction 
This chapter vAll discuss some of the - theoretical 
issues in 
conducting choice experiments and all stated preference research. Issues 
that are examined are task -complexity and cognitive burden, state 
dependence, and incentive compatibility. All of these subjects can 
influence the accuracy of respondent's answers. If respondent's 
preferences are not truthfully revealed, either through - confusion or 
strategic behaviour, the findings, from stated preference survey are 
suspect, and any policy recommendations may (Will) be based on 
inaccurate knowledge. 
Task Complexity and Cognitive Burden 
Choice experiments are very complex survey instruments - when 
compared to public opinion surveys and even many contingent valuation 
studies. The ability of survey respondents to understand all the attributes 
and their various levels, then compare these characteristics between 
different profiles, may be too hard a mental task for some people. So the 
question is asked, "Can complexity of the survey instrument be a source 
of inconsistency in responses? " If the answer is yes, than what can be 
done to improve the quality of responses?. This section does not answer 
that question for the choice experiment conduct and reported in Chapter 
4, but does illuminate the issues involved. - 
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Literature Review 
Homo Economicus, or rational economic man (the assumption of 
rational human behaviour), was taken for granted for a very long time by 
economists, until Simon (1955) first questioned the validity of this key 
principle, noting that the assumption was often times cleady not seen in 
consumers. 
In "The origin of predictable behaviour, Heiner identified that 
consurner's ability to process information had limits, and if these limits 
were exceeded, cognitive burden, could lead to non-rational decision 
making (Heiner, 1983). 
During the past 20 years, since Heiner made that statement, 
research and economic experiments have been conducted to test the 
validity of Heinees hypothesis concerning choice comple)dty and 
information limits. The results of that research does suggest the existence 
of a gap between the cognitive ability of decision makers and the 
cognitive burden (or cognitive requirements) of the decision process 
(Mazzotta and Opaluch, 1995). A test conducted by Mazzotta and 
Opaluch incorporated a complexity index in to their research. So the 
contingent choice task had an index included in the variance of the 
discrete choice model, thus making - the complexity level cAeady 
identifiable in the analysis. They found that complexity can influence the 
estimated coefficients from the model. 
Behavioural decision theory is another field and source of 
literature that addresses the complexity question. The leading theories 
concerning the complexity of the decision environment are summarized 
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by Payne et al. (1993). Generally, research in this area has attempted to 
assess how changes in the task environment impact the way respondents 
choose, how this leads to a wide range of choice strategies, and 
suggestions on how strategy selection processes depend on the trade-off 
between cognitive effort and outcome accuracy. 
Bradley and Daly (1994) have treated the problem of complexity by 
combining both frameworks from above. The authors were the first to 
model task complexity in a random utility. framework, recall from Chapter 
4 that RUT is a foundation stone of choice modelling. The authors used 
the logit scaling approach to test for fatigue effects in rank-order data and 
concluded that the scale effect existed., Ortuzar and Rodriguez (2002) 
and Perez et al. (2003) both confirmed and demonstrated the rigor of 
Bradley and Daly's work by applying it to under circumstances. 
Swait and Adamowicz (2001) studied the problem in depth by 
accounting ýfor choice complexity -and consumer behaviour through 
analysis of the scale factor, using an index of entropy which was linked to 
the experiments features. ýI 
At the same time, De Shazo and Fermo (2002) examined both 
complexity and consistency Ahrough a scale factor parameterisation, 
based on measurement terms that captured either the amount of 
information or the correlation structure of the data. 
The final two economists who have attempted to identify the 
structure'of choice complexity and cognitive burden are Hensher and 
Arentze. 
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Hensher investigated the influence of choice experiments design 
by examining the dimensionality of the choice set over the derivation of 
welfare estimates, such as the subjective value of time, by specifying 
multinomial logit and random parameter logit models which interacted 
between the design dimensions and the attributes (Hensher, 2004). 
Arentze et al. (2003) examined the influence of task complexity in 
terms of the number of attributes, alternatives and choice sets presented, 
as well as the influence of presentation format (surveys with or without 
pictorial material) including the effects of considering a less literate 
population. This research found that both the presentation method and 
the literacy level had no significant impacts, while task complexity had a 
significant effect on data quality. 
Discussion 
A significant quality of choice expedments is the ability to 
analytically disaggregate environmental goods or services into constituent 
attributes and levels, which are of interest to policy makers and 
researchers. The potential to derive distinct monetary values or exchange 
rates between those attributes, and the levels vAthin each attribute, is an 
important expansion of non-market valuation techniques, such as 
contingent valuafion method. It allows multiple hypothetical scenarios to 
be imagined and separate values estimated for each scenario, Without 
the single value or whole picture constraint that is required by the use of 
contingent valuation studies. 
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A negative trade-off for this increased analytic ability is the 
increase in task complexity as experienced by survey respondents. 
Choice experiments present respondents with the task of choosing one 
preferred alternative out of several possible alternatives. These 
alternatives are described by common attributes and varying levels of the 
attributes (Swait and Adamowicz 2001a). The number of possible 
alternative scenarios demonstrates exponential growth as levels and 
attributes are added. In Chapter 4, with 17 levels among the 5 attributes, 
360 possible scenarios could be constructed. Limiting this choice 
experiment to estimates of only main effects from a fractional factorial 
design, resulted in 25 profiles, that had to be combined into choice sets. 
Adding one additional attribute with 3 levels, i. e., sound or noise level, 
would have increased the scenarios to 1080 and require 32 fractional 
factorial scenarios to estimate the main effects. To achieve a sufficient 
number of observations (stated choices) either the population sample 
size has to be increased or the number of choice sets presented to each 
respondent has to increase for alll the choice sets to have sufficient 
opportunity to be compared. - (Greene, 2003) ý 
Respondents have limited information and time to contemplate 
their "best" choice. Swait and Adarnowicz (2001) found that there is a 
systematic impact on estimated choice parameters as complexity of a 
survey instrument is increased. Respondents have limited resources to 
spend on a choice experiment, i. e., time, mental concentration, personal 
interest, prior knowledge of issue. As the complexity increases any one of 
the mentioned limitations, as well as other individual respondent specific 
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constraints, ad infinitum, can motivate a respondent to choose simplifying 
strategies to complete the task. This can result in preferences being 
expressed with differing levels of variance. 
Tversky and Shaffir (1992) found that large numbers of choice sets 
presented to individual respondents may facilitate both a learning effect 
and testing fatigue, both of which can Increase the variability in choices., 
A concern did exist in Chapter 4 about the amount of reading and 
learning required of the respondents to understand the issues being 
discussed, the attributes being analyzed, and the various levels assigned 
to each attribute. During pilot testing of the survey Instrument 
respondents stated that it took approximately eight to twelve minutes to 
read it, with completion of the four choice sets and the socio-economics 
questions taking another ten minutes. Large easy reading type face was 
used, as well as graphics and symbols, to make the survey visually 
interesting for the respondents (See Appendix A). 
A final distinct question was asked at the end of the four choice 
sets presented in each survey. The question asked which single attribute 
was most important to the respondent. This question was used to test for 
consistency of answers by the respondents. The results of this question 
are discussed in Chapter 4. 
206 
State Dependence 
Literature Review 
State dependency deals with theories of decision making under 
uncertainty. It relates to situations in which an individual's choice of a 
course of action, by itself, does not determine the outcome. 
Savage (1954) introduced what has become the standard 
analytical framework for analysing state dependency. It consists of three 
sets: 1) states of the world; 2) an arbitrary set of consequences; and 3) 
and the set of all the functions from the set of states to the set of 
consequences. The set of functions in the third, set, labelled F, are 
referred to as acts and represent courses of action. The consequences in 
the second set, labelled C, describe anything that may happen to a 
person. And the first set, labelled S, represent all the possible resolutions 
of uncertainty, that is, *a description of. the world so complete that, if true 
and known, the consequences of every action would be known" (Arrow, 
1971). The decision maker YAII have different preferences for different 
actions based on the current state and the desired stated. These 
preferences can be ordered by and are transitive. 
A preference relation is state dependent when the current state of 
the individual's world is itself of direct concern to the decision maker. For 
example, supporting the expansion of renewable energy is choosing an 
act whose consequences, the environmental and financial costs, depend 
on the decision makees experience. 
In this example, the state is the cledision makers environment, 
both ecological and financial. It, affects the decision makees well-being 
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directly, and indirectly, through the benefits and costs received by the 
degradation or improvement to the decision makers environment. The 
preference relation may display ordinal state dependence, in which case 
the underlying state may affect the decision maker's preferences by 
altering his ordinal ranking of the consequences; or cardinal state 
dependence, by altering his risk attitudes; or both. 
To define state dependence formally, it is convenient to adopt the 
model of Anscombe and Aumann (1963). In this model the state space is 
finite, and the consequences are lotteries, that is, probability distributions 
that assign strictly positive probability to a finite number of outcomes. 
Preferences among acts are a matter of personal judgement, 
presumably combining the decision maker's valuation of the 
consequences and his beliefs regarding the likely realization of alternative 
events (that is, subsets of the state space). Subjective expected utility 
theory pertains to preference relations whose structures allow the 
decision makers' valuations of the consequences to be expressed 
numerically, by a utility function; his beliefs to be quantified by a 
(subjective) probability measure on the set of states; and the acts to be 
evaluated by the expectations of the utility of the corresponding on 
sequences with respect to the subjective probability. In other words, the 
theory depicts the decision makers' choice among alternative acts as 
expected utility maArnizing behaviour. 
The subjective expected utility representation separates risk 
attitudes, represented by the utility function, from beliefs, represented by 
the subjective probabilities. However, the uniqueness of the probabilities 
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depends crucially on the premise that constant acts are constant utility 
acts. This premise is not implied by the aAoms. In particular, state- 
independent preferences do not imply state-i nde pendent utility function. 
An alternative analytical framework postulates the existence of a 
preference relation on hypothetical lotteries, whose prizes are outcome- 
state pairs. This preference relationis assumed, to satisfy the axioms of 
expected utility and to be consistent with the actual preference relation on 
acts. Because the hypothetical lotteries imply distinct, ýhence 
incompatible, marginal distributions on the state space, preferences 
among such lotteries are introspective and may be expressed verbally 
only as hypothetical choices. Decision makers are supposed to be able to 
conceive of such hypothetical lotteries and, to invoke, for the purpose of 
their evaluation, the same mental processes that govern their actual 
decisions. 
Other theories that yield subjective expected utility representations 
invoke preferences on conditional, acts (that is, preference relations over 
the set of acts conditional on events). Fishburn (1973) advanced such 
theories assuming consequence - sets , 
that . ihave distinct structures. 
Skiadas (1997) proposed a non expected utility model, based on 
hypothetical preferences, -which,., yield a representation vvith state- 
dependent preferences. In this model, acts and states are primitive 
concepts, and preferences are defined on act-event pairs. 
For any such pair the consequences (utilities) represent the 
decision makers expression of his, holistic-, valuation, of the act. The 
decision maker is not supposed to be aware -whether 
the given event 
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occurred; hence his evaluation of the act reflects, in part, his anticipated 
feelings, such as disappointment aversion. 
Dr6ze (1985) presented distinct theories of individual decision- 
making under uncertainty with moral hazard and state-dependent 
preferences. Both assume that decision makers can exercise some 
control over the likely realization of events. 
Drbze does not specify the means by which this control is 
exercised, relying instead on their manifestation in the decision maker's, 
choice behaviour. In particular, departing from Anscombe and Aumann's 
(1963) "reversal of order" assumption, Drbze assumes that decision 
makers strictly prefer that the uncertainty of the lottery payoff be resolved 
before that of the acts, presumably to allow them to exploit this 
information by taking action to affect the likely realization of the 
underlying states. Dr&ze obtains a unique separation of state dependent 
utilities from a set of probability distributions over the set of states of 
nature. ' Choice is represented as expected utility maximizing behaviour 
where'the expected utility associated with any given act is itself the 
maximal expected utility vvith respect to the probabilities in the set. 
Dreze replaces the state space with a set of effects, phenomena 
on which decision makers can place bets and whose realization they can 
influence by their actions. In Dreze's theory the choice set consists of 
adon-bet pairs. 
'Actions affect the decision maker's well-being directly (e. g., actions 
may correspond to levels of effort) and indirectly (through their impact on 
the decision maker's beliefs); bets are functions from effects to monetary 
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payoffs. Dreze gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence 
of subjective expected utility representations with unique, action- 
dependent, subjective probabilities; effect-dependent utility functions 
representing the evaluation of wealth; and a distinct function that captures 
the direct impact of the choice of action on the decision makers well- 
being. 
As with state-independent preferences, the economic analysis of 
many decision problems involving state-dependent preferences requires 
measures of risk aversion. 
Discussion 
State dependence can be of concern when investigating the non- 
market valuation of environmental goods. Preferences revealed by the 
respondents may be significantly determined by prior experiences, 
knowledge and pre-existing attitudes. Common difficulties that can arise 
in surveys from state dependency are yea-saying, the bandwagon effect, 
strategic answering, and spontaneous use of simplifying heuristics when 
preferences are stated. It is of interest because of the rarity of the 
"Neither' option being chosen in Chapter 4 and the size of the ASCs 
derived in the full sample model. Both of these can be inferred to indicate 
a large positive preference for renewable energy. State dependency may 
also explain one source of the heterogeneity of preferences found in 
Chapter 4. (Seetharaman, 2004) 
There are several types of state dependency. Structural state 
dependency is the continuation of the existing preference state. This 
preference can be either positive or negative in its expression. The former 
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being labelled "inertia' because it continues in its present form. The later 
being called-"vadety-seeking" because it continually changes for novelty 
reasons. Structural dependency is commonly found to be the dominant 
form; it is the major determinant of future choices by consumer 
(Seetharaman, 2004). 
Other types of state dependency are habit persistency and 
carryover effects. Two forms of habit persistency are Identifiable by serial 
correlation. The first type is identified from serially correlation of the error 
terms in the random utility function. The later type is identified as serial 
correlation of utility maximizing behaviour on successive preference 
decisions of consumers. Both of these are derived from lagged utility. 
For example, while there is generally positive support for 
green energy consumption in Great Britain (BWEA, 1996; Social 
Research, 2002; MORI, 2003) there has been very low voluntary 
participation in commercial markets for green energy. There is perceived 
utility, but too much state inertia to create behavioural changes. However, 
With mandatory purchases under the ROS program, minimal opposition 
has occurred and there seems to be satisfaction with the new state. Roy, 
et al., (1996) proposed that state dependency evolves vAthin a random 
utility function in a Markov fashion'. Roy believed that there was no set or 
'A Markov chain is a sequence of random values whose probabilities at any specific 
time interval depends upon the value of the number at the previous time. The controlling 
factor in a Markov chain is the transition probability-, it is a conditional probability for the 
system to go to a particular new state, given the current state of the system. 
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predetermined probability of transition of the population to aý new state, 
rather there was an interval of probability and any particular value for a 
specific transition was randomly drawn from that interval. 
In other words, the inertia that existed within the population for not 
voluntarily purchasing green energy may have been over come with 
sufficient time, as there was a positive preference to move in the direction 
of green energy consumption. However, the incremental movement was 
too slow and too erratic, so the government forced a very large and 
involuntary transition to indirect participation in a green energy program. 
It is possible that the growth of, green attitudes- and preferences could 
have lead to viable green ý-energy markets, but the ROS program has 
forced a new utility choice that Scottish consumers seem to be accepting 
and supportive of. 
The carryover - effect is . the 
lagged effect of information 
provision, in the case of commercial markets this can be the effect of 
marketing and advertising, for non-market environmental goods it can' be 
education and information provided , by , interested parties, i. e., 
environmental groups and governments. 
State dependency is an important aspect toýýconsider when 
conducting stated preference valuations. There are , many emotionally 
charged issues tied to electric energy, production. Some of which are the 
use of nuclear energy, global climate change, general air pollution, the 
decline of the Scottish coal industry, the landscape change with 120 
metre tall wind-turbines with co-incidental harm to wildlife, destruction of 
fish habitat by hydroelectric schemes, to name a few negative 
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associations. Positive associations with renewables range from wind 
farms being -perceived as kinetic art on the landscape, a tangible 
fulfilment of technological optimism, greater self-determination from using 
local resources, rural development, and leaving a better environmental 
endowment for the future. 
In one of the CE focus groups that were conducted, one participant 
commented on the imbalance in the distribution of costs and benefits of 
the Scottish-English relationship over energy, North Sea oil, nuclear 
power plant locations, and who really needed renewable energy the most. - 
There are implications of studying issues which contain a large 
emotional element for the respondent. Basic assumptions and axioms 
about utility and preferences for respondents may not hold true (Binger 
and Hoffman, 1998). 
For example, behavioural assumptions may become uncertain vvith 
yea and nea-saying not being strategic behaviour, but rather expression 
of lexicographic preferences, as well as, rational utility maximizing may 
not occur or be consistent (Eister, 1998) (Sunstein, 2003). 
Incentive Compatibility 
A choice experiment or any stated preference research is said to 
be incentive-compatible if it creates a situation where it is in the 
respondent's, best interests to reveal their true preferences for the good, 
and he Will not be tempted to engage in free-riding behaviour (Mitchell 
and Carson, 1989). 
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Literature Review 
Paul Samuelson (1954) concluded that free-riding behaviour would 
always be the individual's optimal response, regardless of which question 
format was used. This assumption contributed to arguments against the 
CV method and other stated choice tools. However, the assumption that 
individuals will always choose to free-ride has been questioned by 
several authors including Dreze and Vallee Poussin (1971), Clarke 
(1971), Groves and Loeb (1975), and Groves and Leydard (1977). 
Dreze and Vallee Poussin (1971) demonstrated that a social 
welfare maximising ' government may achieve a Lindahl-Pareto 
equilibrium using individuals' marginal WTP in a continuous incremental 
dynamic Walrasian tatonnement process. 
Clarke (1971), Groves and Loeb (1975), and Groves and Leydard 
(1977) developed a set of incentive-compatible methods fro revealing 
demand by the use of taxes, subsidies, or side-payments; these methods 
create a hypothetical scenario where it is in the individual's best interest 
to reveal his true WTP. 
(1983), and Akedof and Dickens (1982), countered the 
assumption that strategic behaviourý, is costless beyond the immediate 
choice before the individual, ý building a model of honesty and cooperative 
behaviour in which honesty leads to long-run economic gains that may be 
lost if dishonesty and non-cooperative behaviour occurs. 
Experimental economics has also contributed to the body of work 
showing the free riding should not 
I 
be assumed Ao be- the optimal 
behaviour for respondents. Experiments by Babb and Scherr (1975) 
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compared three elicitation methods for WTP for a concert series and 
additional books for a college library: 1) the Clarke tax, 2) another 
incentive-compatible demand revelation method, and 3) a voluntary 
revelation method. Their research found the voluntary method resulted in 
the largest real payments, surpassing the two incentive-compatible 
demand revelation methods. Many economists discounted these results 
as coming from a poorly designed experiment, due to the novelty factor, 
induced altruism, insufficient incentives, and lack of experience by 
experimental subjects with the incentive-compatible methods. 
I However, Johansen (1977) maintained that there was little 
empirical evidence to support free-riding behaviour and suggested that 
economists may have overestimated the importance of such behaviour. -ý 
Experiments conducted by Vernon Smith et al. (1977,1980), 
regarded as more realistic, failed to refute the earlier findings of Babb and 
Scherr (1975). Smith's work suggests that both incentive-compatible and 
voluntary demand revelation methods eventually achieve cooperative 
behaviour, and cooperative behaviour is often reached more quickly VAth 
voluntary mechanisms. 
Mitchell and Carson (1989) suggest that theoretical results 
supporting incentive-compatible methods rests on several assumptions 
that do not seem to hold: zero costs to determining one's optimal 
strategy, zero costs to the act of responding dishonestly, and that the 
individual perceives no risk that his actions may prevent an optimal 
competitive or cooperative strategy. 
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Research exploring the incentive compatibility of numerous 
elicitation methods suggests that a commonly used CV method format 
can induce the respondents to reveal their true preferences. Zeckhauser 
(1973), and Hoehn and Randall (1987), demonstrated that the discrete 
choice "take-it-or-leave-it approach" for the provision of a public good at a 
set price is an incentive-compatible mechanism; it is in the respondent's 
best interest to answer 'yes' if their willingness-to-pay is greater than or 
equal to the stated price. However, the belief that the dichotomous choice 
CV method format is incentive-compatible has been challenged by more 
recent literature (Cummings and Taylor, 1999; Taylor, 1998) that 
suggests that in order for a dichotomous choice referendum to be 
incentive-compatible, it must be a closed referendum. 
Discussion 
How to motivate respondents of a stated preference survey to give 
accurate and truthful responses is not clear or resolved in the literature. 
The hypothetical nature of stated preference surveys leaves opportunity 
for participants to answer in a manner that can influence the total sample 
estimates, yea-saying or nea-saying -being. the most clear example of 
such behaviour. To avoid strategic responses, or attempted 
manipulation of results, it is important to present a payment mechanism 
which respondents believe is credible. Mitchell and Carson (1989) state 
that if a respondent perceives theyýcould actually end-up having to pay 
for the environmental good in question, they will be motivated to give true 
responses about utility maximizing choices. 
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Research into CV incentive compatibility has not found conclusive 
evidence for mechanisms which assure respondents do not have 
hypothetical bias in their answers. If any results are conclusive, it is that 
CV estimated values will have some level of uncertainty in them. There 
seems to be a general attitude among CV critics to expect value 
estimates to be higher than'the true WTP. But some researchers have 
found CV estimates of WTP were lower than revealed preference 
estimates on average for those studies that comparables could be found 
or developed., 
Choice, experiments have the same concern over hypothetical 
bias. In a Carlsson and Martinsson (2001) study which compared 
hypothetical and actually marginal will ingness-to-pay, donations for an 
environmental project, no significant differences were found. Although 
slight real differences in donations did exist between, the actual and 
hypothetical. Internal validity testing was positive and supportive of the 
estimated CE results. 
In the choice experiment presented in Chapter 4, a conscience 
attempt was made to present the hypothetical choice scenario in a 
realistic and credible manner. A believable government policy to move 
towards a cleaner environment was described. The object of this realism 
was to minimize hypothetical bias and improve incentive compatibility. 
The make the respondents believe their answers were important 
and could contribute to a better understanding of what path the Scottish 
population want to take on renewables the introductory cover letter 
stated, "this research will be published and made available to the 
I 
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public, conservation groups, government, industry and anyone 
concerned for Scotland's future. 0 They were also told that they were 
part of a select group who were being surveyed to find this information 
out. See cover letter in Appendix A. 
Electric utility bills were the designated mechanism for collecting (if 
WTP) or dispersing (if WTA) payments. This is a real, accurate and 
universal mechanism that respondents could understand. Also, it is a 
non-discretionary payment method; respondents would have no choice 
but to participate. 
There are no clear indications in the study if incentive compatibility 
was a problem or not. 
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Introduction 
In this chapter the interactions between the market price of 
electricity, the renewable energy quota imposed on non-renewable power 
producers and tradable green certificates (TGC) are examined: These 
three components are the key elements of the Renewable Obligation 
(Scotland) (ROS) program which has been described in detail in Chapter 
One. The goal of this chapter is to determine if the price criteria and 
policy instruments, quota and TGCs, chosen by the Scottish Executive to 
motivate expansion of renewable power sources in Scotland are being 
used efficiently. 
These three policy variables interact in a manner which 
determines the amount of indirect monetary subsidy transferred to 
renewable energy producers and the financial cost imposed on electricity 
consumers. Two critical motivations for the ROS program were the need 
for rapid deployment of renewable power t echnology, on a commercial 
scale 2, balanced against a political requirement that increases in costs 
resulting from the deployment do not, exceed some unspecified level. A 
price level in monetary terms has'never, been stated by the government 
or any policyrnaker but can be described as a "politically acceptable" level 
that does not lead to voter dissatisfaction., 
A mathematical model of the interacting electricity and TGC 
markets are presented with the ambition of evaluating the efficiency of the 
2 Commercial scale is generally considered to be generator with 775 kW DNC or greater 
(Casazza, 2003). 
223 
ROS program, or if there is a superior method by which the same criteria 
and policy tools (price, quota, and TGCs) can motivate the expansion of 
renewables. Efficiency in this context is described as the timely 
deployment of renewable electricity technologies at an acceptable cost to 
consumers. 
This chapter contributes to the field of renewable energy 
economics in several areas. All published literature and research which 
the author came upon makes the assumption of competitive markets for 
both the physical commodity (electricity) and TGC markets. This chapter 
does not assume competition; rather it assumes a complex relationship 
between a dominant player and subordinate player(s) in a Stackelberg 
relationship. This complex relationship adds to the literature as it portrays 
the regulatory and commercial markets in a more accurate manner, in 
particular to Scotland. While energy deregulation is being promoted in 
many regions of the world, full competition in power industry markets is 
still rare in all but a few developed economies and non-existent in less 
developed or transitional economies. Also, the relationship between the 
dominant firm and subordinate firm(s) is not a standard Stackelberg 
relationship of ceding market share from one firm to another. The 
inclusion of a TGC market imposes a secondary transfer of cost and 
revenue from, the dominant firm to the subordinate firm(s), respectively, 
which affects the quantity of power production - decision of the dominant 
firm. 
The chapter proceeds as follows-, Section 2 presents the prior 
literature investigating the use of TGCs, Section 3 describes the general 
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strategic game to be played and relates its structure to actual operating 
power and TGC markets, Section-4 discusses the general Stackelberg 
game and the concept of backward induction, Section 5 is the presents 
the model, Section 6 presents an ad hoc comparative statics analysis, 
whilst the final section presents conclusions which can be drawn from the 
analysis. 
Current Literature 
Even though much of the world is still dominated by monopolistic 
franchises, ' significant government 'regulation, or outright government 
ownership of the electric power system, the economic literature - on 
tradable green certificates tends to assume liberalized power markets 
and competitive firms. 
In Jensen and Skytte (2002) the market price for TGCs and the 
obligation quota set by -the State 'give -ambiguous results, as, far, as 
consumer welfare. The cross subsidy of the TGCs may lead to increased 
total power production and a lower market, equilibrium, price at some 
quota levels, but at higher quota, levels electricity prices will be higher 
than the 'no program' case., It is also noted that energy conservation is 
made more- difficult if the quota is set in, the range where lower power 
prices occur. 
Liberalized power markets, and increasing deployment of 
renewable energy technologies are somewhat opposing goals (Morthorst, 
2000)., If competitive markets are allowed to select the most efficient 
provider of wholesale -power than new renewables technologies will not 
grow in capacity as their costs are generally, greater than traditional 
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sources or power. TGCs are one method of overcome this cost 
difference. Morthorst contributes to an understanding of the risks, 
involved in TGC markets and the possibility of highly volatile prices. 
Both Lemming (2003) and Morthorst (2000) identify then discuss 
an important drawback of most renewables technologies, stochastic 
production cycles. Stochastic production is the uncontrollable variability in 
delivering power to users, it is also called intermittency. Renewable 
electric power is produced when the fuel resource (wind, water, sunlight, 
etc. ) for generating is made available by nature and nature is not 
consistent over time. An additional drawback discussed by both authors 
is that commercial scale renewables projects tend to have very high 
capital investment costs coupled with low operating costs. 
These characteristics of renewables projects create two significant 
uncertainties for investors in renewables projects. The first uncertainty 
occurs when renewables experience low production in one period, i. e. 
abnormally calm winds for wind turbines, and thus produce less electricity 
and earn fewer TGCs. A scenario is created where traditional power 
firms produce and sell more electricity to cover the absence of renewable 
power, but as a result of this increased production, the firms will demand 
more TGCs. Therefore significant correlation will exist between increased 
demands for TGCs at a time of decreased supply (Morthorst, 2000). 
Both Morthorst (2003) and Nielsen and Jeppesen (2003) show 
that green certificates have been effective in increasing deployment of 
renewables in many European nations and meeting national goals for 
GHG emissions reductions. 
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Nielsen and Jeppesen (2003) discuss the movement in Europe 
towards a unified TGC market because of its effectiveness to date. They 
go on to show that political objectives of the individual national programs 
which are not harmonized within an European TGC system would 
operate with significant arbitrage potential and be economically inefficient. 
Morthorst (2003) adds that proposals, for an EU-wide TGC market may 
make individual national targets for C02-reduciton more difficult. Those 
countries with higher TGC quotas, and resulting higher prices for 
certificates, may motivate greater investment than nations with lower 
quotas and lower TGC prices. 
A static equilibrium model which takes into account TGCs, C02- 
emissions, import and export of electricity, effects on consumer and 
producer surplus changes for the Danish Green Certificate System was 
constructed by Amundsen and Mortensen - (2001). The author's most 
important finding was that green electricity capacity was reduced in a 
scenario of increased C02-emission, constraints because traditional 
generators would constrict production, and therefore demand fewer green 
certificates. This Danish model came to the same conclusion as Jensen 
and Skytte (2003) that TGC quotas and markets have ambiguous effects 
on consumer and producer welfare. ý The potential loss or gain in welfare 
being especially sensitive to'the quota determined by the government. 
227 
The Model 
Introduction 
This model represents a simplification of actual regulatory and 
commercial markets that operate in Scotland and the United Kingdom. 
While the model has features which apply to European and American 
markets, it is primarily meant to model Scotland and the regulatory and 
industrial structure therein. 
The model will be presented in the following order 
I. Identify and describe the players 
State important assumptions about player behaviour 
and market structures. 
Describe the two markets that are of concem. , 
The regulatory regime requiring compliance. 
The order of play. 
After the model has been presented the Stackelberg Game and 
backwards induction - path are briefly described. Than detailed 
mathematical expression are given and described for the players, 
markets and economics, behaviours which ý represent the hypothetical 
TGC market. 
Comparative Statics are used to evaluate the State's policy options 
and examine the optimality of providing the lowest priced electricity with 
the greatest expansion of renewable energy sources. The results of the 
comparative statics are used in an ad hoc analysis, to identify how real 
power and TGC markets might actually behave. 
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The Players 
There are three players: 
Player 1 -The State 
The State regulates the electric power industry. The objective of 
the State is to balance dual objectives of increasing renewable energy 
production without excessive diminishment "of consumer surplus. This 
player may be referred to as: the State, the government, or the regulator. 
Player 2- The Brown Firm 
A firm which is the dominant producer of electricity in the market 
place and can exercise influence over the power market. This firm uses 
only non-renewable fossil fuels (oil, -coal, natural gas) as input for 
electricity generation, with resulting carbon'pollution. The' dominant -firm 
operates under a profit maximising objective. 'This player is referred to as: 
the dominant firm or the Brown Firm. 
Player 3- The Green Firm . 11 -I 
A series of small firms which are similar in quality and size; they 
may be considered as one firm or many in this analysis depending on the 
scenario. The firms produce electricity using only renewable fuels (hydro, 
wind, biomass, etc. ) for generation'-and are a pnce-taker'in the power 
market. Each firm has insufficient production, capacity to ýinfluence the 
electricity market, but may have influence in the TGC market, All of the 
firms operate under a profit maximising objective. These players may be 
referred to as: the fringe firm(s) or the Green Firm(s). 
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Assumptions 
1. ) Both the TGC and power markets operate as open public 
bidloffer exchanges where buyers and sellers are matched then 
exchanges completed as bilateral transactions. This minimizes the search 
and information costs in the market 
Thus it is assumed that: 
There are no market transaction costs for players. 
i 2. ) ý As new renewable generation facilities are built and made 
operational the - TGCs from the Green Firm are sold to the Brown Firm 
under long term contracts (12 - 20 years). The electric power is sold to 
consumers either through the spot market (immediate or short-term 
contracts) or long term market (12-20 years contracts). Both TGC and 
power markets clear each period at an equilibrium quantity and price. For 
each succeeding iteration of play only the new capacity deployed by the 
Green Firm that period is available to the TGC and power markets. TGCs 
issued or transacted in prior periods do not influence current play. 
Thus it is assumed that: 
The game may be played in MUltiDle iterations. but the eguilibdum 
p(ice and guantity established at the end of each round are fixed 
and cannot be re-negotiated in later pedods. 
and 
There is no banking of TGCs between geriods. Eve[y TGC issued 
in a geriod must be sold within that same gedod or it becomes 
void. 
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3. ) No trans-national markets for TGCs currently exist in Europe. 
No country recognises the validity of TGCs issued in anotherjurisdiction. 
Distinct TGC markets do exist for Scotland versus England and Wales, 
yet TGCs issued under either authority may be traded on both markets. 
t: I, C%c Evu tricity is widely traded between countries in continental Europe, but 
only relatively small quantities are traded between Great Britain and the 
continent. 
Thus it is assumed that: 
This game is played as a closed economy. 
4. ) In the United Kingdom and most European countfies TGC 
programs allow for Brown Finns to choose between submitting TGCs to 
the appropriate regulator or pay an equivalent fee in replacement of the 
certificates. The reason for this is that transaction costs do actually exist 
for firms (in contradiction to assumption 1 above) and thus it allows for 
finns to detennine their own most efficient means of complying with the 
TGC regulations. It can be hypothesised that non-pecuniary costs and 
benefits motivate a Finn to use TGCs, -Le., to appear compliant and 
supportive of environmental programs. 
Thus it is assumed that: - 
The Brown Firm has a weak preference for using TGCs to meet 
the govemment obligation versus paying the buyout fee. . 
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The Markets 
There -are two markets that operate in this model. The first is a 
market for electricity. This is a normal commodity market that has sellers 
and buyers of a good. There are many buyers of the good, none of whom 
can exercise market power or influence; buyers of electricity are of no 
concern to this analysis. 
However, on the sellers side of the market there is one dominant firm 
which controls a large and significant share of total production, and 
actively influences the market through its production decisions. It is aware 
of it ability to influence the electricity market. This dominant firm is the 
Brown Firm. 
There are a series of small producer firms who have no market 
influence and perceive themselves as price takers in the electricity 
market. They are all similar in size and quality and may be aggregated 
and treated as a single firm for most purposes in this analysis. This 
aggregated firm is the Green Firm. 
Thus the first market is: 
A Stackelber-ctduopoly electric power market. 
The second market is for TGCs. There is only one buyer of TGCs, the 
Brown Firm. The Brown Firm purchases the TGCs and submits them to 
the State, per regulatory mandate; a pre-established percentage of the 
Brown firms production must be matched by either TGCs or a monetary 
buyout premium must be paid to fulfil the regulations. The Green Firm is 
the only seller of TGCs; by State flat the green Firm receives one TGC for 
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each unit of electricity that it produces and has the right to sell the 
certificate into the TGC market. 3 
Thus the second market is: 
A non-competitive market for TGCs. The Green Firm is a seller of 
TGCs and the Brown Firm acts as a monol2sonist. 
The electricity market is cleared first. This fixes the quantity of power 
which was produced and sold in the market, the TGCs, Which are equal 
to quantity of renewable power produced, are than issued to the Green 
Firm by the State. The TGC market is cleared second with an inelastic 
supply of TGCs and an inelastic demand by the respective firms. 
Thus the order of market clearance is: 
1. ) The electdcity market, 2. ) The TGC market. 
State Regulations 
In order to promote renewable energy the State has initiated a 
TGC market. This market exists only by decree of the government. It has 
mandated that the Brown Firm must submit TGCs, or the equivalent, to 
the State as an operating licensing requirement. The State issues TGCs 
only to licensed electricity producers, the Green Firm, who use renewable 
fuel sources. There is no cost imposed on the Green Firm by the State. 
The Green Firm may sell these TGCs., 
1. The Brown Firm is obligated to submit TGCs to the State in 
an amount equal to a pre-determined percentage of the 
3 Note that the Green firm is not a monopolist, as it is an aggregation of many 
individual small firms who behave the same as price-takers, but do not have 
market awareness to act in collusion and create a monopolistic cartel. 
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firm's annual electdcity sales based on physical quanbty 
transacted, not monetary value. The obligation 
percentage is determined by the State and announced in 
advance of any play. 
2. The Brown Firm has the option, management discretion, of 
submitting a buyout fee In substitution of TGCs to the State. 
The buyout fee is pre-determined by the State prior to each 
interaction of the game and is known by all players. 
Order of Play 
The first player to move is the State, who declares the values of 
the two policy variables, the obligation percentage and the buyout fee. 
Additional information made known includes the forecasted market 
demand for electricity, the production capacity of the Green Firm, and the 
production capacity of the Brown Firm. All this information becomes 
common public knowledge. 
The next player to move is the Brown Firm, who determines its 
profit maximizing quantity of electricity production given its knowiedge of 
the Green Firm's reaction function (maximise profits and act as a price- 
taker) and the values of the two TGC variables. 
The third player to move is the Green Firm, who determines its 
profit maximWing level of production, given the market price for electricity 
and the market for TGCs. 
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Dia-qram6.1- Flow Chart of Transactions for Tradable Green Certificates 
2. State recognises 
TGC obligation due 
to the State from the 
Brown firm 
The 
State 
4. State issues TGC 
to the Green firm for 
renewable power 
produced and sold 
Market and Electricity Market 
I* Electric Power Market * TGC Ma-rk(7et 
1. Brown Firm sells oower to market. 
1 3. Green Firm sells oower to market. 
The electricity and TGC markets operate as follows: 1) Both the 
Brown and Green Firms generate power and sell to consumers; 2) 
Both the Brown and Green Firms report their production quantity to 
the State; 3) The State obligates the Brown Firm to submit TGCs or 
equivalent buyout funds to the State, based on production; 4) The 
State issues TGCs to the Green Firm, based on production; 5) The 
Brown Firm may purchase TGCs in the TGC market to meet 
obligation. 
The TGC program results in the Green Firm earning revenues from 
two sources, electricity and TGCs. The TGCs create new revenue 
sources with no associated production costs. The Brown Firm has 
increased costs from meeting the TGC obligation by either 
purchasing TGCs or paying a buyout equivalent. 
0404vs vuml"g be ,. c I 
The Stackelberg Game 4 and Backwards Induction Path 
The Stackelberg model is a game of strategy between two firms 
(duopoly) producing a homogeneous product. Four variables need to be 
found when solving for the equilibrium price and quantity; the price each firm 
receives from the market and the quantity of good that each firm sells. 
In this game the dominant firm knows the decision objective of the 
subordinate firm, and makes a decision as to the quantity of good it will 
produce before the second firm. In this case a quantity leader and quantity 
follower form the duopoly. The game and strategic interaction is said to be 
sequential in nature. This model is commonly used for industries that have a 
large dominant player who are the natural leaders of the many small 
competing firms who also exist in the market. 
The problem faced by both firms is how much to produce given that 
the market price is determined by the total quantity produced by both firms. 
However, there is a significant difference between the two players. The 
leader knows the follower will only react to market conditions, quantity being 
sold by the leader, and that the follower will be a price-taker In the market for 
the entire product it can generate. This is called the conjectural variation or 
the reaction function of the follower. The leader chooses a level which 
4 The game is named after H. von Stackelberg who published this model in his book, 
Markfform und Gleichgewicht, 1934. 
5 The Stackelberg game and backwards induction are standard material in almost all 
intermediate level microeconomic textbooks and certainly in introductory game theory 
textbooks. The author gives specific citations where appropriate, otherwise the material is 
considered generally available knowledge and no citation given. 
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maximises its profit while recognising the quantity produce by the follower 
and its effect on market price. Described in the simplest terms the leader 
cedes a market share to the follower which will maximise the profits for the 
leader. 
The major difference between the Stackelberg model and solution 
described here and the model proposed in this chapter is that a second 
market exists where the follower sells TGCs to the leader in a non- 
competitive market. Additional profits are earned by the follower and 
additional costs are incurred by the leader in a manner which is not solely 
dependent on the profit maximising quantity decision of either the leader or 
the follower. Even with this second market the equilibrium solution can be 
found (or at least investigated) using backwards induction. 
Stackelberg games are solved using backward induction. The general 
solution finds the price and quantity which occurs at equilibrium. The 
equilibrium quantity is divided between the Brown Firm and the Green Firm. 
Backwards induction locc'urs in the I following order: 
L Solve for -the fringe-follower's reaction function; the 
quantity of renewable . energy production given the 
quantity of electricity production by the dominant firm. 
ii. Solve for the dominant firm's profit maximizing quantity 
of production given its knowledge of the fringe-follower's 
reaction function. 
iii. Solve for the production quantity to maximize profits for 
the fringe-follower firm given the production quantity 
chosen by the dominant firm. 
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iv. Solve for the equilibrium market price and quantity of 
electricity. 
In this paper a final step is added: 
V. Solve for State policy variables to optimize consumer 
surplus and expansion of renewable energy production. 
The Mathematical Model 
Parameters 
Pe market price of retail electricity 
Qe total quantity demanded for electricity; (q, + qd) 
PC market price for tradable green certificates 
I qd quantity electric power produced by Brown Firm 
I qr quantity electric power produced by Green Firm 
qc quantity green certificates produced 
a percentage portfolio obligation for year 
4) buyout price for green certificates, as set by the State 
I aqd total amount of green certificates obligation 
IP maximum price of retail electricity that is politically accpetable 
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Market for Electricity 
The market for electricity is assumed to be non-competitive within 
certain regulatory parameters established by the State6. The Brown Firm 
perceives a downward sloping demand curve which means that it has 
market influence; if the Brown Firm changes it production quantity, the 
market price will change. Other qualities of the demand curve are that it is 
smooth and continuous; there is a market for all - production at some price 
level, and the market functions as if electricity is a normal good. 
Therefore the demand curve has the following properties: 
i. Pe(Qe) is defined and continuous on Qe- 
ii. Pe(Qe) G (0,00). 
1 
iii. There is a iý e>0, such that Pe(Qe) =0 for Qe ; -' 
;ýe 
iv. and Pe(Qe) >0 for Oe <Qe., 
V. Pe(Qe) is twice differentiable; Pe' and Pe". 
The Green Firm perceives a market demand curve which is perfectly 
elastic and no market influence exists. All energy produced by the Green 
Firm can be sold at an exogenous price to the dominant firm. The Green 
Firm is a price-taker. 
The regulatory parameters are not discussed here as they are not relevant to the model, 
other than to say that the State limits abusive business practices by energy firms, as 
electricity is classified as an essential good for social welfare. See literature on energy 
poverty and infonnation from Ofgern for Scotland and the United Kingdom for more 
information. 
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Market for Green Certificates 
The quantity of TGCs issued by the State to the Green Firm is exactly 
the same quantity of power that the Green Firm has delivered to the market. - 
where qc is the quantity of TGCs and qr is the quantity of renewable power., ýý 
qc a qr (6.1) 
The Green Firm will be issued a TGC from the State for each unit of 
electricity (MWh) produced and sold in the retail market to consumers. 
A single market exists for TGC with the Brown Firm as buyer; 
monopso6ist, and the Green Firm as seller. 
If the quantity of TGCs available in the market are less than or equal 
to the obligation requirement of the Brown Firm, the TGC price will be equal 
to the buyout fee. 
If q,: :5 aqd, than P. =0 
Diaqrarn 6.2 Market for Green Certificates, q, suP*< q. demand 
(6.2) 
qdmarld 
PC 
q. su 
market price for TGCs 
/ aqd q, 
total buyout fee = (D(aqd -Q 
This diagram illustrates tF-e dudng one i)edod 
play, after the electricity market has already been cJeared. The 
quantity of TGCs demanded by the Brown Firm Is fixed, as is the 
quantity of TGCs supplied by the Green Firm. All TGCs available 
will trade at a price equal to the buyout fee. In this case, there Is a 
shortage of TGCs, and a buyout will have to be paid. 
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The Brown Firm will purchase and submit all TGCs and pay the 
buyout fee for the balance of the obligation not met with TGCs. (See diagram 
6.2) 
The green certificate price will be equal to zero for certificates in 
excess of the obligation required from the Brown Firm, 
If qc > aqd, than Pc = 0, for TGCs in excess of obligation (6.3) 
The Green Firm will not sell green certificates below the buyout price, 
(D. It is assumed that the Brown Firm is not indifferent between purchasing 
green certificates and paying the buyout price, but has a weak preference to 
meet its renewables obligation by participating in the tradable green 
certificates market. Publicly appearing to support environmental programs 
and cooperating Wth government regulators could be a motivation for this 
weak preference. 
Dlaqrarn 6.3 Market for Green Certificates with qc$uPP'y > qc demand 
q, &-mand 
PC 
market price for TGCs 
aqd qv 
qc > ctqd, 
If the Green Firm produces more TGCs than the Brown Firm 
(monopsonist) is obligated to submit to the State, the price will 
collapse to a price of zero after the obligation quantity is met. The 
market will not clear all TGCs. 
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No market exists for green certificates in excess of the mandated 
quantity to be submitted to the State. The dominant firm is a profit maximizer 
and will only incur the cost of green certificates to a point compliant with the 
statutory regulation. 
An aside: 
What if the Green Firm were a monopolist, or cartel of Individuals acting asl 
one entity, and not an aggregation of many small subordinate firms? 
In a mono polist-monopso nist market, the market equilibrium price Is a 
negotiated value determined by the relative power of each player. In this TGC 
market the monopsonist (Brown Firm) is obligated to purchase certificates to meet 
the State's mandate. Therefore the monopsonist (Brown Firm) has relatively little or 
no power in negotiations with the monopolist (Green Firm). The monopolist (Green 
Firm) can demand a price from the monopsonist (Brown Firm) up to a level where 
all producer surpluses from the parallel power market Is now captured by the 
monopolist (Green Firm). The buyout fee option allows the monopsonist (Brown 
Firm) to reject any price offer greater than the buyout fee, while the monopolist 
(Green Firm) will reject any price less than the buyout fee. All TGCs will be 
transacted because the monopsonist (Brown Firm) is assumed to have a weak 
preference to participate In the TGC market over the option of paying the buyout 
fee. 
It is assumed that the existing capacity of the Green Firm at the start 
of any game is insufficient to produce all the TGCs required to match the 
Brown Firm's obligation. Green certificate supply will be less than the 
demand from the Brown Firm. 
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Brown Firm (dominant, leader, non-renewable power generator) 
The Brown Firm is a profit maximizer with normal profit equation of 
Total Revenues - Total Costs. Total Revenue is a function of the quantity 
produced by the firm and market price. Total Cost is a function of quantity 
produced by each individual firm, quantity of TGCs, price of TGCs, the 
buyout fee and the quota level. The short run profit equation: 
Il d(qd)= TRd- TCd= TRd (qd, 'Pe) - TCd (qd, qr, qc, Pc, 09CI)v 
subject to qd '-"' 0- 
(6.4) 
TRd '"2P. (Q. ) * qd : short run revenue 
(6.5) 
TCVý Y2qd 2+ PC*qc + (P * (aqd - Q: short run costs 
(6. 
The short run total cost of firmd is composed of two categories, 
production cost of electricity and the cost of complying with the State's TGC 
obligation: 
Y2qd 21- 
(6.7) 
- Variable cost of fossil fuelled power production 
and 
P,, * qc +0* (aqd- Q 
(6.8) 
- Cost of compliance with renewables obligation. Total 
purchases of green certificates and payments of the 
buyout option to the State, if there Is a shortfall in 
green certificates to meet the obligation. 
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The Brown Firm is a price taker for fuel purchased to produce 
electricity. The Brown Firm is a monopsonist in the market for TGCs, as it is 
the only player which gains utility from the good. 
The Brown Firm is aware that its production decision Influences the 
production decision of the Green Firm. 
Green Firm (subordinate, fringe, follower, renewable energy 
generator) 
The profit maximizing function for the Green Firm is that of a revenue 
maximizer, as it is assumed that no short run variable costs are Incurred. 
Most renewable energy technology is based on taking diffuse energy 
available from the environment, e. g., wind, water, solar, and converting this 
"free" input into electricity. The profit equation is composed of two revenue 
sources: the sale of electricity, which is the market price for all power sold; 
and all TGCs that may be sold at the TGC market price. 
rl, (Q = TR, = P. (Q. ) * q, + qc* Pr, 
(6.9) 
The Green Firm is a price taker in the market for electric power. 
However, the Green Firm acts in a competitive manner in the TGC market. 
244 
Government 
The State has a policy objective to increase the amount of electric 
energy produced from renewable energy sources. This quantity objective is 
determined exogenously. To maximise the quantity of green power the State 
uses two policy tools, the value of the buyout fee and the obligation quota. 
The State's objective function is: 
Max qr (OA, subject to Pe(Qe) :5 
(6.10) 
Using policy variables, 0 and a, the State desires to maximize the 
quantity of renewable power generated by the dominant firm, with a single 
constraint that the market price of electricity not exceed some price, P. p is 
an ambiguous non-defined value that is determined exogenously to this 
game by the politics of the State. P represents an increased price of 
electricity where the loss of consumer surplus is not a politically acceptable 
exchange for the expansion of renewable energy. 
To support the revenue of the Green Firm, the TGC obligation is set 
by the State at a level higher than the production capacity of green 
certificates. This assures a market for TGCs and that the TGC price will be 
equal to the buyout fee. To facilitate the objective, it is assumed: ? 
q: < aqd 
(6.11) 
To insure grid security the Brown Firm is compelled to balance the 
market and meet demand, after accounting for the Green Firm's production 
decision. The Brown Firm is compelled to vary its production to allow the 
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Green Firm to fulfil its initial production decision. Therefore, market demand 
will always be equal to production by both Green and Brown Firms. 
Q, a qd+ qr 
(6.12) 
All relative parameters are known, by the State, Brown and Green in 
advance of each step. 
Transparency of policy is important to the State so it functions to 
make all parameters public knowledge. 
Solving the Model 
In this section a solution is found for the model which has been 
describe above. A standard backwards induction procedure is used. The end 
goal of this procedure is to attain two equations. The first equation is the 
Green Firm's profit maximising equation as a function of the obligation quota 
and the buyout fee. The second equation is the market equilibrium price of 
electricity as a function of the same two variables, the obligation quota and 
the buyout fee. 
With these two equations, the State's goal of maximising renewable 
energy production while assuring the price of electricity does not exceed a 
critical level can be represented as a constrained optimisation problem. This 
constrained optimisation problem can be solved using the Lagrangian 
method. 
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Mathematics ofBackward Induction 
Step 1. 
Green Firm (fringe-follower's reaction function) 
The profit maximization equation of the renewable power producer 
(Green): 
rl r TRr -TCr (6.13 a) 
= Pq, + pyqy -0 
= Pecir + pyqy 
= [(a - b(()e))qr] + pyqy 
= [(a - b(qdt qr))qr], + Pyqy 
= [(a - bqd- bqr)qr] -+ Pyqr 
= [aqr - bqdqr - bqr 2] + Pyqr- 
2+pyqr IT r= acir - bqdqr - bqr 
With substitution of Py = 0" 
lFirm's profit equation: rT r aqr - 
bqdqr 
- bqr 
2 +4) 
To solve for the reaction function of FirMr:, ' 
F. O. C.: S rI r 18 qr =0 and MRr = MCr- 
j5 rl, /gqr= 0 =a - bqd- 2bq, + (D 
-a + bqd+ 2bqr -'0 =0 
(6.14 C) 
2bqr a- bqd +0 
qr (a - bqd +. 0)/ 2b 
qr [(a + (P)/ 2b] - [bqd/ 2b] 
q r* [(a + (P)/ 2b] - Y2qd 
(6.13 b) 
(6.13 C) 
(6.13 d) 
(6.13 e) 
(6.13 D 
(6.13 g) 
(6.13 h) 
(6.13 i) 
(6.14 a) 
(6.14 b) 
(6.14 d) 
(6.14 e) 
(6.14 ý 
(6.14g) 
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lGreen-profit maximizing reaction function: ý; ýfq,, (D) = [(a + )1-2-bfý 
(6.14 h) 
Step 11. 
Brown Firm (leaders profit maximization function) 
The profit maximization equation of the dominant power producer (leader): , 
The dominant firm's profit function is: 
n 
d= TRd- TCd 
Peqd -Y, qd 
2- [p, qc + (D(aqd. q,: )] 
f2 [(a - b(Qe))qdl - V, qd - [p, qc + (paqd - (Dq, ] 
[(a - b(qd + qr))qd Y2qd 
2 [P, qc + (Paqd - Oqýj 
[(a - bqd - bqr)qd ] Y2qd 
2 [Pcqc + (D(3qd (Dqc] 
[aqd - bqd 2- bqrqdl - '1/2 qd 
2 [Pcqr + (paqd (Pqcj 
aqd - bqd 
2- bqrqd- Y2qd 2- Pcqr q)aqd + (Dqr 
aqd - bqd 
2_y2qd 2_ (Dclqd - bqrqd Pcqr + 4)qr 
(6.15 a) 
(6.15 b) 
(6.15 C) 
(6.15 d) 
(6.15 e) 
(6.150 
(6.15 g) 
(6.15 h) 
= aqd- bqd 
2 
_ Y2 qd 
2 
- Oaqd- [(qr)*(bqd - Pc+ 0)1 (6.15 i) 
Irld =aqd- bqd2 ' 1/2qd2 . (Daqd -[(a - bqd +0)1 2b)*(b gd « Pc + 
(6.15 
With substitution of Pc = (P 
I rl d- = aqd- bqd2- Yiqd2-ý Q)aqd -[(a - bqd + (D)l 2b)*(bqd)l 
(6.15 k) 
To solve for qd max : 
F. O. C.: 8 11 d/i5qd ý0 and MRd *ý MCd- (6.16 
95 Ild/gqd "= 0a- 2bqd- qd - Oa - [(-%)bqd + ((a ý- bqd + (D)/ 2b)(b)] 
(6.16 b) 
a- 2bqd- qd - (Da +% bqd - ((a - bqd+O)/2) (6.16 C) 
=a- 2bqd- qd - (Da +% bqd - Y2a +% bqd - 
Y2 0 (6.16 d) 
= Y2a 
- bqd-qd- (Pa - 
Y20 (6.16 e) 
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bqd + qd= %a- Oa - 1/20 (6.16 ý 
qd (b + 1) = 1/2a-Oa-Y20 (6.16 g) 
qdmax =(Y2a-Oa-V20) 1 (b+1) (6.16 h) 
Brown Firm's profit maximizin'g level of production: 
hdmax(4), a) = (a - 24)a - 0) 12(b+1) (6.16 i) 
Step Ill. 
Firm, 's r)rofit maximizina level of Droduction aiven Firm,, 's outr)ut. 
qr max = [(a + 4))/ 2b] - Y2qd (6.17a) 
= [(a + O)l 2b) - [Y2 (a 20a - 0) / 2(b+l)] (6.17 b) 
= [(a + (D) / 2b] - [(a - 20a - (D) / 4(b+l)] (6.17c) 
= [((2(b+l)/2(b+l))*((a + 0) / 2b)] ' 
- [((b/b)*(a, ý- 20a - 0)) / 4(b+l)] (6.17d) 
= (2ab +2a +2b(D + 2(: D* - ab + 2bOa t b(P) /, 4b(b+l) (6.17e) 
Fringe firm's profit maximizing level of production: 
ýr'nax((V, a) = (ab +2a +3b(P +2bMa + 24)) 1_4b(b+l)l (6.170, 
Step Iv. 
Market equilibrium for production and price. . 
Total electricity l2roduction: 
ae qd+ qr (6.18) 
Qe [(a - 20a - 0) / 2(b+l)] + [(ab +, 2a +, 3bO--+2bq)a + 20) 4b(b+l)l 
(6.18a) 
Qe = [(a - 24)a - 0) / 2(b+l)] + [(ab +2a +3b(D+2b(Da + 24))/(4b(b+l))] 
(6.18b) 
Oe (01 a) = (3ab + 2a - 2bOa + bO + 20) 1 (4b(b+i (6.18c) 
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Market price of electdcitv: 
Pe(Qe) =a- b(Qe) 
Pe =a-b Pab + 2a - 2bOa + M) + 20) / (4b(b+l)) 
:a- ((3ab + 2a - 2bOa + bO + 20) 1 (4(b+ffi 
Step v. 
Government Poligy 
(6.18a) 
(6.18b), 
(6.18C) 
The State's goal is to maximize the amount of renewable energy 
being produced while keeping electricity prices below a maximum 
acceptable level. Higher electricity prices lead to a lower level of consumer 
surplus which is politically undesirable. 
The State's policy goal is expressed by maximising production by the 
Green Firm while being constrained by a market price of electricity, as 
shown in the following equation: 
Max qr PSI), SUbject to Pe(Qe) '5 P, 
From Step iii, above, the production functions of the Green Firm in 
terms of 0 and a, the buyout fee and the obligation quotas: 
qr'n"'x(, 0, a) =(ab+2a+3b0+2bOa+20)/4b(b+1) 
From Step iv, above, the market price of electricity in terms of 0 and 
a: 
Pe (0, a) =a- «3ab + 2a - 2b0a + b0 + 20) 1 (4 (b+ 1» 
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The problem can be set up as a Lagrangian constrained optimization: 
L= (ab +2a +3b(D +2b0a + 2(D) 14b(b+1) 
A[p - (a - ((3ab + 2a - 2b(Pa + bO + 20) 1 (4(b+l)))] 
However, this equation cannot be solved algebraically. 
Comparative Statics Analysis 
The ambition of this chapter is to understand how the obligation quota 
and the buyout fee interact with the price'of electricity. Given the Lagrangian 
constrained optimisation equation does not have a unique solution, but is 
ambiguous, the State's policy variables can be analyzed in comparative 
statics framework. 
Comparative statics is a method by which we can determine the effect 
model variables have on the two key, policy variables. Static analysis 
indicates how the equilibrium value of an, en_dogenous, vadable will change 
when there is a change in any of the exogenous variables or parameters. 
Consumer surplus is, inversely related to the price of electricity. To 
determine the change in consumer surplus it is necessary to examine how 
the variables 0 and a, obligation quota and buyout fee, interact with Pe. 
Affect of (D on R, 
Pe =a- ((3ab + 2a - 2bOa + b(P + 20) / (4(b+l)) 
8 Pe /8 0= (2ba -b- 2) / (4(b+l)) 
For 0: 5 a : 5.5; Pe / 43 0 '4 0 
For .5<a; the sign of 
JP. /t5 0 is dependent on the value of b, the 
slope coefficient for the market demand for electricity. (See Note-2) 
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and 
Affect of a on P.. 
Pe =a- ((3ab + 2a - 2bOa + 3b(P + 20) / (4(b+l)) 
45 Pe /8 Cl ý (2b(D) / (4(b+l)) 
Since 4) ý!: 0; 8P. /ga ý: 0 
Table 6.1, Comparative Statics Analysis of Short-run Stackelberg 
Equilibrium 
Oe Pe qd* qr* Trd Tr, ConsumerSurplu 
+? ++? 
C1 ++0 
Effect on electricity prices: 
+ indicates the interacting variables increase price; 
- indicates the interacting variables decrease price; ? indicates ambiguous results (the effect is either 
indeterminate or the sign changes value at some 
critical level). 
This matrix of indicates how State policy variables, 
obligation quota and buyout fee, 0 and a, interact with the two 
Stackelberg firms to determine equilibrium price and quantity of 
the electricity market. For a complete demonstration of how 
these interactions were derived see section - Notes 1 at end of 
this chapter. 
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The results can be summarized: 
1. The buyout fee, (1), is ambiguous in its effect on Pe. The influence 
of the buyout fee, 4), is dependent on the values of the obligation 
quota, a, and on the slope parameter, b, of the linear demand 
equation. There are some combinations of a >. 5 and b, that the 
derivative, Pe/450 will be positive. (See Graph 4.3) 
2. Pe, the market price of electricity increases as the obligation quota, 
a, increases, as long as the buyout fee, 0, is > 0. 
Ad Hoc Evaluation 
To further investigate the two policy variables to be examined this 
chapter conducts an ad hoc analysis. Ad hoc values are hoped to give 
insight and relevance to how actual institutions will function. An electricity 
market demand equation is used to further evaluate the effects of 
government policy. Using a simplified linear demand equation where, a, is 
the intercept and, b, is the slope parameter, and all other variables are as 
previously described, gives a market equation: 
Pe (0, a) =a- «3ab + 2a - 2b0a + b0 + 20)1(4(b+1» 
(1 7c) 
Inputting the values a= 75 and b =9 (ýee Note-3 for the how these ad hoc 
values were derived); the equation can be reduced from four unknowns to 
two unknowns, 0 and a, the buyout fee and obligation quota. 
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Pe «D, CI) = 75 - «3*(75)*(9) + 2(75) - 2*(9)*Oa + (9)*0 + 2(D) 1 
(4(9+1)), can be simplified to: 
Pe (4), a) = 75 - ((2175 -1 80a + 90 + 20) / (40)), 
Pe QO, a) = 20.625 - «-18(DG + 110) 1 (40» 
From the above equation, it can know be showný 
If 4) is zero, the equivalent of no TGC program, than P. = 20.625, 
which equals the normal Stackelberg game equilibrium with a single market. 
See 
Graph 6.1 below. 
Graph 6.1 Equilibrium Price with No TGC Program 
30 
E 20 
i -0 
10 
0 
0 0.1 0.2 0,3 04 05 06 07 08 09 1 
Obligation Quota (V4 on Brown Rrm 's Productkm 
Graph 6.1 shows the price of electricity when there is not active 
TGC market, with a buy out fee set at zero (see legend). The 
price is F-20-625, the status quo or no TGC program value 
When the buyout fee is greater than 0, a unique P. exists for any 
specific value of the obligation quota. In Graph 6.2, below, the governments 
buyout price is set at E20. It demonstrates that the pdce reducing effect of 
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the buyout fee, 6Pe 16 0<0, dominates the price increasing effect of the 
obligation quota, 15 Pe /5aý! 0, and Pe is below the normal Stackelberg 
equilibrium, until a >. 6111, at which point 6Pe 1 (54) > 0, and the TGC market 
manifests a net increase in electric prices. (See Notes-2) 
Graph 6.2 Electricity Prices with TGC Program ((V = E20,0! ý ct :!! ý 1) 
To test the sensitivity of the elasticity of demand for electricity the 
linear slope is changed in the equation. In Graph 6.3, below, the effects of a 
downward change in the demand slope coefficient are demonstrated. The 
transition of bPe /15 0 "-' 0 to Pe /15 0>0 occurs at distinct values of a, as b 
increases. It can be inferred that the elasticity of demand for electricity is 
significant to determining the level of TGC obligation that results in electric 
price increases. The more inelastic the demand, the higher the level of a can 
be set before 4) will lead to a price increase. 
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Graph 6.2 shows that a positive buyout fee, F-20, relative to the 
status quo level, EO, results in lower electricity prices below a 
critical obligation quota, but increases price over a certain quota. 
Graph 6.3 Electricity Prices with TGC Program (Change in slope 
parameter) 
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Graph 6.3 illustrates the price sensitivity from a change in the 
elasticity of demand for electricity. 
In Graph 6.4, five levels of electricity prices are drawn, given a unique 
value of 4), the buyout fee. The impact of the buyout fee is seen to be 
proportional to the level, the greater the buyout fee, the lower the price of 
power at low quotas and the higher the price of power at high quotas 
Graph 6.4 Electricity Prices with TGC Program (Multiple Values of 0) 
256 
- -1 -I -- -- --I --- '--- - -,. - r- .- 
of electricity, given the level of obligation quota. 
In Graph 6.5, P is now included. P is a politically deternined price 
constraint. Any new equilibrium price above the normal Stackelberg price 
must be less than P. If this price constraint is violated, the desired benefits of 
increasing renewable energy by use of the TGC program is deemed to be 
political unacceptable to the State because of the loss of consumer surplus. 
Assuming the State has a preference to continue the TGC program, 
regulators will choose a combination of obligation quota and buyout fee, a 
and (P, which will limit the loss of consumer surplus. The P-23 level indicates 
an electricity price which would be approximately 10% higher that the no 
program price level. 
Graph 6.5 Electricity Prices with TGC Program and Price Constraint 
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Graph 6.5 shows the effect of different buyout fees on the price of 
electricity for any level of obligation quota. 
Graph 6.6, below is an enlargement of Graph 6.5, allows for visual 
inspection to show that either the buyout fee or the obligation quota 
variables, 0 or a, or the political variable, unacceptable electricity price, P, 
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can be endogenously determined 0 two of the three vanables are 
predetermined. 
Taking the equation: 
Pe (4), a) = 20.625 - (084)a + 114)) / (40)) 
and substituting in P for Pe, 
0= 20.625 - ((-184)a + 114)) / (40)), given any two of the vanables, 
the third is determined. 
Graph 6.6 Electricity Prices with TGC Program and Price Constraint 
(enlarged Graph 4.5) 
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Graph 6.6 illustrates that if either the buyout fee or the obligation 
quota increase the price of electricAty will increase 
Note that at high buyout fees and low obligation quotas electricity 
prices are lower than the status quo. This has implications for the potential 
use of feed-in-tariffs, instead of TGC markets. 
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Concluslon 
There is no unique equilibrium for this modified Stackelberg game. 
There are a quasi-infinite number of combinations of TGC obligations (a) and 
buyout payment values (0) that, the State-could chose. However, - the two 
electric power firms, Green and Brown, do have sub-game perfect 
equilibrium games once the State has determined its optimal policy for the 
TGC program. 
There are general optimizations procedures that the - government 
could follow if it desires to minimize the increased cost of electricity, yet 
expand renewables generation. They are: 
1. Set the obligation quota at a level where the quantity of TGCs is 
closer to the quantity demand, from'Ithe Brown Firm in any one 
period, a so aqd = q.. This will eliminate the Brown Firm's cost of 
the buyout fee paid to the government. This buyout fee does not 
contribute to the economic profits that would motivate expansion 
of the Green Firm. The obligation quota need only be adjusted to 
levels which assure a market for the TGCs and the additional 
revenue that would flow to the Green Firm. Recalling 8 Pe /8 a 
0, if 0 is > 0, the rate of increasing the obligation quota should 
only be as fast as the Green Firm could expand. 
2. Policy decision should be aware that more inelastic the demand 
for power, the higher the obligations quota can be set before the 
buyout fee leads to a price increase. 
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3. Set the buyout fee at a level which creates economic Incentives for 
the Green Firm to expand. 
This last point illuminates one of the weaknesses of this model and 
brings Into focus the primary purpose of TGC programs. Why does a 
renewable energy firm need additional revenues to motivate expansion given 
the reasonably accurate assumption that the firm has no marginal cost of 
producbon? 
The cost structure of the Green Firm Is totally comprised of a large 
fixed cost of capital financing. The shutdown decision for a firm in this form 
is: 
If Pe < AFC (average fixed cost of production), then exit market 
The object of the TGC market Is to assure that P. + Pc ýt AFC. The 
State should set the buyout fee in itern 2 above so this conclition is met 
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Notes 
Note -I 
Comparative Static Analysis 
ComDarative static analvsis of short run Stackelbem equilibrium 
Qe Pe qd* qr* Trd TTr Consumer Surplus 
+? +0? 
++0 
a is conditional on 0 >0, except forTrr . 
Interactions Relations! 2p 
Affect of 0 and a on Q.. 
Oe (0, a) = (3ab + 2a - 2bOa + 3bO + 20) / (4b (b+l)) 
8 Qe 18 (1) = (-2ba +3b + 2) / (4b (b+l)) 
Since 0: 5 a: 5 1; 80e/45 0>0 
Total electricity production moves with the direction Of change in the 
buyout price. 
Individual firm's reaction: For an increase in 0, the increase in Firmr's 
electricity production is greater than the reduction in FirMd'S production. 
Qe (, 0, a) = (3ab + 2a - 2b0a + 3b0 + 20) 1 (4b (b+1» 
8 Qe 18 a= (-0) 1 (2(b+ 1» 
Since 0 ý->O; 8 Qeis a 50 
Total electricity production moves in the inverse direction as a change 
in the matching percentage of the renewables obligation. 
Individual firm's reaction: For an increase in a, the increase in Firmr's 
,, I electricity production is less than the reduction in Fim1ds production. 
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Affect of (P and a on P.. 
Pe =a- ((3ab + 2a - 2b0a + UO + 20) / (4(b+l)) 
t5 Pe /8 0= (2ba - 3b - 2) / (4(b+l)) 
Since 0: 5 a<1; JQ18150 ? 
Pe =a- ((3ab + 2a - 2bOa + 3bO + 20) (4(b+l)) 
8 Pe/ga = (2bO) 1(4(b+l)) 
Since (P ý: 0; t5aelga 0 
The effect on market price of electricity is set by a deterministic 
equation, the assumed inverse demand function. Price moves in an inverse 
relationship to the quantity of electricity produced. The relationship of the 
policy variables to the change in price is as expected given the relationship 
of the policy variables to the total quantity produced. 
Affect of 0 and a on qd- 
qd max (q), Cl) = (a - 2(Da - (0) 2(b+l) 
,6 qd/ 45 (D = (-2a - 1) 2 (b+ 1) 
Since 0: 5 a :51; 
gqd/80 <0 
qd max p la) = (a - 20a - 0) / 2(b+l) 
8 qd/45 Wý (-2(D) / 2(b+l) 
Since 0 ý: 0; 8qd8a 
Affect of (1) and a on qr. 
q, m"x (, 0) = (ab + 2a + 5b(P + 20 + 2b(Da) /4b(b+1) 
Sqr 145 (D = (5b +2+ 2ba) 1 4b(b+1) 
Since 0<a:! ý 1; Sq, 18 0>0 
qrmax «D, a) = (ab + 2a + 5b(D + 20 + 2b(Da) /4b(b+1) 
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t5qr /8a= (2bO) /2 (b+ 1) 
Since (P ýý 0; i5qr ISa ; -> 0 
Affect of (1) and a onrl d. 
rI d aqd- bqd2ý- Y2qd 
2_ 
(Paqd -[(a - bqd+ (P)l 2b)*(bqd)] 
I- 11 dl t54) = -qd ((a+( 
/2)) 
Since 0-: 5 a :ý1; (5 
rldI450 0 
rI d aqd- bqd2ý- Y2qd 
2- 
(Paqd -[(a - bqd+ (D)/ 2b)*(bqd)] 
45 rl d/Sa = -4)qd 
Since 0>0; 
Affect of (1) and a on rl,. 
nr= aqr - bqdqr - bqr 
2+ (Dqr 
(5 flr/(54) = +qr 
Since qr ý: 0; 
r= aqr - bqdqr - bqr 
2+ 
(Dqr 
8 Il d/ i5a =0 
0 => consumer surplus 
a=: > consumer surplus 
8 
rij8c,: 5 o 
(5 1-1,1(50 >. -. 
15rI di 16CI 0 
The changes in consumer surplus which occur as a result of the 
policy variables being investigated move in a manner consistent with 
economic theory, as shown in Pe and Oe above. 
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Note -2 
Given 95 Pe /S 0= (2ba -b- 2) / (4(b+ 1)) 
and b=9: 
45 Pe/8 0= (2*(g)*a - (9) - 2) / (4(9+1)) 
= (1 8a - 11)/ (40) 
setting (18 a- 11)/(40) = 0; 
it is found that 8 Pe /8 0<0 
if a<0.6111. 
The pivot point, where 45 Pe 18 0<0 transitions 8 Pe /8 (V > 0, is 
determined by b, the slope coefficient of the electricity demand equation. 
Note -3 
The values a= 75 and b=9 satisfy the normal demand equation, P= 
a- b*Q, when substituting in the approximate Scottish values of P= 
E25/MWh and Q=5.5 MWh/annum 
264 
C L%!! 5 M hapter 7 
Conclusion 
Chapter Sections 
Review of Research and Findings 
Policy Issues 
266 
Review of Research and Findings 
Scotland is entering a transition period for its environment and 
economy as it decides which path to follow to meet its energy and power 
needs for the next fifty years. The electric power infrastructure needs major 
upgrading and new investment if Scotland is to maintain a secure and 
reliable electric power system to promote economic growth and quality of life 
for its population. Slightly less than one-third of the generating capacity 
within Scotland will be decommissioned, in the next seven years'and an 
additional 40% will be closed in 20 years. New traditional power plants, coal- 
fired or nuclear powered, are expected to take 10 to 15 years to complete 
once the decision to build is made, longer if litigation occurs. This essential 
investment will amount to tens of billions of Pounds by 2025. 
Which technology should be used to replace current power generation 
facilities is the single most important decision that needs to be made. Most 
all other aspects of the power system will be determined once the source of 
power is known., 
The Scottish Executive -announced an,., aspiration to, increase 
renewable sources for electdc power to 40% by the year 2020 from a level of 
approximately 11 % in 2004 ý (9% coming from hydro and 2% from other 
renewables). This is one of the most ambitious, goals for any country in 
Europe, given Scotland has already developed its hydroelectric resources 
and only one or two major hydro schemes are even contemplated for the 
future. Most all of the renewables, growth will have -to come from new 
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sources through the use of new or improved renewables technologies like 
wind farms, biomass generation, marine tidal and wave systems or landfill 
gas and other technologies. 
This aspiration for greater use of renewables has been driven by the 
economic development opportunities that Scotland may be able to capitalize 
on and exogenous decisions by the United Nations and European 
Commission to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions. 
Renewable sources of power have started to grow quickly in the past 
four years. Between 2000 and 2002 non-hydro sources of power over 
doubled, but were still insignificant at just 1.3% of production. A government 
program to promote deployment of renewables during 1990's was met with 
very limited success. 
A new, program was initiated in early 2002 that provided a 
combination of demand push-supply pull incentives. - The Renewables Order 
(Scotland) required retail energy supplier to produce themselves or purchase 
a quota of tradable green energy certificates to submit to the government. 
This program has allowed renewables generating firms to increase revenues 
over 300% with the same level of energy produced. Since the inception of 
ROS there has been a 160% growth in renewables generating capacity and, 
the potential for a 23-fold increase over the next five to seven years, if all 
currently considered projects come to completion. 
There is potential for major harm to the environment and quality of life 
for people who will be impacted by this extraordinary expansion of 
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renewables projects. There is a special concern as greater than 90% of the 
new capacity being considered by energy developers is proposed onshore 
wind farms. 
Examining the social welfare issues around this expansion was the 
goal of Chapter 4. By asking the question, -"Why are some types of 
renewable energy preferred over other types? 1" it was hoped that improved 
decisions could be made about the types of renewables development that 
should be promoted. Quantifying, in,, monetary terms, the positive and 
negative environmental impacts is one step in this process. 
Since there are no commercial markets for environmental attributes of 
renewables projects, a stated preference method needed to be used. The 
choice experiment method was decided upon because of the need to 
compare distinct qualities of. ývarious types of renewables projects. A 
contingent valuation method would not have derived the underlying 
characteristic values that were desired ý for, comparing distinctly different 
hypothetical energy projects. 
After conducting focus groups, academic literature, 
governmental policy statements-and press releases, as well as the popular 
press, four attributes were identified for use-in-the choice experiment along 
with a monetary attribute. , The, non-monetary, attributes are impacts on 
landscape and wildlife, air pollution, and jobs creation; the monetary attribute 
was charges in annual electricity billings. 
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A representative population of Scottish households was desired for 
the choice experiment, so the electoral register was used to create a mailing 
list that represented all areas of Scotland. Approximately 550 registered 
Scottish citizens were mailed a survey packet containing the survey along 
I with a cover letter explaining the choice experiment. The response rate from 
the mail out was over 40% and supplied in excess of 800 choice set answer. 
Unfortunately, the sample population had statistically significant 
differences from the Scottish population. Two population characteristics in 
particular were different. The sample population had an income level below 
that of the general population and the sample population was more rural that 
the average of the national population. These characteristics are related as 
rural populations traditionally suffer from lower wages and lower annual 
earnings. It was hypothesized that the higher response rate from the rural 
population occurred because they are the population most likely to 
experience the energy projects, in both a positive and negative manner. 
- The survey consisted of several parts: an introduction described the 
Scottish Executive's pursuit of expansion for renewable energy projects, ;a 
description of the types of renewables under consideration, a discussion of 
the attributes under consideration, an explanation of the choice sets, 
presentation of four choice sets, and - than collection of socio-economic 
information on the respondent. 
Using random parameter logit regression analysis, estimated 
coefficients were derived for the indirect utility function. For each of the 
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attributes and the various levels within each, the coefficients represent the 
Influence on probability of choice. In an expanded model, which included 
socio-economic variables, two characteristics were identiffied that increased 
the preference for renewables. If ý the respondent was under the age of 40 
years or if the respondent had a higher education they had a greater 
preference for renewables. 
The resulting implicit prices from the expanded model analysis 
showed that the sample population was willing-to-pay E13.13 per household 
per annum to change energy projects from high impact on the landscape to 
no impact on the landscape. Sample households were not willing-to-pay for 
a reduction to low or moderate landscape impacts., 
For wildlife, the sample households would be willing-to-pay E4.24 per 
household per annurn to reduce slight harm. to wildlife to no harm from 
potential projects. The sample group was willing-to-pay E15.89 per 
household per annurn for actually improving wildlife from creating slight harm 
to wildlife, I. 
And for having renewable energy projects that have no increase in air 
pollution instead of slightly increasing airborne pollution, the respondents 
were willing-to-pay Ell 3.84 per household per annum. 
These values met the scope criteria that, higher WTP values should 
be observed for higher quality environmental goods that provide greater 
utility to the survey respondent.,.,, 
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Jobs creation proved to be statistically insignificant. , While the 
coefficient for the monetary attdbute was negative. This monetary coefficient 
matched standard economic theory. Overall explanatory power of the RPL 
was high with a McFadden Pseudo-R2 value of 0.47. This is equivalent to an 
adjusted R2 for an OLS regression of over 0.90. One derogatory finding for 
the MNL analysis was that the IIA assumption did not hold and 
heterogeneous preferences were indicated. 
The high response rate from the rural population of Scotland and the 
supposition that this group would be more affected by the potential 
renewables development motivated a hypothesis that respondent's local 
could be a source of heterogeneous preferences. Segregating the sample 
population into rural and urban groups based on self-disclosed information. 
A log likelihood test confirmed that the two models proved to have greater 
explanatory power than the single full sample set, so the hypothesis was 
validated. 
New implicit prices derived for the urban group changed moderately 
from the full sample set, but did not indicate any substantial re-interpretation 
of the results was necessary. 
The implicit prices derived for the rural sub-sample did support a new 
and different interpretation from both the full sample set and the urban sub- 
group regression results. The rural sample no longer showed willingness-to- 
pay for any reduction of harm to the landscape. For wildlife the rural group 
would not pay for reducing slight harm from energy projects to no harm, but 
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they would be willing-to-pay for a slight improvement in wildlife. A WTP to 
avoid any increase in air pollution continued to hold true for all three sample 
sets. But the rural sub-set WTP was now one-third higher than the full 
sample group and over 70% higher than the amount derived for the urban 
sub-sample. 
Finally, employment became highly statistically significant for the rural 
group while it remained of no significance to the urban group. Combining this 
change of value, with other changes'found for the rural respondents, it was 
inferred that the rural population was willing to allow some level of negative 
environmental impacts on their surroundings for the possibility of jobs 
creation andeconomic development. -, Rural populations in general would be 
willing-to-pay to reduce environmental impacts from being highly negative or 
pay if an actual improvement to the environment- could result, but not for 
complete avoidance of impact. 
Another hypothesis was proposed, that -income could, be a source of 
heterogeneous preferences because economic literature and theory support 
the proposition that improved ý environmental -quality 
is a luxury good. 
Persons with lower incomes would be expected to demonstrate an unwilling 
to pay for avoiding the negative: impacts. -This hypothesis was tested and 
rejected. 
Finally, different scenarios of renewable energy projects were created 
and the social welfare changes calculated as estimated from the full sample 
group implicit prices. Large. onshore wind farms were shown%to, be so 
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adverse to the population that no WTP exists. Large offshore wind farms 
were the most highly valued and households would be willing-to-pay E31.88 
per annum for their attributes. 
Some weaknesses of this choice experiment have become apparent 
since its completion. None of the weaknesses cause the essential WTP 
findings to become suspect or invalid, but rather would have made the 
research stronger or more relevant to the literature on environmental 
valuation and hopefully to governmental policy makers. 
Instead of pursuing estimated values of generic attributes of 
renewable energy projects, examining wind farms attributes specifically 
would have made the research more relevant and meaningful at this time. 
Wind farms are the dominant type of renewable energy projects being 
proposed and the public's awareness of them is very high. There is the 
possibility that respondents may have had difficulty thinking in generic 
attribute terms and not in wind farm attribute terms when making their choice 
selectons. 
A noise from energy projects attribute was not included in the 
experiment, but numerous persons have asked why it was not included. The 
popular press's continual mentioning of that attribute as a criticism of wind 
farms specifically, and major energy developments in general, has made it 
an issue of interest. No empirical research was found showing there is a real 
environmental change in noise levels from wind farms. - Put more simply, no 
decibel-meter readings have been reported to believe this, is a real 
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environmental issue. It appears to* be unsupported rhetoric, beyond on 
anecdotal stories. Also, the issue of noise was not mentioned in the focus 
groups. 
The validity test, voting for. the -single most import attribute, was a 
good tool and demonstrated there was partial internal consistency in 
responses from the sample populatiom Presenting a list of, various types of 
renewable energy projects, similar to,, project profiles used, in the social 
welfare change analysis that was calculated, could have given a higher level 
of validity testing. Would the summed implicit prices for hypothetical projects 
have shown the same ordinal rankings'as voting for preferred projects? 
The attribute levels for landscape impacts might have benefited from 
more precise anchoring of the terms: 'Iow, moderate and high. A written 
definition of what moderate landscape impact means would have helped 
create conceptual consistency between respondents. 
A strategic model of interactions between firms that generate and sell 
electric power and a government was presented. A government requirement 
motivated the creation of a new: market for tradable green certificates to 
promote increased renewable energy.,, prod ucfion., 'ý Power economics 
literature has ignored the, use, of ýa .' Stackelberg model when conducting 
analysis of green certificate markets and trading to date. 
A more accurate, model of how existing, power markets operate in 
much of the world is a scenario ýwhen one dominant player is able to 
exercise'some level of market ý control - and a competitive-fringe of small 
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renewable energy firms exists. Understanding how the two principal policy 
tools used by the government interact in the electric power market is 
important to optimizing social welfare. 
The first policy tool is the obligation level of green certificates that 
must be purchased by the dominant power firm and submitted to the 
government. The dominant firm is a strictly non-green producer of power. 
The second policy tool is the option price, or the buy-out price, that the 
dominant firm must pay if it chooses not to submit TGCs. Alone these tools 
are not sufficient to incentivise any renewables development, but combined 
they create a second market that trades in TGCs and which creates an 
additional revenue stream for the renewables firm and an additional cost to 
be incurred by the brown firm. If either the obligation quota or the buy-out 
price is set to zero by the government, than the brown firm will not participate 
in the TGC market and no transactions will take place. The electricity market 
will behave as normal. 
The market for green certificates was found to have only two 
functional prices; the TGCs would trade at a price equal to the buy-out price 
or the certificates would trade at zero. 
When the obligation quota is set at a quantity greater than the amount 
of certificates that will be produced in any one period, the market power 
belongs to the renewables producer. Prices Will be as high as the green firm 
can demand from the brown firm. This could be a very significant cost to the 
brown firm give the imbalance of relative negotiating strengths. But with the 
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brown firm has an option to pay a buy-out price instead of 'purchasing 
certificates, so the green firm perceives a TGC price ceiling beyond which 
the brown firm will chose the buy-out option. For any TGC production in 
excess of the obligation quota, no demand will exist and the price will be 
zero. The brown firm is a rational and profit maximizing entity, it will not 
purchase TGCs beyond the quantity the government demands it submit. So 
the TGC market price will be either-equal to the government set buy-out 
price up to the quantity of the government set obligation, or TGC price will be 
zero for any quantity above the obligation., 
It was determined that a sub-game -perfect equilibrium does exist 
between the two firms, once the government has established and declared 
the obligation quota and the buy-out'price. Once the two policy vadables 
have been set, there is a unique price and quantity which both firms will 
trade their goods; TGCs and electricity. 
However, the model showed no optimal equilibrium value existed that 
the government could select for the two variables. The government had one 
exogenous constraint placed on it by politicians. A political acceptable price 
increase of electricity for the new program, could not be exceeded. There 
was shown to be a quasi-infinite number of combinations of the buy-out price 
and obligation quota that would suffice to increase green energy production 
but not exceed the political price constraint. 
It was also found that as the buy-out price increased the expansion of 
green energy production was greater than the reduced production caused by 
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the brown firm's additional costs of the TGCs. As a result, at lower obligation 
quotas, the market for electricity experienced an outward supply curve shift. 
This shift resulted in an equilibrium point with a greater quantity of electricity 
being supplied at a lower price than that of a power market with no ancillary 
green certificate trading. 
However, after some critical level for the obligation quota, Ahis 
situation reverses itself. The net change in electric power producton is 
downward; this is the result of the brown firm's reduced production being 
greater than any increase in production by the green firm. The electricity 
market supply curve has shifted inward, with a new equilibrium being a 
higher price and lower quantity. 
Finally, it was -shown that the government could endogenously 
determine an optimal equilibrium using the two policy variables and the 
political price constraint. By designating any two of the three variables, the 
third could be determined. For example, if the political price constraint is 
explicitly stated and the quantity of renewables generation (obligation quota) 
is assigned, then the optimal value of the buy-out option is determined. After 
which the two power firms will adjust to their own optimal equilibriums. 
For further research, and to develop a better understanding of how an 
actual TGC market and power market may interact there are several 
modifications that could be examined within this model. 
The first modification would be to expand the number players in the 
competitive-fringe. In this model there is only one, who by it nature was. a 
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sole producer of green. certificates. Expanding the model to include 
numerous fringe players, all of them small and identical, would be a more 
accurate portrayal of the actual markets and may provide insights into the 
TGC market development. 
The second modification would be to have differentiated costs 
structures for the multiple fringe players. The final modification would be to 
have an oligopoly of dominant firms, instead of a single dominant firm. All of 
these modifications have the possibility of providing deferent results from 
that were found in the current model. 
Policylssues 
This dissertation has - examined - several aspects of Scotland's 
movement to increase deployment and -. use of renewable energy. 
Specifically, it was oriented to the issues of electricity production. The some 
of the essential mechanisms have been put in place to move forward and 
have significant amounts of power production come from renewables. 
The Renewables Obligation (Scotland) has created an investment 
climate that large amounts of - private capital are moving into a business 
sector that heretofore had been unable to, demonstrate profits without direct 
government financial support. Private firms in the energy sector have been 
left to their own devises to seek efficiency and profits with any of the eligible 
renewable power technologies. 
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A potential problem has arisen as a result of this hand off policy. 
Commercial energy developers are using only technologies with the highest 
potential profits. So the vast majority of renewables projects being proposed 
to date are onshore wind farms. A very visible "rush for wind" is occurring in 
Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom. Other profitable renewables 
projects are being developed, but in relatively inconsequential quantities. ,, - 
Wind farms were on the cusp of being profitable before the ROS was 
enacted, but the additional revenues now earned by the sale of ROCs, has 
made them highly profitable. Other technologies, which are still ýnot 
profitable, even at the current earnings levels, continue to need government 
funding and support for on going research and development. 
Many of the technologies that are yet to be commercialized have the 
least environmental impact, as estimated by the implicit prices derived in the 
choice experiment in Chapter 4. Submersed marine technologies vAll have 
no landscape impact and may have no impact on fisheries, although it is too 
early in testing of these systems to have certainty of this last point. 
Onshore wind farms were shown to have a substantial negative 
landscape effect and stated preferences were found to show a low WTP for 
this form of energy production, depending on the scale of the project. 
While there is a large and consistently positive attitude expressed by 
the general population toward renewables, a question remains as to the 
accumulation effect of too many wind farms being constructed in Scotland. 
Wind farms development and deployment should progress at a good pace if 
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wind farms are located and constructed in a manner that minimizes 
environmental impacts on local residents and does not disrupt commercial 
interests like tourism. 
ý The government should consider having minimum productivity 
requirements for a wind farm to be permitted. There is the potential that well 
placed and highly efficient farms may not be deployed as a result of the 
accumulation effect in some regions, while lower. quality farms which were 
permitted earlier are constructed. ,I 
It is clear that the ROS has been highly effective in motivating new 
deployment of renewable energy facilities- Possibly too well. Economic profit 
will motivate entry into the market by new firms or expansion of existing 
firms. The quantity of speculation with deployment new farms may indicate 
that the economics profits are too ý large, and the social welfare cost to 
consumers is more than necessary for the policy objective. 
There is a perverse incentive in the ROS as it now stands. Given the 
annual ratcheting up of the buyout price and the obligation quota, firms 
which are already in the market have an incentive to obstruct new firms from 
entering. The value of ROCs increases as the quantity of ROC falls short of 
the obligation quota. 
Only landfill gas and wind farms power projects are being intensely 
deployed in Scotland. All other technologies are still too costly for 
deployment, even Wth the ROC premium. Commercial enterprises have not 
increased their research and development budgets for developing alternative 
281 
technologies because these technologies are still too distant from being 
financially competitive. Banding of technologies, giving special-, ROC 
incentives or credits, may be necessary to stimulate firms to risk more on 
research. Use of feed-in-tariffs may be necessary for some of these less 
advanced technologies. 
Rural communities are most likely to be affected by large renewables 
projects. Policies which assure that adequate benefits are derived for the 
environmental costs incurred should be put In place. 
And finally, the level of electricity price increases anticipated from the 
deployment of green technologies does appear to be as important to most 
households as feared by some politicians and activist groups. However, 
those households on the margin of fuel poverty must be given special 
assistance as even a 5% increase is a hardship. 
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Appendix A 
Dear (name of person) 
The University Of Glasgow is conducting research on renewable 
energy development in Scotland. Your household has been selected to participate in 
a survey that seeks people's opinions on the impacts that may result from new renewable 
energy projects. This research is being funded by the Scottish Economic Policy Network 
with a goal of promoting academic research on issues that are of special interest to the 
Scottish Parliament. This is a chance for your opinion to be heard as this research will be 
published and made available to the public, conservation groups, government, industry, 
and anyone concerned for Scotland's future. 
The Scottish Executive has committed itself to expanding the use of renewable energy 
resources, the primary reasons being environmental (concerns about climate change) and 
economic (creating newjobs and export opportunities). The type of renewable energy 
projects we are talking about are more than just wind farms (on-shore and off-shore), but 
also include hydroelectric schemes, power plants that bum wood, farm waste and 
household refuse, solar panels on houses, facilities that extract natural gas from land fills, 
and shoreline power plants that use wave or tidal energy. 
Your household is one of 500 throughout Scotland, chose randomly from the electoral 
registrar. By completing and returning this survey you have the chance to voice your 
opinion about the future of renewable energy development in Scotland. You may be 
assured ofcomplete anonymity and confidentiality ofall information given to us, none of 
which will be passed on to anyone else. 
As a sign of appreciation, 1 out of every 100 surveys that are returned will be 
randomly chosen to receive a UO prize: replies must be received by 30 September 2003. 
If you have any questions about this survey please contact myself, or Ariel Bergmann 
(Ph. D. research student) at 0141330 3385, email: scotiandresearchCcD aboo. co. uk. . 'y 
Thank you for your help. 
Yours sincerely, 
Professor Nick Hanley 
UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
IMPACTS FROM 
RENEWABLE ENEA9Y 
DE V& OPM EM 7ý 
IN SCOTLAND 
¶ 
A SURVEY OF PEOPLES VIEWS 
AUTUMN 2003 
40),, X, 41, 
ot 
jobs 
The Scottish Executive and the U. K. Government have 
committed themselves to an expansion of renewable energy 
development during the next decade. Examples of renewable energy 
are hydroelectric schemes, windmills (onshore and offshore), solar 
panels for heat or electricity, tidal and wave power, and burning 
household rubbish and forest or agricultural waste. 
This commitment to increase the use of renewable energy 
sources is partly due to concerns over global warming (climate 
change). The U. K. has agreed to many European Community and 
International treaties that mean we have to reduce the amount of 
green house gases (climate change gases) produced by the use of 
fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) for electric power generation. 
Investing in renewable energy also offers the prospect of future 
jobs in Scotland, as a major growth sector. 
This survey aims to find out what people would prefer to 
happen in Scotland from all the new renewable energy 
construction and development that will occur during the next 10 
to 15 years. 
1 in every 100 surveys returned will be randomly 
selected to receive a E20 prize. If you would like to be 
included, please give us your name and address. 
Name 
Address 
If you would like to receive a copy of our results once 
they are ready, please tick this box [: ] 
Plectse reDly by 30 Sentember 2003 
This survey looks at f ive different kinds of that 
renewable energy projects might have. These are: 
* Landscape * Wildlife 
* Employment 
* Air Pollution 
* Price of electricity 
All the different kinds of renewable energy (wind farms, hydro 
power stations, etc. ) have some or all of these kinds of impacts and 
it's these impacts that our survey focuses on. 
WHAT ARE THESE IMPACTS? 
Landscape - How large a project is can inf luence how much visual 
impact results, but the location of the project is also very important. 
For example, a wind farm could have 3 or 30 windmills and the wind 
farm could be located in an industrial estate or in a national park. 
Size and location also matter for new hydroelectric schemes. 
,ýi 
Wildli - The effect on wildlife f rom renewable energy development 
can range f rom harming wildlife a little to actually helping it a little, 
but in many cases there will be no effect., For example, hydroelectric 
dams can prevent salmon f rom swimming up rivers. Farmland that is 
used to grow energy crops allows for healthier wildlife. However, 
the government would not allow projects that had large negative 
effects on wildlife. 
Air Pollution - Many types of renewable energy projects create no 
air pollution at all. Some projects do create a low level of air 
pollution, for example, burning household rubbish at a power station, 
but this is a very small amount compared to when electricity is being 
generated from burning coal or natural gas. 
fS, 
jobs Employment, - All renewable energy projects will create new long- 
term employment in local communities. Renewable energy projec... 
require operational and maintenance workers that tend to be skilled 
or technically trained. These jobs pay above average wages. People 
will also be employed during construction, but these are not long- 
term jobs in the local community. 
The price of electricily- A large expansion of renewable energy in 
Scotland may cause an increase in electricity prices. An average 
household currently pays about E270 a year for electricity (which is 
about E68 a quarter). However, this would probably go up if Scotland 
goes ahead with using more and more renewable energy rather than 
traditional energy f rom oil, gas, and coal. 
In the next part of this questionnaire, we are going to ask you to 
choose between two possible renewable energy projects that maybe 
built in Scotland. Each plan is described in terms of its impacts; that 
is, in terms of what it would mean for landscape, wildlife, air pollution, 
jobs and electricity prices. Here is (in example: 
oi)tion examr)le 
Plan A Plan B Neither 
7-D ANDSCAPE 
sual impact caused by - HIGH NONE No increase in 
location and/or size renewable energy 
WILUIFE 
health of habitat SLIGHT HARM SLIGHT HARM 
Alternative 
climate change 
AIR POLLUTION NONE NONE programs used 
EMPLOYMENT 
ew jobs in local community 8-12 JOBS 1-3 JOBS 
jobs North Sea gas 
RICE OF C16 
fired power 
stations instead 
ELECTRICITY per year per year 
2dditional rates per year 
YOUR CHOICE: A B I would not want 
(please tick one only) either A or B 
You will see that each plan has dif f erent combinations of 
impacts. In this example you can see that Plan A has high visual 
impact, 8-12 new jobs created and an increase in electricity bills of 
E16 per year, while Plan B has no visual impact, 1-3 new jobs created, 
and an increase of E7 per year for electricity. But the impacts on 
air pollution and wildlife are the same in both Plan A and Plan B. 
"Neitheru means that we do not go ahead with renewable 
energy at all - we just keep on using fossil f uels like North Sea gas. 
However choosing this option would mean missing out on all of the 
benefits of renewable energy. Also, the government would have to 
pursue other means of reducing the use of fossil fuels, for example, 
increased petrol taxes and forcing businesses to invest in energy 
efficiency measures, costs that may be passed on to consumers. 
In each of the options that follow, we just ask you which plan 
you would prefer to go ahead. There are no wrong or right answers; 
we are simply. interested in your opinion. So, please go through each 
of the 4 options, and for each one tick either "Plan A", "Plan B" or 
"Neither". Make sure you only tick one box for each option! 
option I 
Plan A Plan B Neither 
r-'"-= LANDSCAPE 
visual impact coused by HIGH NONE *No increase in 
location and/or size renewable 
J 
Wildlife 
health of habitat NONE SLIGHT HARM 
energy 
*Alternative 
climate change 
Air Pollution NONE NONE programs used 
to Employment 
new jobs in local 1-3 JOBS 1-3 JOBS 
*North Sea gas 
jobs 
communitv 
f ired power 
Price of electricity stations 
additional rates per year E7 E29 instead 
YOUR CHOICE: A I would not want 
(please tick one only) ED 
either A or B 
E=1 
option 2 
Plan A Plan B Neither 
r- =7 7-771 LANDSCAPE 
visual impact caused by NONE MODERATE *No increase in 
location and/or size renewable 
Wildlife SLIGHT SLIGHT energy health of habitat IMPROVEMENT IMPROVEMENT *Alternative 
SLIGHT climate change 
Air Pollution NONE programs used INCREASE 
Employment 
new jobs in local 1-3 JOBS 8-12 JOBS 
*North Sea gas 
jobs communitv fired power 
Price of electricity 
EO 
stations 
additional rates per year instead 
YOUR CHOICE: A B I would not want 
(please tick one only) ED 
either A or B 
E-: 1 
5.11.18.4 
option 3 
Plan A Plan B Neither 
LANDSCAPE 
visual impact caused by NONE NONE *No increase in 
Iceatian and/or size renewable 
Wildlife SLIGHT energy 
health of habitat IMPROVEMENT 
SLIGHT HARM *Alternative 
SLIGHT climate change 
Air Pollution NONE programs used INCREASE 
Employment 
new jobs in local 8-12 JOBS 20-25 JOBS 
*North Sea gas 
J0 bs I community 
f ired power 
Price of electricity stations 
additional rates per year E45 EO instead 
YOUR CHOICE: A I would not want 
(please tick one only) E=1 
either A or 8 
option 4 
Plan A Plan B Neither 
LANDSCAPE 
visual impact caused by HIGH MODERATE *No increase in 
location finfllargi7f! renewable 
Wildlife 
health of habitat SLIGHT HARM NONE 
energy 
*Alternative 
SLIGHT climate change 
Air Pollution NONE programs used INCREASE 
Employment 
new jobs in local B-12 JOBS 8-12 JOBS 
*North Sea gas 
jobs rommunitv 
f ired power 
Price of electricity stations f 
.J additional rates per year 
C16 f, 29 instead 
YOUR CHOICE: A B I would not want 
(please tick one only) ED either A or B E-D 
overall which of these is impacts is most important to you? (Please tick only one) 
Landscape Wildlife- Air Pollution 
Employment Price of electricity_ 
16.9.3.10e 
Finally, we would like to ask you some questions about yourself. This will 
help in understanding your choices and help us to make sure that our survey is 
representative of the Scottish people. Remember that all information you give 
will be kept confidential and anonymous. 
About yourself -- 
Do you live in: a city - 
Do you have any children? 
a small town -a village/the country 
Yes No 
Do you work in the energy sector? Yes No 
Roughly how much was your last electric bill? 
Are you a member of a conservation group? Yes No 
What is you gross (i. e., before tax) household income? 
4 E10,000 
f, lo. 000-EI5,999 
E16,000-f-20,999 
E21,000-f. 25,999 
f, 26,000-f. 30,999 
e3l. 000-E35,999 
E36.000-E40,999 
f, 41.000-f, 45,999 
f, 46,000-f. 50,999 
f, 51.000-E55,999 
f, 56,000-E60,999 
f, 61,000-f, 65,999 
f, 66,000-f, 70,999 
E71.000-E75,999 
f, 76.000-f, 79,999 
E80.000+ 
How old are you? 
younger than 25 25-40 - 
41-54 55-65 older than 65 
Which of the following best describes your level of education? 
school only - college - university 
We would be interested to have any additional comments you may have on this issue of 
renewable energy development in Scotland 
Thanks for your time - now please post your reply back to us using the envelope 
provided. 
Appendix B 
option I 
Plan A Plan 8 Neither 
LANr)SCAPE 
visual impact caused by HIGH NONE *No increase in 
location and/or s*ze renewable 
Wildlife energy 
health of habitat NONE SLIGHT HARM *Alternative 
climate change 
Air Pollution NONE NONE programs used 
Emp loyment 
*North Sea gas 
. new jobs in local 1-3 JOBS 1-3 JOBS jobs comm nity 
f ired power 
Price of electricity stations 
additional rates per year f, 7 f, 29 instead 
YOUR CHOICE: A I would not want 
(please tick one only) either A or 8 
option 
Plan A Plan B Neither 
LANDSCAPE 
visual impact caused by NONE MODERATE *No increase in 
location and/or seze renewable 
Wildlife SLIGHT SLIGHT energy 
health of habitat IMPROVEMENT IMPROVEMENT *Alternative 
SLIGHT climate change 
Air Pollution NONE programs used INCREASE 
Employment 
new jobs in local 1-3 JOBS 8-12 JOBS 
*North Sea gas 
jobs community 
f ired power 
Price of electricity stations 
additional rates per year E7 EO instead 
YOUR CHOICE: A B I would not want 
(please tick one only) either A or 8 
5.11.18.4 
option 3 
Plan A Plan B Neither Cr 
LANDSCAPE 
visual impact caused by NONE NONE ise in *No increase in 
location and/ar! sizr- renewable 
Wildlife SLIGHT energy 
health of habitat IMPROVEMENT 
SLIGHT HARM *Alternative 
SLIGHT climate change 
Air Pollution NONE programs used INCREASE 
Employment *North Sea gas 
new jobs in local 8-12 JOBS 20-25 JOBS joibs i I commun*tv I 
f ired power 
Price of electricity stations 
Ll 
additional rates per year f, 45 f, 0 i nstead 
YOUR CHOICE: A I would not want 
(please tick one only) either A or B 
option 
Plan A Plan 8 Neither 
LANDSCAPE 
visual impact caused by HIGH MODERATE *No increase in 
location and/or ! qi7p- renewable 
Wildlife energy 
health of habitat SLIGHT HARM NONE *Alternative 
SLIGHT climate change 
Air Pollution NONE programs used INCREASE 
Employment 
*North Sea gas 
new jobs in local 8-12 JOBS 8-12 JOBS 
jobs 
commun4tv, 
f ired power 
Price of electricity stations 
additional rates per year C16 f, 29 instead 
YOUR CHOICE: A B I would not want 
(please tick one only) either A or B 
overall which of these is impacts is most important to you? (Please tick only one) 
Landscape Wildlife 
- 
Air Pollution 
I 
Employment Price of electricity 
16.9.3.1 Oe 
option I 
Plan A Plan 8 Neither 
LANDSCAPE - 
visual impact caused by NONE NONE *No increase in 
location and/or size renewable 
Wildlife energy 
health of habitat NONE NONE *Alternative 
SLIGHT climate change 
Air Pollution NONE programs used INCREASE 
Employment 
new jobs in local 20-25 JOBS 1-3 JOBS 
*North Sea gas 
jobs 
community 
f ired power 
Price of electricity stations 
additional rates per year f, 16 fo i nstead 
YOUR CHOICE: A I would not want 
(please tick one only) E: 1 either 
A or B 
option 
Plan A Plan B Neither 
LANDSCAPE 
visual impact caused by NONE LOW *No increase in 
Jocatoon and/or size renewable 
Wildlife 
health of habitat NONE 
SLIGHT energy 
IMPROVEMENT *Alternative 
4 rib climate change 
Air Pollution NONE NONE programs used 
Employment 
new jobs in local 8-12 JOBS 20-25 JOBS 
*North Sea gas 
jobs communitv 
f ired power 
Price of electricity stations 
additional rates per year E16 E45 i nstead 
YOUR CHOICE: A B I would not want 
(please tick one only) either A or 8 
8.25.15.2 
ot)tion 
Plan A 
ý 
Plan 8 Neither 
LANDSCAPE mnmm 
visual impact caused by 
LOW LOW *No increase in 
location and/or size renewable 
Wildlife SLIGHT 
NONE 
energy 
health of habitat IMPROVEMENT *Alternative 
SLIGHT 
climate change 
Air Pollution NONE programs used 
INCREASE 
Employment 
1-3 JOBS 1-3 JOBS 
*North Sea gas 
jobs 
new jobs in local 
commun0tv 
f ired power 
Price of electricity stations 
additional rates per year 
f, 16 f, 0 instead 
YOUR CHOICE: A I would not want 
(please tick one only) either 
A or 8 
option 4 
Plan A Plan B Neither 
LANDSCAPE 
visual impact caused by LOW NONE *No increase in 
locafion and/or seze renewable 
Wildlife SLIGHT energy 
health of habitat SLIGHT HARM IMPROVEMENT *Alternative 
SLIGHT climate change 
Air Pollution NONE programs used INCREASE 
Employment 
new jobs in local 8-12 JOBS 8-12 JOBS 
*North Sea gas 
jobs commun4tv 
f ired power 
Price of electricity stations 
additional rates per year E7 f, 7 instead 
YOUR CHOICE: A B I would not want 
(please tick one only) either A or 8 
overall which of these is impacts is most important to you? (please tick only one) 
Landscape Wildlife- Air Pollution 
Employment Price of electricity 
1.21.19.14e 
option I 
Plan A Plan 8 Neither 
LANDSCAPE 
visual impact caused by MODERATE LOW *No increase in 
I 
locat*on and/or size renewable 
Wildlife 
health of habitat NONE NONE 
energy 
*Alternative 
SLIGHT climate change 
Air Pollution NONE programs used INCREASE 
Employment 
new jobs in local 20-25 JOBS 8-12 JOBS 
*North Sea gas 
jobs 
commun4ty 
f ired power 
Price of electricity stations 
additional rates per year f, 7 
f-29 i nstead 
YOUR CHOICE: A B I would not want 
(please tick one only) either A or 8 
option 
Plan A 
ý 
Plan B Neither 
LANDSCAPE NENMN 
visual impact caused by HIGH MODERATE *No increase in 
location and/or size renewable 
\3ý. - 
-J - r ý 
Wildlife 
NONE 
SLIGHT energy 
sýý, h health of habitat IMPROVEMENT *Alternative 
SLIGHT climate change 
Air Pollution NONE programs used INCREASE 
Employment 
new jobs in local 1-3 JOBS 1-3 JOBS 
*North Sea gas 
jobs communitv 
f ired power 
Pr ce of electricity stations 
additional rates per year f, 45 f, 16 i nstead 
YOUR CHOICE: A I would not want 
(please tick one only) either A or 8 
20.6.7.23 
14 
44 1 44 
oDtion 3 
Plan A Plan B Neither 
LANDSCAPE 
visual impact caused by NONE MODERATE 
*No increase in 
locateon ond/or size renewable 
Wildlife 
health of habitat NONE SLIGHT HARM 
energy 
*Alternative 
SLIGHT climate 
change 
Air Pollution NONE programs used INCREASE 
Employment *North Sea gas 
new jobs in local 8- 12 JOBS 1-3 JOBS 
jobs commun0tv 
f ired power 
Price of electricity stations 
additional rates per year f, 45 f, 45 instead 
YOUR CHOICE: A I would not want 
(please tick one only) either A or 
8 
ot)tion 
Plan A Plan 8 Neither 
LANDSCAPE 
visual impact caused by HIGH NONE *No increase in 
location and/or soze- renewable 
Wildlife SLIGHT SLIGHT energy 
health of habitat IMPROVEMENT IMPROVEMENT *Alternative 
SLIGHT 
climate change 
Air Pollution NONE programs used INCREASE 
Employment 
8-12 JOBS 1-3 JOBS *North Sea gas 
jobs new jobs in local f ired power 
Price of electricity stations 
additional rates per year fo f, 29 instead 
YOUR CHOICE: A I would not want 
(please tick one only) either A or B 
overall which of these is impacts is most important to you? (Please tick only one) 
Landscape Wildlife 
- 
Air Pollution 
& 
Employment Price of electricity 
22.12. lU. 24 
ODtion I 
Plan A Plan a Neither 
LANDSCAPE 
visual impact caused by NONE HIGH 
*No increase in 
location and/or size renewable 
Wildlife 
health of habitat SLIGHT HARM NONE 
energy 
*Alternative 
Air Pollution NONE NONE 
climate change 
programs used 
Employment 
1-3 JOBS 1-3 JOBS *North Sea gas 
jobs new jobs in 
local 
communitv 
f ired power 
Pr ce of electricity stations 
additional rates per year f, 29 
f, 7 i nstead 
YOUR CHOICE: A I would not want 
(please tick one only) either 
A or B 
option 
Plan A Plan B Neither 
LANDSCAPE 
visual impact caused by MODERATE NONE *No increase in 
location and/or soze renewable 
Wildlife SLIGHT SLIGHT energy 
health of habitat IMPROVEMENT IMPROVEMENT *Alternative 
SLIGHT climate change 
Air Pollution NONE programs used INCREASE 
Employment 
new jobs in local 8-12 JOBS 1-3 JOBS 
*North Sea gas 
jobs community 
f ired power 
Price of electricity stations 
additional rates per year fo f, 7 instead 
YOUR CHOICE: A B I would not want 
(please tick one only) either A or 8 
5.11.18.4 
Ac own'sk"', , 'A -f Aeoýý, ý RK 
ontion 3 
Plan A Plan B Neither 
LANDSCAPE 
visual impact caused by NONE 
NONE *No increase in 
location and/or size renewable 
Wildlife SLIGHT energy 
health of habitat SLIGHT HARM IMPROVEMENT *Alternative 
climate change 
Air Pollution 
SLIGHT NONE programs used 
INCREASE 
Employment 
20-25 JOBS 8-12 JOBS *North Sea gas 
jobs 
new jobs in local 
communitv, 
f ired power 
Price of electricity stations 
additional rates per year f, 0 
f, 45 instead 
YOUR CHOICE: A B I would not want 
(please tick one only) either 
A or 8 
oDtion 4 
Plan A Plan B Neither 
LANDSCAPE 
J 
visual impact caused by MODERATE HIGH *No increase' ase in 
location and/or 11,2 h b renewable 
Wildlife energy 
health of habitat NONE SLIGHT HARM *Alternative 
SLIGHT 
climate change 
Air Pollution NONE programs used 
INCREASE 
Employment 
new jobs in local 8-12 JOBS 8-12 JOBS 
*North Sea gas 
jobs 
commun4tv 
f ired power 
Price of electricity stations 
additional rates per year f, 29 f, 16 instead 
YOUR CHOICE: A I would not want 
(please tick one only) either A or 
B 
overall which of these is impacts is most important to you? (Please tick only one) 
Landscape Wildlife 
- 
Air Pollution 
Employment Price of electricity 
16.9.3.10er 
option 1 
Plan A Plan B Neither 
LANDSCAPE *No increase in 
visual impact caused by 
location and/or s*ze 
NONE NONE 
renewable 
Wildlife energy 
health of habitat 
NONE NONE *Alternative 
SLIGHT climate change 
Air Pollution 
I 
NONE 
INCREASE programs used 
Employment *North Sea gas 
new jobs in local 1-3 JOBS 20-25 JOBS f ired power jobs 
communitv 
Price of electricity stations 
additional rates per year 
fo E16 instead 
YOUR CHOICE: A B I would not want 
(please tick one only) either 
A or 8 
option 
Plan A Plan 8 Neither 
LANI)SCAPE *No increase in 
visual impact caused by LOW NONE 
renewable 
Wildlife SLIGHT energy 
health of habitat IMPROVEMENT 
NONE *Alternative 
climate change 
Air Pollution NONE NONE programs used 
Employment *North Sea gas 
new jobs in local 20-25 JOBS 8-12 JOBS f ired power jobs 4 commun tv 
Price of electricity stations 
additional rates per year 
f, 45 f, 16 instead 
YOUR CHOICE: A I would not want 
(please tick one only) either A or 8 
8.25.15.2r 
option 3 
Plan A Plan B Neither 
LANDSCAPE 
visual impact caused by MODERATE NONE *No increase in 
A, = location and/= renewable . _ Wildlife energy 
health of habitat SLIGHT HARM NONE *Alternative 
SLIGHT climate change 
Air Pollution NONE programs used INCREASE 
Employment 
new jobs in local 1-3 JOBS 8- 12 JOBS 
*North Sea gas 
jobs 
communitu 
f ired power 
Price of electricity stations 
additional rates per year C45 f, 45 instead 
YOUR CHOICE: A B I would not want 
(please tick one only) either A or B 
option 4 
Plan A Plan 8 Neither 
LANDSCAPE 
visual impact caused by NONE HIGH *No increase in 
location and/or sbze- renewable 
Wildlife SLIGHT SLIGHT energy 
health of habitat IMPROVEMENT IMPROVEMENT *Alternative 
SLIGHT climate change 
Air Pollution NONE programs used INCREASE 
Employment 
*North Sea gas 
new jobs in local 1-3 JOBS 8-12 JOBS 
jobs commun6tv 
f ired power 
Price of electricity stations 
additional rates per year f, 29 f, 0 instead 
YOUR CHOICE: A I would not want 
(please tick one only) either A or 8 
overall which of these is impacts is most important to you? (Please tick only one) 
Landscape Wildlife Air Pollution 
Employment Price of electricity 
22.12.10.24r 
W-W 
option I 
Plan A Plan B Neither 
LANDSCAPE 
visual impact caused by LOW MODERATE *No increase in 
location and/or s9ze renewable 
Wildlife energy 
health of habitat NONE NONE *Alternative 
SLIGHT climate change 
Air Pollution NONE programs used INCREASE 
Employment 
new jobs in local 8-12 JOBS 20-25 JOBS 
*North Sea gas 
jobs 
community 
f ired power 
Price of electricity stations 
additional rates per year f, 29 E7 i nstead 
YOUR CHOICE: A B I would not want 
(please tick one only) either A or 8 
option 
Plan A Plan B Neither 
LANDSCAPE 
visual impact caused by MODERATE HIGH *No increase in 
location and/or suze renewable 
Wildlife SLIGHT energy 
health of habitat IMPROVEMENT 
NONE 
*Alternative 
SLIGHT climate change 
Air Pollution NONE programs used INCREASE 
Employment 
new jobs in local 1-3 JOBS 1-3 JOBS 
*North Sea gas 
jobs 
community f ired power 
Pr ce of electricity stations 
additional rates per year f, 16 E45 instead 
YOUR CHOICE: A B I would not want 
(please tick one only) either A or 8 
20.6.7.23r 
option 3 
Plan A Plan B Neither 
LANDSCAPE 
visual impact caused by LOW LOW *No increase in 
location and/or ! 91 7E enewable 
Wildlife SLIGHT energy 
health of habitat NONE IMPROVEMENT *Alternative 
SLIGHT climate change 
Air Pollution NONE programs used INCREASE 
Employment *North Sea gas 
new jobs in local 1-3 
JOBS 1-3 JOBS 
jobs AV 
f ired power 
Price of electricity stations 
additional rates per year 
f, 0 f, 16 instead 
YOUR CHOICE: A I would not want 
(please tick one only) either A or 
B 
option 
Plan A Plan B Neither 
LANDSCAPE 
visual impact caused by NONE LOW *No increase in 
location and/or s*zc renewable 
J- 
Wildlife SLIGHT energy 
- 11Yýlh health of habitat IMPROVEMENT 
SLIGHT HARM 
*Alternative 
SLIGHT climate change 
Air Pollution NONE programs used INCREASE 
r(s Employment 
new jobs in local 8-12 JOBS 8-12 JOBS 
*North Sea gas 
jobs commun6tv 
f ired power 
Price of electricity stations f 
additional rates per year E7 f, 7 instead 
YOUR CHOICE: A B I would not want 
(please tick one only) either A or B 
E 
verall which of these is impacts is most important to you? (Please tick only one) 
Landscape Wildlife 
- 
Air Pollution 
Employment Price of electricity 
1.21.19.14er 
Appendix C 
Back of Post Card 
bear (name of person) 
Last week a questionnaire seeking your opinion about renewable energy 
development was mailed to you. Your household was one of only 500 chosen 
to participate in this survey. If you have already completed and returned it 
to us please accept our sincere thanks. If not, please do so today. Because it 
has been sent to such a small sample of Scottish households, your response 
is important to assure that the study reflects all the views within Scotland. 
Please contact Ariel Bergmann at 0141.330.3385 or email: 
scotlandresearch@yahoo. com. uk if you have any questions. 
Sincerely Professor Nick Hanley 
Front of Post Card 
Renewable Energy Impact Study 
University of Glasgow 
Economics Department 
Adam Smith Building 
Glasgow G 12 8RT 
XXXXXXXXX)DCXXXX 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
UNIVERSITY 
Of 
GLASGOW 
Appendix D 
Report for University of Glasgow 
Renewable Energy 
Synopsis of Focus Group Responses 
Author: Maggie Dewar 
Focus Ecosse 
3 Caithness Row 
New Lanark 
MLIl 9DG 
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1.1. Background Information 
This report, commissioned by the University of Glasgow, contains preliminary 
research to determine what 'characteristics' of 'green' or renewable energy 
production were regarded as 'good' or 'bad' by a cross-section of the Scottish 
public. The findings reported below, Will be the first step in gathering 
information for the University and ultimately other decision-makers (for 
renewable energy) within Scotland. The preliminary report contains the opinions 
of focus groups, recruited from the general public. 
1.2. Composition of Focus Groups 
Two focus groups were recruited: one rural (New Lanark), one urban (Glasgow). 
Each group contained a balance of genders and ages and drew from a pool of B, C 
and D categories. 
The New Lanark focus group contained residents from the village of New 
Lanark itself and other rural areas (Carluke, Biggar, Crossford). New Lanark is a 
restored mill village in South Lanarkshire and was an interesting place to study 
because there was an existing hydro-electric station which had been existence for 
more than 200 years. Because this could have sensitised the participants, 
members were also recruited from outside New Lanark. Having local knowledge 
of a particular type of renewable energy could have worked both ways - that is 
residents may have been more aware of disadvantages or advantages of hydro 
technology. 
The urban focus group was drawn from a pool of staff (secretaries and porters) 
working for the University of Glasgow and some past students. This group 
contained 12 participants compared to New Lanark (8 participants). 
1.3. Structure of Sessions 
Given the nature of the subject and the possible diversity of the two groups, it 
was decided that it was important to establish the levels of pre-existing 
knowledge regarding renewable energy, and uncover any biases. To ensure 
uniformity and avoid biasing the discussions, a scnpt was prepared and read 
(Appendix 1). 
Once read, the group were asked a series of questions: 
Name the renewable energy technologies you are familiar i wl 
What characteristics of these technologies are (in your own opinion) good or 
bad 
Which technology would you favour most? 
Would you favour another technology if the energy installation's were on 
your own doorstep? 
The group answers were written down on a flipchart (see results section). 
Transcriptions of the sessions can be found in Appendix 11. 
2 
Following this 'brain-storming' session, the presenter from the University of 
Glasgow, briefly described the following technologies: 
Solar power 
Hydro, power 
Tidal power 
" Wood burning 
" Landfill gas 
" Wind 
The presentation was designed to clear up questions raised during the discussion 
period and fill any knowledge gaps regarding types of renewable technology. 
Upon completion of this presentation, the groups were sub-divided into groups of 
four and asked to complete an evaluation exercise. This consisted of asking each 
group to allocate a percentage to where they would like their money to be spent 
if they were allowed to nominate their favoured renewable energy technology, 
Finally, each individual was asked to complete a questionnaire (Appendix 111) to 
draw out their own personal opinions and any past and present perceptions 
regarding renewable energy technologies. Most importantly, it was intended to 
identify what characteristics of renewable energy they found most attractive. 
2. Results 
2.1. Results of Group 'Brain-storming' 
Summary of Renewable Energy Sources identified by 
New Lanark Glasgow 
* Water/Hydro * Wind 
Wind 
Solar 
Geothermal 
Tidal 
Wood 
Nuts/burning waste 
Dung/organic waste 
" Tidal/Wave 
" Solar 
" Hydro, 
" Domestic/Municipal waste 
" Animal waste/dung 
" Fermentation 
As there was a great deal of similarity, where identical technologies were named 
by each group (hydro, solar, wind, tidal, organic waste) these shall be reported 
together 
The New Lanark group seemed aware of geothermal energy and wood burning 
(which were not mentioned by the Glasgow group). However, the Glasgow 
group seemed aware of generation from fermentation processes (sugar cane). 
This was not discussed by New Lanark. 
3 
1.1. Background Information 
This report, commissioned by the University of Glasgow, contains preliminary 
research to determine what 'characteristics' of 'green' or renewable energy 
production were regarded as 'good' or 'bad' by a cross-section of the Scottish 
public. The findings reported below, will be the first step in gathering 
information for the University and ultimately other decision-makers (for 
renewable energy) within Scotland. The preliminary report contains the opinions 
of focus groups, recruited from the general public. 
1.2. Composition of Focus Groups 
Two focus groups were recruited: one rural (New Lanark), one urban (Glasgow). 
Each group contained a balance of genders and ages and drew from a pool of B, C 
and D categories. 
The New Lanark focus group contained residents from the village of New 
Lanark itself and other rural areas (Carluke, Biggar, Crossford). New Lanark is a 
restored mill village in South Lanarkshire and was an interesting place to study 
because there was an existing hydro-electric station which had been existence for 
more than NO ýears. Because this could have sensitised the participants, 
members were also recruited from outside New Lanark. Having local knowledge 
of a particular type of renewable energy could have worked both ways - that is 
residents may have been more aware of disadvantages or advantages of hydro 
technology. 
The urban focus group was drawn from a pool of staff (secretaries and porters) 
working for the University of Glasgow and some past students. This group 
contained 12 participants compared to New Lanark (8 participants). 
1.3. Structure of Sessions 
Given the nature of the subject and the possible diversity Of the two groups, it-, 
was decided that it was important to establish the levels of pre-existing 
-' knowledge regarding renewable energy, and uncover any biases. To ensure 
uniformity and avoid biasing the discussions, a script was prepared and read 
(Appendix 1). 
Once read, the group were asked a series of questions: 
" Name the renewable energy technologies you are familiar with. 
" What characteristics of these technologies are (in your own opinion) good or 
bad 
" Which technology would you favour most? 
" Would you favour another technology if the energy installation's were on 
your own doorstep? 
The group answers were written down on a flipchart (see results section). 
Transcriptions of the sessions can be found in Appendix II. 
2 
Following this 'brain-storming' session, the presenter from the University of 
Glasgow, briefly described the following technologies: 
" Solar power 
" Hydro power 
" Tidal power 
" Wood burning 
" Landfill gas 
" Wind 
The presentation was designed to clear up questions raised during' the discussion 
period and fill any knowledge gaps regarding types of renewable technology. 
Upon completion of this presentation, the groups were sub-divided into groups of 
four and asked to complete an evaluation exercise. This consisted of asking each 
group to allocate a percentage to where they would like their money to be spent 
if they were allowed to nominate their favoured renewable energy technology. 
Finally, each individual was asked to complete a questionnaire (Appendix 111) to 
draw out their own personal opinions and any past and present perceptions ,, 
regarding renewable energy technologies. Most importantly, it was intended to 
identify what characteristics of renewable energy they found most attractive. 
2. Results 
2.1. Results of Group 'Brain-storming' 
Summary of Renewable Energy Sources identified by 
New Lanark 
" Water/Hydro 
" Wind 
" Solar 
" Geothermal 
" Tidal 
" Wood 
" Nuts/buming waste 
" Dung/organic waste 
Glasgow 
" Wind,,, 
" Tidal/Wave 
" Solar 
Hydro, 
Domestic/Municipal waste 
, Animal waste/dung 
Fermentation 
As there was a great deal of similarity, where identical technologies were named 
by each group (hydro, solar, wind, tidal, organic waste) these shall be reported 
together 
The New Lanark group seemed aware of geothermal energy and wood burning 
(which were not mentioned by the Glasgow group). However, the Glasgow- 
group seemed aware of generation from fermentation processes (sugar cane). 
This was not discussed by New Lanark. ', ' 
1,, ; 
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2.2. Comparison of Renewable Energy Technologies discussed by both focus 
groups 
2.2.1. Hydro Power Characteristics 
Npw T. nnnrk 
GOOD CHARACTERISTICS BAD CHARACTERISTICS 
Plentiful Dams (unnatural, damage the environment) 
Renewable Large areas may be flooded 
Clean Reliant on climate 
Cheap Disturbs water tables 
Used on different scales - 
flexible 
Noisy 
I 
. 
Visible 
Glasgow 
GOOD CHARACTERISTICS BAD CHARACTERISTICS 
Easy to store Ugly - big buildings 
Some of the dams are quiet a tourist 
attraction (e. g. Pitlochry) 
Dangerous (deaths at Barrhead Dam). 
Should be made out of bounds 
Dependable Dams destroy existing landscape/wildlife 
Dams - low maintenance Depends on weather - affected by drought 
Cheap Initially they change the environment for 
miles around 
Reliable 
Fishing - encourages leisure & 
sports 
Not surprisingly, there were similarities between both groups when they 
discussed bad characteristics. For instance, both felt that hydro power generation 
would cause problems because it could destroy the environment - e. g. when 
creating dams and flooding valleys. The groups also felt that hydro was rather 
dependent on climate (although NL felt water was plentiful at present). The New 
Lanark group expressed the opinion that hydro technology could also be noisy 
(possibly because certain members of the group had personal experience of this). 
The Glasgow group felt that hydro could be dangerous and could be unattractive 
(e. g. with big buildings). 
There were interesting differences between groups as to what constituted "good' 
characteristics. The New Lanark group felt it was clean, plentiful, cheap and 
flexible whereas the Glasgow group focused more on the fact it was easy to 
store, low maintenance, and encouraged fishing and tourism. It was strange that 
given New Lanark's position and the fact that the Falls of Clyýe attract a large 
number of visitors per annum, that the New Lanark group did not list this as a 
positive attribute. 
4 
2.2.2. Wind Power 
New Lanark 
GOOD CHARACTERISTIC BAD CHARACTERISTIC 
Aesthetically pleasing Ugly 
Clean Noisy 
Reliable Expensive infrastructure 
Plentiful 
Flexible size 
Glaseow 
GOOD CHARACTERISTIC BAD CHARACTERISTIC 
Environmentally friendly Noisy (depending on the size of the generator., 
Okay if they are out in the sea or the middle of 
nowhere.. say on hills), 
Noise free They vibrate 
Low maintenance Bad for birds and wildlife 
Looks nice in pictures Ugly - blot on the landscape 
Both groups agreed that wind farms could be ugly and noisy., New Lanark also 
felt that the infra-structure of building and maintaining windmills could be 
expensive. Glasgow noted that windmills interferedwith wildlife. Strangely 
enough, members within each focus syndicate also 
' 
felt windmills were 
aesthetically pleasing! The Glasgow group disagreed within itself andstated that 
windmills were noise free. 
Generally, it was felt that wind power was clean, reliable and plentiful. New 
Lanark were also keen on the fact that the technology was flexible and could be, - 
adapted by individual householders as well as on a larger scale. 
2.23. Solar Energy 
New Lanark 
GOOD CHARACTERISTIC BAD CHARACTERISTIC 
Clean Expensive for households to install and maintain 
Flexible Need a big area 
Easilyinstalled What happens in winter? 
Good for households Intermittent 
Personalised Need building regs / impact on the value of your 
property 
Cheap Don't know who owns it 
5 
C-lactynw 
GOOD CHARACTERISTIC BAD CHARACTERISTIC 
Cheap to run Difficult to rely on if it depends on the sun. 
Natural If it's reliant onjust daylight hours you're going' 
to produce less electricity in the winter when you 
need more. 
Panels so each house can Ugly - but you can hide it on roofs 
generate it's own electricity 
Adaptable - it's portable and I-Egh maintenance - do they bum out? 
can be hidden an ere 
Can store small amounts Easily vandalised 
Solar energy possibly prompted most discussion within each session. The New. 
Lanark group felt it would be expensive and to install and maintain (on houses). 
It would also give rise to questions about building regulations, the impact on the 
value of property and indeed the question of who actually owns the panels. In 
contrast the Glasgow group did not express any such concerns but they did think 
the panels looked unattractive (but could be hidden), and could be easily 
vandalised. Both groups believed that there would be some issues regarding the 
lack of sun/daylight in Scotland. There were questions regarding the mechanics 
of the technology. These were answered later in the session. 
Of the positive characteristics there was general agreement that it was a good 
technology because it could be used by individual householders and was 
therefore flexible and cheap. The New Lanark group liked the fact that it may be 
cheap, easily installed and clean. The Glasgow group also liked the fact that it 
was be natural and could be stored. 
2.2.4. Tidal 
New Lanark 
GOOD CHARACTERISTIC BAD CHARACTERISTIC 
Cheap Distribution may be a problem 
Sustainable May have an enviromnental impact 
Good for islands 
- 
Effects wildlife 
Clean tAffects shipping 
Not visible I 
6 
C. Inqcrnw 
GOOD CHARACTERISTIC BAD CHARACTERISTIC 
Endless supply of waves Location - accessibility difficult 
Affects sea life and birds 
Cheap Unemployment - there wouldn't be the same 
amount of people employed to produce and 
maintain or anything like that 
Natural It takes up the seaside and the beach (not that i Scottish beaches are very good - their too cold! ) 
Environmentally friendly Depending on size and nearby beauty spots it 
could be unsightly as well, like a big pontoon, 
floating a ross a beauty spot 
Maintenance - it could be dangerous because it's 
out to sea. Very, very hard to maintain. The very 
fact they're not in general use to a big scale, 
probably Points to that., 
Generally both groups were in agreement that tidal power was good because it 
was cheap, clean, sustainable and environmentally friendly.., 
There was an interesting point of difference in that New Lanark felt that the 
technology was not visible whereas the Glasgow group felt that potentially it 
could ruin existing beauty spots. 
Both sessions agreed that tidal technology could have a detrimental affect on the 
environment and wildlife (also shipping for NL)., Locality was a concern to both, 
groups as it could create distribution and maintenance problems. 
Interestingly, the Glasgow group expressed concern that this technology would 
create unemployment. 
2; 2.5. Waste /Dung 
New Lanark 
GOOD CHARACTERISTICS BAD CHARACTERISTICS 
Gets rid of 'bad' gas Burning causes pollution 
Gas Flaring - better than putting 
waste into rivers 
Needs collecting 
Plentiful Smelly 
Reduces landfill May produce harmful by-products 
May encourage responsibility for 
recycling 
Requires public to be educated 
Reduces collections 
Could produce a good by-product 
7 
ClOQUAW 
GOOD CHARACTERISTICS BAD CHARACTERISTICS 
Reduces the amount of landfills Take up a lot of space 
Makes use of waste Smells 
Encourages responsibility and 
changes attitudes to the 
enviromnent 
Pollutes - burning 
Creates employment Bad for ozone layer 
Cheap Needs separated - needs lots of types of 
bin 
supply Plentiful Smelly 
- Expensive to run 
Both forums expressed fears over pollution problems, smells, harmful by- 
products resulting from waste or dung being burned. New Lanark felt that there 
would be a problem regarding education of the public and Glasgow felt it would 
take up a lot of space, would need a separation system and would consequently 
be expensive to run. 
On the positive side it was felt that it was a good thing to get rid of methane gas 
and reduce the number of landfills. Also positive was the fact that the source was 
plentiful and would encourage individual responsibility for re-cycling. New 
Lanark felt that it would have a positive effect on the health of rivers, as waste 
would no longer be pumped into them (from sewage works). The Glasgow group 
again raised the issue of employment - this time in job creation. 
2.3. Other Technologies Identified by focus groups 
2.3.1. Geothermal Power 
New Lanark 
GOOD CHARACTERISTICS BAD CHARACTERISTICS 
Uses heat from the ground Relatively unknown 
Good to combine with other 
systems 
Costly 
Good for small communities Large amounts of land needed 
Source is free Negative effect on the earth 
Not visible Difficult to install 
It was interesting that half the New Lanark group had heard of this technology 
and even mentioned a scheme in Glasgow but the Glasgow group did not 
mention it. 
S 
23.2. Wood burning 
New Lanark 
GOOD CHARACTERISTICS BAD CHARACTERISTICS 
Recycles waste Burning causes pollution 
Cleans up air Trees new time to grow 
Helps farmers diversify Requires large areas of land 
Trees Changes the ecosystem 
Look good Takes nutrients from the earth/ affects the 
water table 
Education required 
May increase the cost of food and 
detrimentally affect the quality of food (if 
imports increase) 
2.3.2. Fermentation 
Glasgow 
GOOD BAD 
Creates employment Smells 
Uses waste products Needs a lot of space 
Open to abuse 
Expensive 
,7. -i-;; ,'ý, ý-,,, -. ' 
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2.2.1. Results of Sub-Group Valuation Exercise, 
Group 1 New Lanark Percentage Characteristic 
Run of river 20 Water abundant in Scotland, Lots of,,, 
room for several power stations; more 
aesthetic than other systems 
Reservoirs 20 As above 
Wave 10 As above 
Wind 20 Lots of hills and valleys that will 
provide good areas for wind farms 
Biomass 10 Prevents methane hitting the. _ atmosphere and reduces global; 
warming 
Wood 110 Gives employment 
.. n 
Group 2 New Lanark Percentage Characteristic 
Hydro (run of river) 21 Abundant, % 
Tidal 20 Saves pollution,, by-product useful,, 
provides employment, reduces waste 
Biomass 39 Plentiful & clean 
On shore wind power 19 
Solar panels I 
9 
Group 3 Gl!! ýw Percentage Characteristic 
_ Solar power 40 Can be stored, environmentally 
friendly, an be hidden 
Hydro-electric 40 Plenty of rain, scenic, low 
maintenance, fish farms 
Tidal 20 Natural, unlimited supply, cheap 
Group 4 Glasgow Percentage Characteristic 
Solar 75 Cheap, natural, hidden, no effect on 
the environment, cost effective 
Hydro 12.5 Highly efficient, low maintenance, low 
impact on the environment 
Recycling 12.5 Uses natural produce, more access 
ent) for people 
Group 5 Glasgow Percentage Characteristic 
Biomass 50 Re-cyclable, neutral effect on the 
environment 
Hydro-electric 40 Uses what Is available, environment 
recovers from construction 
Photo- voltaic 1 10 1 Makes us aware 
2.2.2. Overall Summary of Valuation Exercise 
Technology NL 11 NL2 I GI G2 I G3 
Hydro 40 121 1 40 12.5 1 40 
Solar 40 75 1 10 
Biomass 10 39 ;0 
Recycling I 
Tidal 20 20 
Wind 20 19 
Wood 10 
The table above surnmarises the results of the rating exercise. Groups of four 
were asked to allocate percentages to the renewable energy sources they felt 
would be most suitable for Scotland. Hydro electricity was chosen by all five 
groups, followed by, solar, biomass and tidal energy. It was interesting that the 
New Lanark groups both selected wind power whereas the Glasgow groups did 
not select this as an option. The Glasgow group also never selected wood burning 
as a desirable renewable energy technology. 
The characteristics that seemed to appeal most to the focus group members were 
abundance, beneficial or neutral effect on the environment, naturalness, 
efficiency and low maintenance. The summary of the individual responses 
summarises this more accurately (see below). 
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2.3. Individual Responses 
2.3.1. Question 'Before this evening, what sources of renewable energy did 
wmi knnw ahmit (n1P.. qqP. liqt)?! ' 
Energy Technology Lanark Focus Group Glasgow Focus Group 
Solar 7 10 
Wind 8 9 
Tidal 5 6 
Hydro 8 9, 
Biomass 3 5 
Methane/Landfill 1 4 
Geothermal 2 1 
Wood I 
Dung 
.I 
Some of the New Lanark group members were well- infbrnýed regarding 
e an renewable energy technologies. Most m, mber'sk'new"abo'ut" solar, win Idd 
hydro technologies followed by tidal and biomass. 
2.3.2. Question 'Following this evening's discussions have you learned 
about other renewable energy alternatives? If yes, please list bclOW0 
Energy Technology Lanark Focus Group Glasgow Focus Group 
Solar I 
Tidal 2 5 
Hydro ýl 
Biomass 3 1. , 1.1 6 
Methane/landfill gas 4 3 
Photo-voltaic 3 
Geothermal 2 
Dung 
Fermentation 
When asked this question, both the Glasgow and Lanark'gro ups seemed to' 
have (prior to the evening's discussions), known least about methan6/landfill 
gas/biomass. Three of the New Lanark members also listed 
only one mentioned solar). Five of the Glasgow group claimed notio, ýýve 
known about tidal and four mentioned fermentation. 
2.3.3. Question 'Before tonight's discussions, which renewable energy'-! '-ý" 
technologies would you have chosen as being I best', for the-, ý, 'ýJ 
0). environment and your community? (please name tw' -1 ý--, ý 
Energy Technology Lanark Focus Group 'Glasgow Focus GroUP 
Solar 2, 
Wind 6' 
Tidal 2 
Hydro 8 8 
Biomass 1 
Fermentation 1 
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The response to this question highlighted some interesting differences 
between the groups. Hydro power was the most popular choice at New 
Lanark and second most popular with the Glasgow respondents. Most 
popular with Glasgow members was solar, Only two respondents in Lanark 
chose this option, preferring instead wind power. 
2.3.4. Question 'Following tonight's discussions have you changed your 
mind? If yes, which renewable energy sources would you now choose- 
and why? ' 
All 8 respondents from the New Lanark group said they would not change their 
minds but 4 said they would now add Biomass/landfill gas to their list. 
in Glasgow, 10 of the 12 respondents said they would not change their minds, 2 
would now consider biomass. One respondent also stated they would consider 
waves following the evening's discussions. 
Energy Technology Lanark Focus 
Group 
Glasgow Focus 
Group 
Abundant 3 6 
Sustainable 2 3 
Cleanliness' 4 2 
Low environmental impact/ 
Environmentally friendly 
3 7 
More localised production I 
Frees society from the grip of multi- 
nationals 
I 
Natural 1 5 
Cheap/Cost efficient 3 5 
Aesthetically pleasing 1 6 
Easy to install 1 
Provides employment 2 
Creates individual and local 
responsibility 
2 
Small scale possible I 
Low maintenance 2 
Efficient 5 
No By-products 2 
Hidden 2 
Doesn't affect wildlife 3 
Easily transported/Storable 2 
There was a tremendous spread of characteristics which members stated were 
important to them. The most popular for the New Lanark group were cleanliness, 
followed in equal measures by abundance, low environmental impact and cost 
efficiency. The Glasgow focus group members favoured first low environmental 
impact followed by abundance and aesthetically pleasing. Also popular was 
naturalness, cost efficiency and efficiency. Interestingly although employment 
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was mentioned more by the Glasgow sub-groups, it was not chosen by any 
individuals as important. 
2.3.5. : 
Question' Given a budget of 100 counters, which renewable energy sources 
wo uld ou invest in personally? 6 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Solar 10 
Wind 30 20 9 19 20 30 10 50 
Tidal 20 12_ 20 10 15 20 
Hydro 30 20 38 21 60 70 50 
Biomass 15 20 40 39 36- 
Methane/landfill 
gas 
15 - 10 
Wood 125 1 1 
Dung 20 1 1 1 
9 10 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Solar 40 20 20 100 20 75 25 20 20 40 25 
Wind 50 
Tidal 20 20 30 20 
Hydro 40 30 60 50 60 12.5 50 40 1 40 25 
Biomass 70 25 40 1 
Methane/landfill 20 12.5 
Fermentation I 1 1 80 
% selected by New 
Lanark 
% selected by Glasgow 
Solar 2 34 
Wind 
. 
26 4 
Tidal 14 8 
H ydro 41 34 
Biomass 20 11 
MethaneALandfill 4 3 
Wood 3 2 
DunR 3 
Fermentation 7 
The top three technologies selected by both group were: 
New Lanark Glasgow 
st Hydro Hydro 
nd 2 Wind Solar (first equal) 
Biomass Biomass 
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Perhaps not surprisingly, the individual results varied from the subgroup 
exercise. Hydro, power came out top with both groups but Glasgow members 
favoured this equally with solar energy. Interestingly, the New Lanark individual 
seemed to favour wind power (followed by biomass) much more than solar - 
energy. 
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APPENDIKI 
Renewable Energy - May 26 
th & 27t",, 2003 
University of Glasgoii ý'': "'"ý1 
Objective. - Tofind out what characteristics or attributes of renewable energy, 
technologies make them more or less desirable to members of the general 
public. 
Potential Issues: 
" Public may not know about the Mi rang'e"of technologi'es'therefoie may 
need some education. Care must be taken to avoid 'leading'. 
" There may be some confusion over what an attribute is - e. g. they may 
not even consider employment as an attribute. 
" There may be a conception that 
' 
alternativ 
'e 
energy sources are to 
'o expensive and cost may present a barrier. It is therefore important to 
stress that there is money for alternative energy sources" from'Scoftish 
Executive. 
The following script is to ensure that both Focus groups are. approached in as 
uniform a manner as possible. 
"The University of Glasgow is conducting a, prýeliminary stiidyt6'determinc 
what characteristics of green energy production are most favourable or 
least favourable to the people of Scotland. This information will be uieful to 
planning boards and local councils in their decision-making process when 
developers of renewable power projects make'applications to build in 
Scotland. This focus group is helping'ide'tify, ' -t d' ''bad ii- opinions about goo or 
characteristics of the different renewable energy'technologies. 
Background 
Electricity is one of the most important products'consumed in modern 
society. With greater knowledge about , 
'our, e'n'viro'nment, 'a"c"riticaI 
characteristic about electricity has become the source of its generation. We 
ask if it is polluting our land, water and air? A66 is th6's6urce'd generation 
depleting or damaging the resources of th e, region or I pl an I et9. ' 
There are many types of technologies that are classified as renew''a, ble". The 
two most important characteristics of thes ,e, techn , ologies'aie that fossil fuels 
or nuclear energy are not used and that the InIa, tu ra I environment i's -not 
depleted or damaged by the conversion of its energy to electricity, for us. 
The Scottish Executive has committed Scotland to significantly increasing its 
renewable power production by the year 2010 England and Wales have also 
made major commitments to increasing their use of green renewable power. 
This goal has been established in an effort to reduce the use of power'plants 
that use fossil fuels (coal and natural gas) to'generate electricity., Fossil fuel 
power plants are a major contributor to global climate change gases, 
commonly known as greenhouse gases or global warming gases. 
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Regardless of the type of renewable technology used, the price of electricity 
sold to businesses and consumers will not be different. Also, taxes will not be 
changed to promote or develop any of these technologies. " 
Part One 
Thefirstpart ofthe evening should be spent establishing pre-existing knowledge 
ofthe group. Care should be taken not to lead the discussion or introduce 
technologies that the group do not name themselves. The reasonfor the project 
should be briefly (see script). This part ofthe evening is designed to make the 
participantsfeel relaxed 
Questions 
1. Name the renewable energy sources you have heard about (Write answers 
on flip chart) 
Questions2 &3 you should cover each named renewable source separately. 
2. If I were to ask you what characteristics of these technologies were good 
what would you say? (It may be useful to give an example such as saying 
that in the traditional world of energy industries such as coal mining a 
good attribute was that it was a major employer). (Write answers on flip 
chart). 
3. What attributes of these technologies are bad? (Write answers on a 
flipchart). Again it may be useful to give an example using say coal - bad 
attributes would be unsightliness of bings, danger, pollution, etc. 
4. As we mentioned earlier (script) the Scottish Executive are going to 
invest a sum of money in alternative renewable energy sources. This will incur a small cost on the price of electricity and taxes but the cost to the 
consumer will be the same regardless of what technology is chosen. I 
would like to get a feel for which technology you favour most of all from list 1. Can'I have a show of hands for (then go down list one by one). 
S. If I was to change the question slightly and ask you which of the 
technologies you would choose if the installation was on your own 
doorstep. Can I have a show of hands for (again go down list) 
Part Two 
This part of the evening can be used to describe the technologies, which 
University of Glasgow want to discuss (power generating from - landfill gases, 
solid waste to recycling, sugar mill co-generation, wave power, solar panels, 
wind mills (sea and land), wood burning). Even if all technologies have been 
covered it would still be useful to summarise the information as there may be 
someone in the group less aware than others. 
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The group should be split in two. The following task should then be described. ', 
'Your group has been asked by the Scottish Executive to invest money in 
alternative energy projects. Your group has been given a budget of 100 
counters to invest it in an number of areas it wishes. Within your group we 
would like you to come to a consensus and allocate this budget where you think 
it will be best spent. You will be given 10 minutes to come to an agreement., 
Onceyou have completed the iask we would like the group to elect a 
spokesperson to ctplain why they made these allocations. ' 
The groups will be given a card to help this process: 
Energy Source Budget Reasons 
x 
y 
z 
A 
Part 3 
Thank you very much for your help this evening; your input has been very; 
greatly appreciated. Before we hand you your envelopes could you please take 
the time to fill in this very short questionnaire. We need certain information fbrý,, 
our records and it would also be very valuable if you could let us have your 
individual thoughts on tonight's discussion. Thank you. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Transcription 
Glasgow University 26 MaV, 2003 
Focus Group I (New Lanark) - Renewable Energy 
MD - What types of renewable energy do you know about? 
Group - Waterpower, wind, solar, geothermal (heat from the earth), tidal, wood, 
macadamia nut shells! 
MD - well that's a waste 
Ari - Put down nuts 
Group - dung, all types of dung, organic waste 
Group - animals? 
MD - like on a big wheel! 
Group - that can be classified as wind and dung! 
Group member A- you can only really put down two - that's the waterpower 
and the wind power in this area. 
Group - what about the sun! 
Group - there's a lot of gas produced by that septic tank at the bottom of the 
village! 
Group member A- well I don't know ... for all we see of the sun! Group member B- you don't need the sun though you just need light, you just 
need daylight. 
Ari - who mentioned solar? What were you envisaging when you said that? 
Group - panels on the roof 
Ari - Okay - like hot water solar? 
Group -I don't know what they do but they are panels on the roof, and they 
catch rays or whatever... whatever the sun does it's converted. 
Group - Because it's not the heat from the sun that ... you don't need sunshine... Ari - well, we'll get into it. 
Group - have we missed any? Any more to add to the list? 
Summary of Renewable Energy Sources Named by the Group 
" Water 
" Wind 
" Solar 
" Geothermal 
" Tidal 
" Wood 
" Nuts/burning waste 
" Dung/organic waste 
" animals 
MD - We'll have to wait. It's only because we want to find out what's in your 
headfirst. I want to draw out the characteristics of each one before we elaborate. 
MD - Characteristics. Take it away from renewable energy. Say we look at coal 
-a good characteristic might be it gives a lot of heat or a lot of employment and 
a bad effect could be as we mentioned already the effect on global warming. So 
the ones (renewable energy sources) that you've brought up, I just want to go 
through them and pull out good and bad characteristics that you can think of. 
We'll go down the list you've given me. 
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Group - plenty of, plenty of water. 
Ari - yes, it's very renewable 
Group - clean 
Ari - what do you mean by clean? Water's clean? 
Group - the fact that it's renewable, it's not, there isn't waste from it. ' So you're 
not producing say sludge from it or muck, fumes... tý, "Iiý_, Iýý- - t' "'! .;:, 
MD -Thanks, we just have to check that we don't put'in our own opinions. 
Group - cheap. The bad side to water would be if you were building a dam and; 
you would probably damage the environment or make it unnatural (likeat 
Pitlochry). Or you would have to fill land, which didn't have water to force it, 
into another place to get the energy. 
Group - You've got plenty of catchment areas in Scotland really when it comes. 
to that aspect of it. Water is always there. Well it is as long as we keep getting 
the rain. Water as against wood fires, where are you'going to get the wood -,. ý,, - 
continually to keep the fires burning to get energy? You're going to run out of, 
forests in no time. Ten years and your going to be scratching your head looking 
for forests, whereas with water it's always there. 
Group - Well it is as long as you keep getting min. I don't think we'll1ever run 
out but we do have droughts. At the moment the gases are changing the climate 
just now so what's to say that we won't be affected and eventually run out: It 
does have that possibility. 
Group - climate is a big factor. And affecting water tables. 
MD - Anything else - good or bad? 
Group - we've only spoke about water in large dams but there's lots'of areas. 
where we could use it more locally. For instance in modem houses you can get' 
conductors on the roof, have got little wheels and can generate enough electricity 
to give you some lighting or heat your water in the house., 
MD - If I say it can be used on different scales would that describe that? 
GOOD BAD ý: - ; ', -ýý '', ý ý;, ý,.; ý ý_, , ý,, ý 
Plentiful -damage the',,, Dams (unnatural 
environment) 
Renewable Large areas maybe flooded 
Clean Reliant on climate 
Cheap Disturbs water tables - 
Used on different scales - flexible Noisy 
Visible 
MD - Okay I won't milk it. The next type is wind. 
Group - What you've got is the hills here for these wind farms. They say they're', 
' 
unsightly but I don't think they're unsightly. Okay stick 1000 up it's gonna be 
unsightly. 
Group 2- But it's the noise they make. The noise if you're beside them.,. -.,:. Group 3- But it would be unsightly if you had that put in your view. For 
instance if you lived in a cottage in the highlands and all of a sudden you jot 10 
wind farms put in front of you, and it's obscuring what you used to see as a'I 
vision. So really it's unsightly in that respect., 
Group 4- But what's more important, the air you breathe or. your environment? 
There's got to be sights. 
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Group - But if you're going to get cheap electricity out of 
it, it's one of these 
things you could grin and bear if you were going to get cheaper electricity. 
Group -I think noise is true of water too - 
if you've got big pipes... 
Group -I must admit when I was going through the 
Lake District and turned the 
comer and the 3 big windmills just hit you.. you know the bit of the road? I think 
it's the most amazing sight. 
MD - You think it's good? 
Group - so architecturally, it's the aesthetic qualities. 
Group - Well if you think of all those pylons that cross the country. I 
don't think 
you can say wind farms are any worse. 
Group - why do they paint them white? It would 
blend in. 
Group - the great thing about Scotland 
is you can place them anywhere. I think 
any industrial estate of more than I Okm I think they should put in a wind turbine., 
Group 2- it doesn't have to be on a hill, they can put them in valleys - you can 
get the wind coming through the valley. 
Group 3- they still need to be properly placed to pick up that. I don't know how, 
easily these are to produce? 
Ari - well you've got to put them where the wind 
is! 
Group - so you've got to consider that. That's the down side - not enough... 
wind dependent. 
Group 2 But it's also, if you're looking at characteristics, it's clean. We can 
maybe argue that it's plentiful., 
Group 3- you are already getting the picture that you can't just work with one 
because of the dependency on the rain and wind and so you would have to have a 
blend. 
Group 4- well that's a thing that's going to have to happen in the future because 
you've got coal, what else.. Nuclear power. You've got them two working 
together which your going to have to phase out... so they're going to have to get 
an alternative just to take their place in the next century. The next 20 -3 0 years. 
Group 5 -can be small as well. I think I've seen something about the size of a 
satellite dish that you can put on your house -a micro-turbine. 
Ari - scalability (in good column) 
Group 6- it's probably more portable than water. Water has to be located in a 
place whereas wind is everywhere. You can't have water next to your house but 
you can have wind. Flexibility. 
Summary of Wind Power 
GOOD BAD 
Aesthetically pleasing Ugly 
Clean Noisy 
Reliable Expensive infrastructure 
Plentiful 
Flexible size 
MD - We'll try and move on. Solar. 
Group - expensive, 
Group 2- do you mean the infrastructure is expensive? 
Group I- well it's the old thing, how do you convince everyone to put panels on 
a house that's already built? Do you lobby people to get builders to put panels on 
every new house that's built? 
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Group 2- it's because the panels arc expensive. The actual'clcctricity generated 
isn't expensive. It's the infrastructure. 
Groups I- it's putting the equipment in and the maintenance of that equipment. 
You know how do you convince people that solar panelsare eI asier to maintain?, 
Certainly in Hamilton there was a large council scheme where they tried and the, 
council didn't bother repairing them. 
Group 2- perhaps that's because the emphasis was 'on a test rather than the 
norm? 
Group I- even so, I am unaware of whether you can have a massive solar farm? 
Solar farms would take up a lot of space to generate the power thatwe need so, 
unless you're putting into individual buildings, properties - it's going to be 
expensive to start up. 
MD -That's your perception that it needs a big area? 
Group- the first place for this is going to be industry it's not going to be 
domestic anyway? 
Group - well you can because you can have photovoltaic cells, photovoltaic tile's" 
on your roof. You don't have to have a huge big solar panel., You can have roof; 
tiles that are solar capturing. 
Group 2- imagine yourself in a house with a sixty grand mortgage. Your not 
going to put them in to save a small bit on electricity your going to need 
legislation. 
MD - If I put this as household solar energy. 
Group -but you still have to pay either on its installation'or consumption.,,, - 
Group 2-I agree with you but very few 'People on modem estates, are going to P. 
have a wind turbine on their estate - they're going'to depend on large'wind farms 
that send power into them. 
MD - I'll come back to the statement that all the fornis will be the same p'nce'to 
the consumer. But I take your point about it if it is'a household., 
Group -a utility company isn't going to come in and wire us all for sound. -,,,! - Group - solar is flexible as well. 
Group 2-I suppose a bad point is that people don't think it's possible here.,. ý,,, 
Group 3- It's the limited supply - which local panels can provide you with. Every program I've ever seen is about new modem house, ý the panel s are there 
and it's going to provide you with enough electricity to maybe heat some water, - or give you night lights. It's not going to give you Power you're still dependent 
on something else. 
Group 4- in Scotland I think there would be a bit'of a hiccup on tt aspect., ha 
Group 5- Annie was saying that you don't actually need sun it's the light. Is that 
right? 
Group 6- the sun's rays are always there. " 
MD - It doesn't have to be blazing sun. 
Group 5- so that's a bit of a red herring. 
MD - It's the perception that we are interested in. '- 
Group -I was under the same impres I sion as you 'you needed sunlight. ý, ý MD- I think Ari will talk abit more about that. 
Group - well I think the panels on your roof are good it fitseasy, it's cheap and it's instantly effective. 
Group 2- but if you go round building control will tell you you've got to have a; 
certain colour of tile on your roofý 
MD - As an individual I suppose you are doing something of your, own choice. 
11) 1 
Ari - Building codes? 
Group - Building regulations. 
Ari - Okay, I'm going to cross the line because it could be both bad and good. 
Group - If you get legislation say from the Scottish Executive that you must have 
it then you're using regs in a good way, but at the moment ... Group - How would the costing structure be like with solar? At the moment if 
you have wind or water which the company would be producing, the solar you're 
producing yourself 
Ari - to actually answer your question, in places, in other countries, in certain 
places in the States, power companies come in and give you $50 / year to put 
them on your roof They collect the power, which happens to go straight into 
your house and then you pay them your regular utility bill. That way you lay out 
nothing but it really belongs to them and they are renting space. 
Group - so is it going to cost you to have solar? 
Ari - the way they're doing it in Scotland - no. 
Group - so that would be cheaper? 
Ari - ultimately though, regardless of which technology, which types of energy 
used, the price you pay for electricity, whether it's a solar or wind, it will cost, 
exactly the same. Because it's green, it will cost the same. A really innovative 
way of managing this, regardless which type of renewable energy is used, the 
price you pay for electricity will be the same. 
Group - so is this a way of saying that if you stop all conventional nuclear forms 
of electricity and they'll stop charging fossil tax? 
Ari - actually, they have done away with the fossil fuel tax. Actually, they've 
suspended it j ust now. Remember, we are j ust talking about renewable. 
Group - there's a change over problem. 
MD - that won't be dealt with 
Ari - we're just talking about the renewable branch. 
Group - well I'm a consumer and for my electricity and gas I have a little meter 
in my house but now you're going to say that all my roof, the panels belong to a 
utility company and maybe come up and service it? 
Ari - I'm not saying that that's going to be the case here. I'm just saying there's 
ways around you paying for the panels yourself. 
MD -I think it's valid to raise that as a concern. Lack of control/ privacy? 
Group - who actually owns it? 
Ari - who owns it. Depending on how you look at it that can be a good or bad. 
Group - it's funny you tend to look at renewable like that - you look at ways you 
can make it yourself You don't think of that with fossil fuel - you don't think I'll have a generator, build my own. But now that all the renewable forms are 
coming up you think 'I couldjust do that myself . Ari - so that's a characteristic. How personal is it? 
Group - would it not be cheaper to produce than the other two? 
MD - well I don't know but that's you're perception so I'll put that down as 
good. It doesn't need to be true but it's a valid perception. 
Group - cheaper for the person who's going to consider the three. 
Summary of Solar Energy 
GOOD BAD 
Clean Expensive for households to install and 
maintain 
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Flexible Need a big area 
Easily installed What happens in winter? 
Good for households Intermittent 
Personalised Need building regs impact on the 
value of your property' 
Chea P Don't know who owns it 
MD - Any more? Okay the next one is geothermal. 
Group - well I think David Ike said the next eruption will be on ihe'Isle of Arrari 
so we should go and buy land over there if there's going to be avolcanic,, 
eruption! 
MD - okay Annie? 
Group- well a bad thing is not many people know about it. - 
MD - who would have known about geothermal or would liýve, cons 
I iderid that? 
Four out of 8. 
Group - using the heat from underground to make power, heat , and electricity., You can use the heat from old mine shafts, if you happen to'have them, and as 
you know, Scotland is riddled with mineshafts. Or y6u'can just dig a trench'a few 
feet deep. The further down you go the higher the t, emoeiatu're I O'degrees f6r 
every 100in or whatever it is you go down. But it"s certainly'not'en'ough to'heat-. '. 
to give you a whole heating system but it can provide enough heat-t6-heat water-' 
to a certain temperature that can help reduce your reliance'on" f6ssil fuels'. - They' 
use it a lot in other countries. There's two geothermal schemes -one in' 
Shettleson in Glasgow and it heats about 40 housesý and another'one in Perth; but' 
they're both quite small but very successful. The Aole p'oint'of them is it's 
combined with a community energy system such as I have to say we haýe in - 
feediýgall of theý house ' '' ý`ý, - ,I"' New Lanark where we have a single boiler S. 
Group 2- well I've worked at 1000 feet underground and I cahfiae'say it Was 
that hot to generate heat. 
Group I- yes but it's surprising how much there is? 
Group 2- no the further you go to the earths cýoie' *the in ore heat you're going to, 
get. 
Group 3- I'm sure that must beinore costly? 
Group 4- the assumption that whatever Maggie is saying is that the price to us, "' 
will be the same. 
Ari - how it's being structured is that your electricity bill'whether'it's f6r'heating 
water or T. V., regardless of whether it's geothermal or wind, -will be the same'. " 
Group - again I think you'd have to be talking about big areas. Againt- I'm not 
that up on geothermal but I'd have thought youieeded.,. ` you know your"' 
saying one of the ways is to have trenches... surely that means ybu'v6 got to 
have lots of trenches and how do you cover up that trench? 
Group 2 -it's just like a tube, a pipe and the heat of the earth warms the water. ý- 
Group I- but your still going to use a large'piece of lafidAt's like building 
house - you have to put the utilities in but at the'end'of the daý you're'probably 
using up the same space but a the end of the day to produce the volumes'you'd 
need I'd have thought you'd need more'space. - 
Group 2- it's another way of pioducing renewýableienergy,, ' it's not a soiution o, n 
it's own. 
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MD -I don't think there's going to be one solution, I think it'll be a combination 
approach. 
Ari - no, not in our lifetime. That's my opinion. They'll be no one solution. It'll 
be a combination. And believe me the needs in say Canada are different from 
Scotland versus Mexico. Actually in all of Scotland it's pretty uniform, unless 
you're in the Highlands. 
Group - would that disturb the balance (in the earth) if you done it on a large 
scale. 
Group - if you take too much heat oM 
Group 2-I mean we're not going to produce our own Mount Vesuvius or 
anything like that? I mean the ones in Glasgow is it actually fires in the mines? 
Group 3- no the one in Shettleson is ... I don't know if they used a mineshaft or 
trenches. I'm not sure 
Group 4- the mineshaft makes you think of the bings, spontaneous combustion. 
Group 3- It's nothing to do with fires it's just the heat. 
MD - how would you summarise this? 
Group -I suppose you could say one of the bad things is that it will never be 
enough on it's own. It's got to be combined. 
Group 2- it's less accessible. 
Group 3- at the moment in this country but it's used widely in others. We're 
way, way behind. Sweden and Scandinavia are way, way ahead of us in terms of 
community heating systems. 
Ari - then you can go to Iceland where they generate mostly al of their electricity 
and heat for free. 
Group - that's another thing. Like the other renewable energy systems, 
essentially the source is free. It's the infrastructure to catch the energy that's 
expensive. 
Ari - yeah the energy source is free almost by definition. 
Group - it's the commitment of the country itself to develop these systems that's 
important. 
Group 2- people here aren't really interested. Theyjust take their gas and 
electricity for granted. They don't know anything about geothermal or solar or 
anything. 
MD - Scott you're our youngest member. In terms or renewable energy have you 
ever heard of geothermal? 
Scott - no never. 
MD - have you heard much about the others? 
Scott - oh yes, solar power we did a lot of at school. 
MD - Good or bad? 
Scott - don't know, never really thought about it! 
Group -a good thing about that is we don't have windmills and people saying 
that's unsightly. 
Ari - not visible 
Group - but then by the same thing it probably takes more effort to put it in. 
MD -I suppose given our ground conditions, it might do in Scotland. Put down 
difficult to install? 
Group - and distributions probably going to be a bit more? 
Group 2- different areas have different types of power. We're talking about say 
take that to Glasgow, that would be costly because the nearest place to draw heat 
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from the ground would be peat fields. But to move that into Glasgow, I don't 
think that would be feasible. Different areas, different types of heat. -, 
Group - is this looking at transportable energy?, ,, "1 11, "1 -1 11. i 
Ari - we are looking at things that ... transportable in that it will either replace 
electricity or be turned into electricity. 
Group - so you don't have to put a pipe on every -street or a windmill on'every, 
house? You can transport it? 
Ari - it's like the system your talking about replaces electricity you use to make 
hot water or it replaces the methane gas boiler. 
Group - but it still going to be electricity. 
arm is: the f Ari - but wind farms, you transport it 100 miles from where 
Group - so we don't have to think of it being round the comer? 
Ari - this is wh this is an issue. As the years go by, almost every y -communityA will have to develop some renewable energy within it'Sown space.;. i,, 
Group - could geothermal be fed into the National grid? 
Ari - no there's no place in Scotland that has hot enough geothermal. - Iceland has 
that but it comes out as blast furnace hot. But this one would replace electricity,,. 
or methane like in your boiler. 
Group - is there an energy that comes off rocks? If you put ultraviolet light on 
rock. If you go to the rock museum there is ... they light up in all different 
colours? 
Group 2- but you're using power to make power. 
Group I-I know but what I'm saying is ý... is that anything'you could use. 
Ari -I don't know anything about it so I'd have to say, 'probably not.,,, 
Summary of Geothermal Power 
GOOD 
Uses heat from the ground Relatively unknown 
Good to combine with other systems Costly 
Good for small communities Large mnounts, of land needed,, - Source is free Negative effect on the earth 
Not visible Difficult to install 
MD - Lets move on. Next is waste., The waste that was mentioned was ding., 
Group - general compost. 
Group 2 -general dung 
Group I- when you say dung do you mean the heat coming off when it- 
decomposes or the gas coming off the dung? 
Group 3-I was talking about in India where they collect all the dung and use it., ' 
in fires. 
Ari - okay, you have two types going on. One is where you bum it, whether it's 
for fire or bum it to create stearn for a turbine and one is as it decomposes,,, 
catching the methane. 
Group - but is that bad for the environment. The effect from the gases from that 
are bad. Smoke fumes bad too. 
Group - tell me is methane released into the air damaging the ozone or is it 
worse if it's burned? 
Ari -this is a question -'is it good or bad that we're burning the gas'. I'll get-, into that 
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Group - it's difficult to collect. 
MD - you just need big 
dung trucks! 
Group - again you would need plenty of 
it. It's plentiful. 
Group - not in my back yard! 
Yes it's plentiful as a household waste. 
Group - if you're burning wood or nutshells, 
it's not releasing any more carbon 
dioxide.. 
mi) - we'll put nuts with wood. 
Group - it's smelly 
Group - it's balanced 
MI) - sorry to skelp on. Anything else? 
Group - has a by-product 
NO - Is that good or bad? 
Group - well it might be good. May be able to spread it on the land afterwards. 
MD - Anything else? 
Group - it reduces landfill. 
Group - reduces collection. 
Group - there would also be more human interaction. We would all have to do 
something. 
Group 2- you would need education. You would have to put the products in to, 
what's good for waste and what's not good for waste. So we'd have to take more 
responsibility. 
Group - it might be good or it might be bad because some people may not take 
on that responsibility. 
Group 2- you would need legislation. Animal and human waste will always be 
there but consumer waste has to be reduced. Very soon they're going to reduce 
the number of landfills dramatically in the next couple of years. 
Summary of Waste as Renewable Energy 
GOOD BAD 
Gets rid of 'bad' gas Burning causes pollution 
Gas Flaring - better than putting waste 
into rivers 
Needs collecting 
Plentiful Smelly 
Reduces landfill May produce hannful by=products 
May encourage responsibility for 
recyclin 
Requires public to be educated 
Reduces collections 
Could_produce a good by-product 
MD - Woods and nuts next 
Group - bad smoke. We older folk remember when you couldn't see your hand 
in front of your face when you were burning fossil fuels. Smoke, smog, ill health. 
Group 2- they're actually using waste, chipped waste wood in commercial 
energy production. 
Ari - less waste? Useful waste? 
Group - recycling waste. 
Group - not encouraging farmers to grow strips of willow to bum? 
Group - has to be replanted. Regeneration. 
Group 2- the trees that you plant are going to soak up a lot if the smoke. 
Group 3- they produce more oxygen 
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Ari cleaner air? 
Group - it takes time 
Group 2-I just remember when they brought in smokeless fuel and thank god! 
In Hamilton and round about Motherwell where you had the steel works the, 
smogs were a nightmare and the flues you got in winter through smog were. 
dreadfal. 
Group 3- you'd need plenty of it. T: t, 
Ari - is that good or bad? Who's going to grow it? 
Group - well exactly, again it's area. You need large areas so who grows it? 
Group - it helps farmers diversify. 
Ari - is that good or bad? 
Group - it's good. 
Ari - so it's good and creates unemployment 
Group - someone mentioned willow because it grows very fast, okay so if you 
have to grow a particular species of tree will it change the. eco-system. '- Also, 
would it affect the water table? 
Group - it would be a drain on the soil if you keep planting, 
Group 2- again, people don't know about it., There's not enough knowledge',,,., 
about all of these. It's education, education, education.,.., 
Ari -just last week the Scottish Executive allocated 2.25. million pounds for a, 
several year education programme on renewable energy. - 
Group - but was there not a wood plant built but was closed down just for the,,.,.. 
want of 3 million pounds? 
Group - it might reduce our edible food. If farmers get money to plant wood, 
trees then the agriculture will not be balanced so there may be less food. -i ,,,: 1, .1, "' Group - so food costs may go up because we have to import food from abroad. 
Group - also health because there would be more treatment to the food, which, ". 
means it wouldn't be fresh anymore, which means we'd get sick. 
Group -I don't know if we would allow it to become an issu'e'whereby 
wouldn't be producing food 
Group 2- we don't even eat our own lamb. 
Summary of Wood as Renewable Energy 
GOOD BAD 
Recycles waste Burning causes pollution 
Cleans up air Trees new time to grow,, 
Helps farmers diversify Requires large areas of land. - i 
Trees Changes the ecosystem 
Look good Takes nutrients from the earth/ affects, 
the water table. - ýý --, f ,, r. ý. ý,, 1ý -ý -1,1, ý Education required 
May increase the cost of food and 
detrimentally affect the quality of food 
(if imports ncrease) 
MD - I'm going to stop you there and 6nd on tidal., 'i 
Group - wave power. It's paddles underneath. 
Group - free, plentiful, totally sustainable 
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Group - the bad side of that is probably the transportation from the very edges of 
a country. So distribution is probably going to be an issue there. 
Ari - again that's a cost issue for Scottish Power to worry about 
Group - it suits Britain because we are an island 
Group - out of our visibility.. mostly 
Group 2- would it affect shipping? 
Ari - sure and fishing... use of the ocean 
Group - swimming! 
Group 2- not good for animals as it disturbs their habitats 
MD - Animals like: 
Group - nesting birds, the algae round the coast that the shellfish depend on 
Ari - wildlife and environment 
Group -I don't think it would have that big an effect on wildlife. 
Group 2- if you were a seal and you went past a big mechanical paddle that took 
you head off you'd maybe think differently! 
Group 2-I thought these things just went up and down. 
Group I- but it's an amazing amount of power you're talking about there. I 
don't know what speed they go up and down at. 
Group 2- what's going to happen if you have a big diesel-spewing machine on 
your coastline? , 
Group 3- it's not going to be spewing diesel! 
Group I-I don't know, how are you going to lubricate the machines? 
Group 2- water will lubricate nylon. 
Summary of Tidal as a Renewable Energy Source 
GOOD BAD 
Cheap Distribution may be a problem 
Sustainable May have an enviromnental impact 
Good because we are an island Effects wildlife 
Clean Affects shipping 
Not visible 
MD - Since we're on to specifics, we might as well get Ari to fill in the gaps and 
talk in more depth about some of the issues you've raised. 
MD - Could I have a simple show of hands - if you had to choose one of these (as an individual) which one would it be? 
Five voted for HYDRO and three for WIND. 
MD - If I were to change the question slightly, and say that it would be on your 
doorstep, would you change your vote? - One person did and changed from 
WIND to HYDRO. 
Presentation by Ari (not transcribed) 
Groups split into three groups of 2. 
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MA -I want you to imagine if you had a budget of LIOO - what energy types 
would you invest your money in? What characteristics do you like about 
these technologies. "--.,, ý,,., -, 
Group I New Lanark 
Run of river 20 Vater abundant in 
Scotland, Lots of room'k, *, 
for several power, -, 
stations, 'more aesthetic'ý 
than other systems 
Reservoirs 20 As above 
Wave 10 'As above, 
Wind 20 Lots'of hills and valleys 
that will provide good 
areas for wind farms- 
Biomass 10 Prevents methane hitting 
the'atmosphere'and 
reduces global'waimin&`ý 
Wood 10 ._ Gives employment;, -' 
:! 
Group 2 New Lanark Plentiful& clean 
Hydro (run of river) 21 Abundant 
Tidal 20 Saves pollution,, by- 
product useful, I 'provides 
employment, reduces 
waste 
Biomass 39 Plentiful & clean 
On shore wind power 19 
Solar panels I 
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Transcription 
Glasgow University 27 Ih May, 2003 
Focus Group 2 (Glanow) - Renewable Enemv 
MD - What types of renewable energy do you know about? 
Group - wind, waves, solar, hydro 
MD - What do you mean by hydro? 
Group - in dams using gravity, rivers 
MD - Any more? 
Group - recyclable waste 
MD - What do you mean by that? 
Group - domestic and municipal waste. Household trash. 
MD - Anything else? 
Group - animal waste, dung 
Ari - what were you envisaging when you said 'solar'? 
Group - well you hear so much about solar power that can create energy. 
Ari - okay so you are talking about 'photovoltaic that go straight from sunlight to 
electricity? 
Group - yes 
Group - what about the other solar energy that heats water and comes through 
panels? You could use that to heat houses. 
Ari - so you've got solar for photovoltaic, which is straight for electricity and 
solar hot water heating. 
NID - Any more? 
Group - alcohol 
MD - What I want you to think about is what characteristics of each type of 
energy are either good or bad. We'll do it in the order you've given me: 
WIND POWER 
GOOD BAD 
Environmentally friendly Noisy (depending on the size of the 
generator. Okay if they are out in the 
sea or the middle of nowhere.. say on 
hills) 
Noise free They vibrate 
Low maintenance Bad for birds and wildlife 
Looks nice in pictures Ugly - blot on the landscape 
The group acknowledged there were crossovers - eg. one person noted that 
there would befluctuating energy production (which would be bad) but 
another group member noted that this was okay as when there was a lot of 
energy created (on a windy day), it would be cold and more energy would be 
used and vice-versa. 
Group - would the power produced from wind farms be stored? 
Ari -I will make one statement - with wind farms You can't store energy- 
Group - is that why there's so many together and not just one alone? 
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Ari - it Is easier to maintain 60 of them at once than say 60 in 10 
different spots., 
So it's easier running them like a factory than spreading them all over the place. 
If they were individually placed they would probably be more pleasing., I ý, It 
WA XM T)tlW'PT? 
GOOD BAD 
Endless supply of waves Location -, accessibility difficult 
Affects sea life and birds;,. - ", ': 
Cheap Unemployment - there wouldn't be the 
same amount of people employed to -ý -; 
produce and maintain or' a nything like 
, that' 
Natural It takes up the seaside and the beach 
(not that Scottish beaches are very 
good - their too cold! ) 
Environmentally friendly Depending on size and nearby beauty'. 
spots it could be unsightly as well, like 
a big pontoon floating across'a beauty 
spot 
Maintenance -it could be dangerous 
because it's out to sea. Very, very hard 
to maintain. The very fact they're not, 
in general use to a big scale probably_ 
points to that. 
Group - What about when the sea's really rough or really calm? How is it' 
affected by the natural ebb and flow? 
Ari - It depends on the types of wave power you're talking about. 
MA - We'll just say it varies because what I'm trying to do is get what's in your 
head 
Just now and Ari will fill in any gaps. 
SOLAR 
GOOD BAD 
Cheap to run Difficult to rely on if it depends on the; 
sun. 
Natural If it's reliant onjust daylight hours 
you're going to produce less electricity 
in the winter when"you need more - ----- Panels so each house can generate it's Ugly - but you can hide it on roofs 
own electricity - 1 1: t ''I I-ý ; --- Adaptable - it's portable and can be lEgh maintenance do they bum outT, 
hidden anywhere 
Can store small amounts Easily vandalised 
Group questioned about whether sun was needed to generate power. 
r -and th6 other' Ari - it depends on the type. One is solar hot wate' o"n'6 is the, 
photovoltaic. 
Group - does it store up what can't be used? How does it work at night? 
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Ari - again it depends. With solar-hot water yeah you can store the hot water 
in a 
boiler or cistern. Electricity - again it can be stored in batteries but it depends on 
how much.. yeah you can store a small amount in batteries. 
MA - When we talked about hydro before we noted there were two types - one, ' 
using reservoirs the other a river. 
Ari - there are two major types of hydro. One is the traditional (where I come 
from) where you have a dam and you control and store the water then release it 
when you need energy. Then there's what you call run of river where during the 
daily flow you siphon off a little bit and run it through a turbine and it goes right 
back into the river. So you don't store the water - you just use it as it flows each 
day. Scotland has both types already - big and small. So you just have to be clear 
which one you're envisaging 
HYDROPOWER 
GOOD BAD 
Easy to store Ugly- big buildings 
Some of the darns are quiet a tounst 
attraction (e. g. Pitlochry) 
Dangerous (deaths at Barrhead Dam). 
Should be made out of bounds 
Dependable Dams destroy existing 
landscape/wildlife 
Dams - low maintenance Depends on weather - affected by 
drought 
Cheap Initially they change the environment 
for miles around 
Reliable 
Fishing - encourages leisure & sports 
RECYCLABLE WASTE 
GOOD BAD 
Reduces the amount of landfills Take up a lot of space 
Makes use of waste Smells 
Encourages responsibility and changes 
attitudes to the enviromnent 
Pollutes - burning 
Creates employment Bad for ozone layer 
Needs separated - needs lots of types 
of bin 
At this stage recording stopped but the group responses to the next two 
renewable energy sources was noted. 
ANIMAL DUNG 
GOOD BAD 
Cheap Smelly 
Plentiful supply Expensive to run 
Creates employment 
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FERNM-NTATION 
GOOD BAD 
Creates employment Smells 
Uses waste products Needs a lot of space 
Open to abuse 
Expensive 
MA - If I were to ask you to vote for one vAx of renewable energy,: whichwould 
you vote for?: 
SOLAR -5 votes 
HYDRO -6 votes 
FERMENTATION -I vote 
MA - If I was to say that whatever you chose would- end 
I up next - to "I yI ou would 
you change your mind? 
No one changed his or her mind. 
Presentation by Ari (not transcribed) 
Groups split into three groups of 4. 
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MA -I want you to imagine if you had a budget of LIOO - what energy types 
would you invest your money in? What characteristics do you like about 
these technologies. 
Group I Glasgow Percentage Characteristic 
Solar power 40 Can be stored (solar-hot 
water), environmentally 
friendly, can be hidden 
Hydro-electric 40 Plenty of rain, scenic, low 
maintenance, fish farms 
for eating 
Tidal 20 Natural, unlimited 
I supply, cheap 
-j 
Group 2 Glasgow Percentage Characteristic 
Solar 75 Cheap, natural, hidden 
from people, no effect on 
the environment, cost 
effective (both types of 
solar) 
Hydro 12.5 1-fighly efficient, low 
maintenance, low impact 
on the environment. Both 
types of h dro 
Recycling 12.5 Uses natural produce, 
more access 
(involvement) for people 
Group 3 Glasgow Percentage Characteristic 
Biomass 50 Re-cyclable, neutral 
effect on the environment 
Hydro-electric 40 Uses what is available, 
environment recovers 
from construction, 
aesthetically pleasing, 
freely available 
Photo- voltaic 10 Makes us aware of 
energy uses because you 
know it is not an infinite 
supply 
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APPENDIX III 
University of Glasgow., ý 
Renewable Energy Te6nologiies' 
Name: 
I Date of Birth: -I 
Home Address: 
Telephone No: 
Individual Responses 
3. Before this evening, %vhat sources of renewable energy did you know 
about (please listP: 
4. Following this evening's discussions have you learned about other 
renewable energy alternatives? If yes, please list below: 
5. Before tonight's discussions, which renewable energy technologies would 
you have chosen as being 'best' for the environment and your, 
community? (please name two): 
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AD 
6. Following tonight's discussions have you changcd your mind? If yes, 
which renewable encrgy sources would you now choosc and %%hy? 
7. Given a budget of 100 counters, which renewable energy sources would 
you invest in personally? (please use the below table). 
Energy Source Budget Reasons 
x 
y 
z 
Q 
A 
Please hand completed responses to your presenter and collect 
payment. 
I have received payment of L20: 
Sip-nature: 
Date: 
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